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Th e Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-
proﬁ t, non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is 
to propose policies that bring about steady economic 
growth at high employment and reasonably stable 
prices, increased productivity and living standards, 
greater and more equal opportunity for every citizen, 
and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have the 
approval of trustees on the Research and Policy 
Committee. Th is committee is directed under the 
bylaws, which emphasize that “all research is to be 
thoroughly objective in character, and the approach 
in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the 
general welfare and not from that of any special politi-
cal or economic group.” Th e committee is aided by a 
Research Advisory Board of leading social scientists 
and by a small permanent professional staﬀ .
Th e Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending speciﬁ c legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. Th e research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the ﬁ eld under study. 
Th e full Research and Policy Committee participates 
in the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the 
trustees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve 
or disapprove a policy statement, and they share with 
the Research and Policy Committee the privilege of 
submitting individual comments for publication.
Th e recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. Th ey are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staﬀ  members, or others 
associated with CED.
Responsibility For CED Statements On National Policy
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Preface
CED’s interest in the interaction and interdependence 
of business and society and the development of more 
socially conscious corporate leaders started with 
its founding in 1942.  CED policy statements on 
corporate governance issues since 2006 have analyzed 
ﬁ rst, how corporations could regain the public’s trust 
in the wake of corporate scandals and compensation 
unrelated to performance, and second, how corporate 
directors could promote the long-term enduring quali-
ties of their enterprises rather than give in to ﬁ nancial 
market “short-termism.”   
Th is report examines how these eﬀ orts to build public 
trust and long-term value have coalesced to encourage 
many large, global corporations to pay greater attention 
to their longer-term interests by striking a balance 
between short-term commercial pursuits and such 
societal concerns as the environment, labor standards, 
and human rights.  Many companies have also found 
ways to turn such concerns as the eﬀ ects of climate 
change and other environmental damage into proﬁ table 
commercial opportunities.  Th is report also explores 
how all corporate boards could take a more active part 
in considering such issues and improving the reporting 
of ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial measures of corporate 
performance broadly conceived.  
Th e recommendations of this report are oﬀ ered to 
stimulate debate within the corporate community.  Our 
intent is not to call for speciﬁ c change but to encourage 
corporate leaders to contemplate our recommenda-
tions and adapt them to their unique circumstances.  
In accord with this purpose, companies identiﬁ ed in 
illustrative case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 were asked 
if they wanted to correct any factual errors or provide 
a short statement or comment related to the issues.  
ExxonMobil Corporation’s statement can be found at 
the end of this report (page 55) and in footnotes on 
pages 37-39.  We are grateful to ExxonMobil for their 
cooperation.
Th is report and our two previous reports  taken 
together give a comprehensive and up-to-date survey 
of the potential contributions of boards of directors to 
improving overall corporate performance.  Empowered 
boards can ensure that corporate strategy builds lasting 
value by addressing key shareholder and societal con-
cerns.  In our view, directors could do more with their 
current authority to motivate managements to greater 
innovation, and to support managements in ﬁ nding 
long-term value solutions to the numerous economic 
and societal pressures they face.  
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1Th e ﬁ nancial crisis, which became evident in 
September 2008, transformed U.S. ﬁ nancial markets 
and provided a painful reminder of the conﬂ ict that can 
occur between private-sector actions and public goals.  
A root cause of the crisis was the excessive risk taken 
by almost all market participants—corporate execu-
tives, money managers, rating agencies, investment 
intermediaries, bankers, and investors—to achieve 
short-term results that temporarily beneﬁ ted their 
businesses and themselves at the expense of their own 
long-term interests and those of their shareholders, 
employees, other linked businesses, and the nation as a 
whole.  Of course, government regulators, some home 
buyers, and others who overextended credit purchases 
also share responsibility.  
Although the crisis started in the ﬁ nancial services 
sector, our focus in this report is not on ﬁ nancial 
services or capital markets as such.  Our focus is on 
corporate governance and the vital role directors can 
play in mitigating the types of pressures that created 
the crisis.  “Rebuilding Corporate Leadership” is best 
understood in the context of our previous reports on 
regaining public trust in the wake of Enron and other 
scandals and how corporate directors could promote 
the enduring qualities of their enterprises.*
It is clear to us that the underlying patterns of behav-
ior—rooted in short-sighted and self interested behav-
iors—exist across all industries.  A well-functioning 
board can govern the corporation and its management 
by supporting a CEO who is doing the right thing for 
the sustainability of the business, while checking the 
excesses and other mistakes of one who is overly short 
sighted, self interested, or conﬂ icted.
Starting in 2002, the CED Subcommittee on 
Corporate Governance and Capital Markets has met 
to propose ways by which to restore conﬁ dence and 
trust in American corporations and their leaders by 
encouraging enlightened statesmanship in accounting, 
corporate governance, other board and management 
practices, and, as important, the strategic thinking 
of corporate leaders.  Public corporations are the 
driving force of the U.S economy.  Th ey are the core 
of a system unsurpassed in creating jobs, income, and 
wealth, and in delivering a wide choice of goods and 
services.  Corporate leaders should understand it is in 
their self interest to engage responsibly with the society 
around them.  Th ey must ﬁ nd an appropriate balance 
between generating short-term proﬁ ts and building for 
the future, because sustainable proﬁ ts come only from 
long-term investment and strategy.  
Th is statement is meant to promote discussion; its recom-
mendations are advisory.  We encourage corporate leaders 
to put the long-term health of their enterprises at the 
forefront of their numerous priorities, by paying greater 
attention to how their business strategies interact with 
the societal environment that shapes their corporations’ 
long-term performance and sustainability.  Aligning the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders with the 
long-term interests of society will generate vibrant and 
successful entities that will help to regain the public's trust.
Our focus is on the potential contributions boards of 
directors can make to improve corporate strategy and 
long-term performance.  Directors generally have been 
reluctant overseers of their corporations.  Before the 
corporate scandals associated with Enron, WorldCom, 
and others, directors too frequently deferred to “imperi-
al CEOs.”  Th e Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other reforms 
put greater emphasis on the responsibility of indepen-
dent directors to counter the CEO’s inherent power.  
But many directors have interpreted those reforms 
solely in terms of ﬁ duciary loyalty to shareholders and, 
consequently, to the maximization of short-term share 
value, despite the diversity of shareholder interests and 
the transitory membership of that group. For many 
Rebuilding Corporate Leadership:
How Directors Can Link Long-Term Performance with Public Goals
Executive Summary
* Private Enterprise, Public Trust: Th e State of Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley; and Built to Last: Focusing Corporations on 
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2directors, the daily share price has come to represent 
the success or failure of a board’s ability to represent 
shareholders’ interests.  But shareholders will not 
prosper long when other groups linked to the health of 
the corporation—broadly, society—do not also thrive.  
Directors have a legal obligation and duty to address 
the long-term performance of the corporation.  
Directors’ ﬁ duciary duties include broader societal 
concerns that aﬃ  rmatively aﬀ ect the corporation’s 
performance and long-term sustainability.  To meet 
that duty, directors must consider the concerns of 
all—not just current shareholders, managers, or 
other powerful constituents—who are in a position 
to aﬀ ect a company’s long-term performance.  In 
today’s environment, boards must know that they are 
empowered to reject actions that produce only short-
term ﬁ nancial results at the expense of the long-term 
interests of the corporation.  Compensation policies, 
for example, should not be designed to promote 
purely short-term share price enhancement.  
Many corporate leaders—directors and CEOs—have 
found that a principled, long-term view fosters greater 
appreciation of the interdependence between the 
corporation and the society in which it operates.  Th ese 
individuals are leading the development of business 
strategies that take account of societal challenges as a 
means to ensure their corporations’ and society’s long-
term prosperity.  Although many boards remain behind 
the curve, a number of forward-thinking directors seem 
willing if not eager to consider shareholder resolutions 
that encourage action to abate climate change, disclose 
environmental risks, or incorporate human rights best 
practices.   As important, some are speaking out to urge 
U.S. political leaders to repair their broken systems so 
they can begin to solve long-term societal problems 
that hamper business as well as society’s other con-
stituents.  But too few business or political leaders are 
following these paths, and talk about business and 
society interaction far outpaces action.  
Our central conclusion is that corporate boards 
and the leaders they select must integrate relevant 
societal concerns, such as environmental and human 
rights considerations, into corporate strategy to 
strengthen long-term competitiveness and the 
sustainability of both the corporation and the society 
in which it exists.  A successful framework requires 
that societal and business leaders view and treat each 
other as partners, not adversaries.  Th eir actions 
and public communications should recognize their 
interdependence and shared goals. 
Recommendations
Th is report is addressed primarily to America’s corpo-
rate directors.  Individual directors and the boards they 
compose can make an enormous diﬀ erence by motivat-
ing management to identify and execute long-term 
value solutions to the economic and social pressures 
their businesses face.  
In summary, our major recommendations are as 
follows: 
• Th e board of directors has ultimate responsibil-
ity for the performance of the corporation.  
Directors have an obligation to act as stewards 
of the corporation’s long-term economic health.  
Th ey should widen the purview of their delibera-
tions to give weight to societal issues that impact 
the ﬁ rm’s longer-term performance.  (p. 26)
• Our basic recommendation with regard to 
societal issues is not a “one-size-ﬁ ts-all” solu-
tion.  As each corporation is unique, each will 
have unique societal issues that may impact 
its performance.  Th ese should be the board’s 
concern.  Our recommendation is simply that 
boards should play an active role in encouraging 
company management to evaluate the options 
available and to decide explicitly what it ought 
to do, based on sound business grounds that 
incorporate a longer-term view.  Once a decision 
has been made and justiﬁ ed, the board should 
monitor implementation and continue to evalu-
ate the company’s strategy on the basis of long-
term costs and long-term beneﬁ ts. (p. 32)
• Directors regularly should consider how the 
company plans, manages, and communicates 
its interaction with society.  Th e board should 
insist that management report regularly to it 
and to the public on non-ﬁ nancial performance, 
including social performance.*  To institutional-
ize the process, the board may want to establish 
a special committee or empower its governance 
committee to take responsibility for oversight.  
Th at committee should report to the full board 
and appear regularly on its agenda.  (p. 28)
3• Directors should recognize the value of corpo-
rate communication with shareholders and the 
public on issues that bear on the company’s repu-
tation and brand value, even when such commu-
nication may not be required by regulation or ﬁ t 
neatly into ﬁ nancial disclosure formats.  Boards 
that have a non-executive chair or lead director 
may want to consider a communications role for 
that person on such issues and topics.  (p. 32)
• Directors should promote honesty in reporting 
not only on ﬁ nancial results and other non-
ﬁ nancial aspects of their company’s operations, 
but also on the risks, opportunities and results 
of its social interactions.  Such reporting should 
show how the company evaluates the long-term 
impact of potential costs and beneﬁ ts.  But aside 
from mandated environmental and labor report-
ing to government regulatory agencies, corporate 
“sustainability” reporting should remain within 
the purview and at the discretion of individual 
companies (as they exercise their responsibility 
for honest and full communication with share-
holders).  Directors should use their authority to 
help their companies ﬁ nd a ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c way to 
communicate eﬀ ectively with shareholders and 
the public—through the regular annual report 
to shareholders, in a separate public report, or in 
some other way.  (pp. 33-34)
• Th e CEO is mainly responsible for carrying 
out the board’s directions.  When choosing a 
CEO, the board’s selection committee should 
be mindful of the role that person will play in 
setting the tone and direction of the company 
with regard to ethics, integrity, and engagement 
with shareholders and other interested parties.  
Boards should tie a portion of CEO and senior 
management’s performance compensation to 
metrics based on the corporation’s performance 
on such concerns.  (pp. 28 and 29)
Interdependence of Business and Society
Th e current paradigm that shapes the way that many 
business and political leaders and the general public 
think about the relationship between business and 
society is overly narrow and oppositional.  Th is conven-
tion views the role of business solely as the maximi-
zation of proﬁ ts. While those engaged in business 
understand the good that comes from the proﬁ t motive, 
many in the public and in politics see the pursuit of 
proﬁ t as feeding individual greed at the expense of 
society.  Th ey perceive private and public interests to be 
engaged in a zero-sum contest for resources and power.  
Th e recent turmoil and government intervention in 
ﬁ nancial markets has exacerbated these perceptions.
Our preferred framework recognizes that the interests 
of society and business are not mutually exclusive: they 
are interdependent; their goals are linked; and they 
should be seen in positive-sum terms.  Our society 
depends on corporations to innovate and invest, 
thereby improving living standards, creating jobs and 
wealth, and providing social goods.  Corporations, too, 
depend on society.  At the most fundamental level, 
society establishes and secures property rights and 
provides the environment in which businesses can 
exist.  An excellent and equitable education system 
is needed to provide a productive and innovative 
workforce.  Intelligent policies towards land, water, 
energy, transportation, communication, health care, and 
other concerns are needed to sustain the environment, 
improve commerce, and maintain a vibrant society.  An 
eﬀ ective and equitable system of justice keeps all parties 
productively engaged in the pursuit of the common 
good and protects property and other economic rights.  
It is without question in each corporation’s interest to 
sustain the society in which it operates.
We recognize that there are practical limits to any 
corporation’s ability to fulﬁ ll societal needs—individual 
companies cannot do everything.  Neither can they 
ignore their proﬁ t-making responsibilities.  Surely 
government must play a prominent role in setting 
the public agenda and rules of fair competition that 
support, rather than undermine, far-sighted business 
statesmanship (as discussed below). 
Yet, failure of corporations to shift to an approach—
based on substance, not image—that recognizes their 
interdependence with the societies around them will 
further increase public cynicism toward business, erode 
society’s already diminished trust in, and support of, 
corporations and their leadership, and invite more bur-
densome regulation.  Such results are in the interests of 
* Of course, these need not be the same reports, but public reporting must be truthful and easily understood.
4neither business nor society.  Society overall is already 
poorer and less able to address its needs because 
business has not been suﬃ  ciently engaged in helping to 
ﬁ nd solutions to problems culminating in the late-2008 
ﬁ nancial crisis.  Business risks losing its “license to 
operate,” imperils its access to needed physical, human, 
and ﬁ nancial resources, and invites ever greater scrutiny 
and more stringent regulation through excessive atten-
tion to short-term self interest.  
The Role of the Board of Directors
Boards should spend more productive time considering 
long-term sustainability, which means ﬁ nding practical 
ways—through production, research and development, 
investment, marketing, communications, human re-
sources development, and other processes—of carrying 
out a strategy that includes the interaction between the 
corporation and society.  
Many directors are uncertain about the validity of 
societal and other non-shareholder concerns and how 
such concerns interact with corporate performance.  
But recent research indicates that how a corpora-
tion engages societal issues is a signiﬁ cant factor in a 
company’s performance.  Investors and analysts are 
increasingly using such evaluations to allocate capital.  
Th at does not mean that other corporate constituents 
any more than shareholders should determine company 
policies; that social considerations should trump 
hard-headed business analysis; or that the corpora-
tion should be viewed as an arm of government or an 
instrument of social policy.  It does mean, however, 
that boards must pay greater attention to how societal 
concerns aﬀ ect the corporation while continuing to 
keep an eye on traditional ﬁ nancial criteria. 
Boards are uniquely positioned to make sure that the 
long-term interests of the corporation are not lost 
or sacriﬁ ced to the pressures of daily business activ-
ity.  Successful boards will help the CEO to balance 
short-term and long-term goals. Boards can serve as a 
buﬀ er between the CEO and market forces that make 
unhealthy short-term practices diﬃ  cult to resist.  Th ey 
should support—and protect—CEOs and other senior 
managers who take the long-term view.
Because each corporation has a stake in the health and 
welfare of the society in which it operates, its directors 
cannot aﬀ ord to ignore that social environment.  Nor 
can they ignore the welfare of key groups, such as 
employees, whose interests bear on the wealth-creating 
potential of the corporation.  
Additional Considerations
In the course of our deliberations, we examined several 
related critical issues.
First, we examined some practical cases where corpora-
tions have had to confront directly environmental and 
human rights issues.  Th e examples we analyze, in the oil 
industry with respect to climate change and in internet 
technologies with respect to human rights, illustrate 
the diﬃ  cult problems companies face and the types 
of responses they have developed.  Th ese examples 
demonstrate that companies cannot avoid confronting 
hard questions regarding environmental, human rights, 
and other societal concerns, and that no one answer ﬁ ts 
every circumstance. Whether decisions are made after 
considerable deliberation or in the heat of a moment, 
business decisions that intersect with societal interests 
can reverberate in unexpected ways.  Th e importance 
of such decisions both to the society in which a 
business operates and to the business itself should 
command the attention of corporate directors.  
Next, we addressed the question of whether privately held 
corporations that are owned by private equity companies 
face the same societal pressures as their publicly held 
counterparts.   We found, unsurprisingly, that the 
actions of private ﬁ rms are subject to the same market 
forces and bound by the same social considerations 
(including government regulation) as large, public 
corporations.  Of course, private-equity-owned ﬁ rms 
diﬀ er from public corporations on a number of ac-
counts: disclosures, access to funding, executive com-
pensation, shareholder/ownership rights, and investors’ 
liquidity, to name a few.  But these diﬀ erences neither 
protect private ﬁ rms from market competition nor free 
them from exposure to societal concerns.  In fact, like 
their public counterparts, market forces, pressure from 
non-governmental organizations, and “enlightened self 
interest” work to nudge some of these private ﬁ rms 
toward a more operational and sustained integration of 
social issues with company strategy.  Others, of course, 
remain resistant to change or ﬂ y under the radar of 
social monitors.  
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equity-owned businesses must become more adept 
at incorporating societal concerns into strategic 
frameworks and business plans.   For private ﬁ rms, 
which currently are not compelled to disclose as much 
information as public ﬁ rms, greater voluntary disclo-
sure of their activities might serve as a starting point.  
Finally, what is the proper division of responsibility 
between business and government?  Shouldn’t govern-
ments take primary responsibility for addressing societal 
concerns?  
Government plays many economic roles in market 
capitalist systems.  Among them are: promotion of 
macroeconomic growth and stability; maintenance 
of social equity in the distribution of income; and 
regulation of market competition.  Most relevant to the 
issues addressed in this report, governments generally 
supplement markets by providing public goods and 
compelling private entities to account for the costs they 
impose on society—the two primary concerns that 
corporations are increasingly called upon to address.  
Clearly, government must establish and enforce social 
policies in these areas. Normally, the business role 
is to obey local laws and regulations.  But laws and 
regulations typically set minimum standards.  Many 
businesses, especially global corporations, often exceed 
these minimum standards.  In advanced economies, 
like the United States, the pressure to exceed regula-
tory minimums is strongest when it appears that 
government policies lag behind societal attitudes.  For 
example, U.S. environmental policy, to many observers, 
has not caught up with societal concerns about the 
risks of climate change.
In the U.S. context, a lack of trust in political institu-
tions undermines social progress and shifts public 
demands from political leaders to business leaders.  A 
better outcome would be one where political institu-
tions could be relied upon to address intelligently 
public concerns and close the gap between social expec-
tations and government policies.  Elsewhere, CED has 
addressed the problem of Washington’s broken policy 
process.*  Our conclusion and recommendation, 
adapted from that analysis, is that political leaders 
should understand the costs they impose on busi-
ness and society at large if they do not take action 
to improve political governance and policymaking.  
Th ey need seriously to address reforms in ethics, 
lobbying, redistricting, earmarks, and other legisla-
tive procedures and executive practices to break the 
logjam holding back policy reforms in substantive 
areas such as global climate change.  
We also reiterate conclusions and recommendations 
from CED’s previous policy statement on government 
regulation.†  Th at analysis pointed to what some now 
term “smart regulation,” which draws from an array 
of ideas linked to performance-and principles-based 
regulation.  Smart regulation seeks to strike an appro-
priate balance between ﬂ exibility and eﬃ  ciency, relying 
more on markets than on commands.  
Conclusion 
CED was founded by a group of business statesmen 
who had strong views on the direction of public policy 
and the role of the business community in helping to 
advance our society as a whole.  A key, if not critical, 
contribution of the business community to overcom-
ing societal problems may lie not only in individual 
corporate policies but in business statesmanship—the 
willingness of business leaders to speak out on pressing 
public concerns, such as unsustainable cost increases 
in federal entitlement programs, the lack of universal 
health care, environmental damage from climate 
change, and the threat to human rights.
It is not an either-or choice.  U.S. business leaders 
should consider both how their business strategies 
interact with societal issues and how they personally 
can make a diﬀ erence by supporting sound public 
policies that address society’s key concerns.  
* “Washington Is Broken” So What Are You Going To Do About It?
† Modernizing Government Regulation: Th e Need for Action
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Introduction
Public, for-proﬁ t corporations perform a highly impor-
tant societal function—they create jobs that provide 
income and wealth to elevate living standards better 
than any other known mechanism.  But CEOs and 
corporate directors increasingly face myriad additional 
demands to extend their success to other areas of 
societal concern.  Shareholders, regulators, government 
agencies of all types, consumers, employees, non-proﬁ t 
organizations, ratings agencies, and other constituen-
cies expect CEOs and directors to do much more than 
take (prudent) risks to grow proﬁ ts and act within legal 
constraints.  Rather, they expect ethical behavior and 
transparent operations that respect environmental, so-
cietal and corporate governance concerns, and a host of 
other ﬁ nancial and non-ﬁ nancial objectives.  Balancing 
these expectations has never been easy.  In recent years, 
excessive compensation, exorbitant severance payments, 
and other forms of short-sighted and self-interested 
behavior have poisoned the public’s opinion of business 
and business leaders.  Th e ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 has 
further lowered the public’s regard of business.
One of the great strengths of the corporation and of 
successful corporate leaders has been the ability to 
adapt to ever-changing circumstances.  Today, as cor-
porations become more global and increasingly operate 
in geographic areas with diﬀ erent, often conﬂ icting 
legal regimes and social norms, demands of corporate 
constituencies—transmitted through resource (capital 
and labor) and ﬁ nal-product markets, government 
regulation, and public forums—motivate more than 
ever corporate leaders to consider these pressures and 
embrace public goals to bring the forces of corporate 
enterprise to bear on public problems. 
Th e problems faced by society—whether local, 
national, or global—also necessarily confront busi-
nesses, which exist within and are part of society.  
Environmental problems throughout the world aﬀ ect 
living standards and constrain activities once taken for 
granted.  Th e increasing scarcity of critical resources, 
such as clean water and energy, limit choices for both 
consumers and producers.  Producers face greater legal 
and market constraints because consumers and citizens 
are more sensitive to how things are produced—the 
conditions under which workers labor, the types of 
chemicals and materials used, and even the method 
of production.  As important, the seeming inability 
of political systems, in the United States and virtually 
everywhere else, to address these concerns meaningfully 
creates social conditions that impede economic growth 
generally and make business decisions much more 
diﬃ  cult for individual ﬁ rms.
Th is study examines:
• How these conditions, as reﬂ ected by the various 
demands of shareholders and others, aﬀ ect corpo-
rate strategy; 
• What actions corporate directors could take to 
promote the identiﬁ cation and inclusion of societal 
concerns into core business strategies, consistent 
with the goal of maximizing long-term value; 
• Whether constituency demands and societal 
concerns aﬀ ect public and private corporations 
diﬀ erently; and
• Where the limits may be between private, volun-
tary actions of corporations and the responsibilities 
of governments.
The Context of Recent Events
In fall 2008, ﬁ nancial markets in the United States 
and other parts of the world fell into a crisis that saw 
in quick succession the collapse of some of the na-
tion’s top ﬁ nancial institutions and an unprecedented 
$700 billion appropriation designed to stabilize credit 
markets and recapitalize remaining ﬁ nancial institu-
tions.  
Th e crisis is a painful reminder of the conﬂ ict that can 
occur between private-sector actions and public goals.  
A root cause of the ﬁ nancial crisis was the excessive risk 
8taken by almost all market participants—corporate ex-
ecutives, money managers, rating agencies, investment 
intermediaries, bankers, and investors—to achieve 
short-term results that temporarily beneﬁ ted their 
businesses and themselves at the expense of their own 
long-term interests and those of their shareholders, 
employees, other linked businesses, and the nation as a 
whole.  Actions by public oﬃ  cials charged with regulat-
ing private-sector conduct, particularly in the ﬁ nancial 
sector, also played a signiﬁ cant role in the crisis.
Th is “short-termism” took diﬀ erent forms in diﬀ erent 
parts of the economy, but it was pervasive.  In ﬁ nancial 
services, excessive leverage and a classic mismatch 
between short-term liabilities and long-term invest-
ments were at the core of problems obscured by a 
blizzard of complex ﬁ nancial paper.  In housing, myopic 
greed of borrowers and lenders created bad loans that 
could be justiﬁ ed only by looking beyond the very 
short-term through rose-colored glasses.  Elsewhere, 
in manufacturing for example, many ﬁ rms focused 
more on their quarterly earnings-per-share number 
than they did on investing in research and development 
(R&D) and worker training, which underlie long-term 
performance. 
Although the crisis has been centered in ﬁ nancial 
services, our focus in this report is not on that sector or 
on capital markets as such.  Our focus is on corporate 
governance and the vital role directors can play in 
mitigating the types of pressures that created the crisis.  
It is clear to us that the underlying patterns—rooted 
in short-sighted and self interested behaviors—exist 
across all industries.  A well-functioning board can 
govern the corporation and its management by sup-
porting and protecting a CEO who is doing the right 
thing for the sustainability of the business, while 
checking the excesses and other mistakes of one who is 
overly short-sighted, self-interested, or conﬂ icted.
Recovery from this crisis will continue to dominate 
economic decision making for some period of years.  
We do not, however, want to lose sight of longer-term 
forces that also will shape the business environment.  
It is vitally important that as a society, and as business 
leaders, we work to ﬁ x both short-term and long-term 
problems.  
The Corporation and Society are 
Interdependent
Historically, corporations were privately organized and 
publicly chartered to both grow the value of sharehold-
ers’ investments and advance the public good.1  In 
the 16th and 17th centuries, “chartered companies” 
were created by monarchs largely to explore and 
open the resources of the New World.  And the early 
American colonies empowered chartered corpora-
tions to build critical infrastructure, including roads, 
canals, and banks.  It wasn’t until 1830 that the state 
of Massachusetts ﬁ rst allowed companies the privilege 
of limited liability, a hallmark of the corporate form, 
without being engaged in public works.  And, in 1837 
Connecticut became the ﬁ rst to allow companies to be 
incorporated without a special legislative act.   Even 
then, legislatures often revoked charters from corpora-
tions that failed to fulﬁ ll their public responsibilities.2
But the conventional view of the modern corporation 
is that it must operate primarily (some would say 
solely) in the interests of its shareholders.  Nearly a 
half century ago Milton Friedman claimed “there is but 
one and only one social responsibility of business—to 
use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its proﬁ ts so long as it stays within the rules 
of the game.”3  More recently, that view has been 
challenged by scholars and practitioners who have 
examined the role of the board with regard to a broader 
set of corporate constituents and concluded that they 
too merit consideration.   We take up this issue in more 
detail in discussing the role of boards of directors in 
Chapter 3.
Recent turmoil in ﬁ nancial markets and the downturn 
in business generally have soured public perceptions of 
business and business leaders.  Corporations are under 
increased pressure to rebalance public and private 
goals, as the public demands tangible results beyond 
the corporations’ direct (though temporarily declining) 
contributions to personal income and wealth.  Some 
shareholders are among those demanding “more,” by 
agitating for greater consideration of environmental, 
human rights, and other societal issues.  Although such 
demands have been greatest on large, global corpora-
tions, the underlying trends make it likely that even 
relatively smaller-sized companies, and non-corporate 
businesses, will feel the same pressures if they have not 
yet. 
9Various constituencies, often working through non-
proﬁ ts or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
make similar demands.  Many NGOs actively advocate 
higher standards of corporate behavior with respect to 
environmental and human rights issues.  Other NGOs 
attempt to hold corporations accountable by leveraging 
the Internet and other media sources to expose what 
they see as sub-standard labor practices, abuses of 
human rights, pollution of local waterways, violations 
of government health and safety standards, and the like.
Of course, governments—local, state, and national—
have their say, too.  Governments everywhere require 
disclosure and reporting of the corporation’s eﬀ ects 
on society.  Government laws and regulations often 
mandate the achievement of certain societal objectives 
running the gamut from standard ﬁ nancial disclosures 
to employment practices to environmental standards.  
Other times, governments may impact businesses by 
doing too little to meet societal goals directly, thereby 
increasing public pressure on, and often the commercial 
need for, corporations to ﬁ ll the gap.  In some less de-
veloped countries, where governmental authority exists 
in name only, multinational corporations frequently 
carry the burden of providing basic services usually 
supplied by governments.  Even in the United States, 
corporations often must provide workers with remedial 
education services, roads for transportation, and other 
infrastructure improvements.
At the same time, other voices, mostly from the 
business community, are questioning how much of 
the corporation’s resources it can aﬀ ord to devote to 
societal issues that, however worthy, do not add to this 
quarter’s or even this year’s bottom line.  Where is the 
line between private and public responsibilities?  And 
what calculus can guide the corporation’s decision 
making?
To an extent, how the public and business think about 
each other and their relationship has consequences 
for the achievement of their separate and mutual 
goals.  Th e conventional (Friedman) framework, cited 
above, strongly implies that society and business stand 
opposed to one another; any beneﬁ t to business comes 
at the expense of society and vice versa.  It reﬂ ects 
a zero-sum game where private and public interests 
are understood to be mutually exclusive ends.  Often 
politicians, NGO leaders, the media, and others adopt 
this framework to demonize “Corporate America” and 
link caricatures of greedy businessmen to stir cynicism 
within the general public.  Th is framework colors 
and shapes perceptions about the relationship of the 
corporation to society at both board tables and kitchen 
tables.  
In reality, the interests of society and the business com-
munity are not mutually exclusive, but interdependent, 
and their goals are interlinked.  Our society depends on 
corporations to innovate and invest, thereby improv-
ing living standards, creating jobs and wealth, and 
providing social goods.  U.S. corporations are expected 
to provide a signiﬁ cant portion of the social safety-
net (health insurance and retirement income) often 
provided elsewhere by governments.  Corporations 
also depend on society, and it is in each corporation’s 
interest to sustain the society in which it operates.  An 
excellent and equitable education system is needed to 
provide a productive and innovative workforce.  Health 
care that is accessible, aﬀ ordable, and based on medical 
best practices is necessary to ensure a healthy society 
and productive workers. An eﬀ ective and equitable 
system of justice keeps all parties productively engaged 
in the pursuit of the common good.  Th e production of 
safe, high-quality goods and adherence to labor practic-
es that meet high ethical standards allows corporations 
to minimize the cost of accidents, attenuate concerns 
over the threat of litigation, and enhance the value of 
their brand.  In these circumstances, consumers and 
workers become more attracted to the company and 
invested in its success.  Th e eﬃ  cient use of land, water, 
energy and other resources is needed to both sustain 
the environment and lower overall costs.  But, there are 
limits to what each individual corporation can aﬀ ord to 
do on its own.
The New Corporate Engagement
Th e social role of business and the question of how 
businesses can best fulﬁ ll that role have been the 
subject of many books and articles dating back to the 
inception of capitalism and to the work of its leading 
proponent, Adam Smith.  Th e Depression of the 1930s 
broke the implicit social contract that had supported 
prior business expansion and touched oﬀ  a ﬁ erce public 
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debate on the role of the corporation and its relation-
ship to society—a debate that culminated in the New 
Deal.4   In the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
“corporate social responsibility” (CSR) became a vogue 
term, as businesses began to respond to social pressures 
by initiating CSR programs and appointing CSR 
oﬃ  cers to demonstrate corporate concern with social 
causes.  Over time, CSR programs have developed from 
a focus ﬁ rst on philanthropy (what might be called 
“ﬁ rst-generation” CSR), then on public relations (the 
“second-generation”), and now increasingly on product 
development (“third-generation” CSR).  
Like many others who recently have examined this 
topic, we do not favor CSR as a term of art. 5  Some 
hold the perception, whether fair or not, that CSR 
activities tend to originate outside the ﬁ rm and mar-
ginalize social concerns, despite the intent to give them 
greater prominence.  Our focus in this statement is dif-
ferent:  we are concerned with the interdependence of 
business and society, and on how corporations should 
anticipate and incorporate social factors into long-term 
strategies and objectives.  Th e 2002 report of the Aspen 
Institute used the term “social impact management” 
to describe this intersection, and interdependency, of 
business practice and wider societal concerns.  Within 
such a framework, CSR activities and programs as 
sometimes narrowly construed may count among the 
ways corporations react to social demands, but they do 
not by themselves capture this wider ﬁ eld of interest.  
A common critique of mostly ﬁ rst- and second-
generation corporate social responsibility programs is 
that charitable donations and other narrowly focused 
CSR-related projects serve only as short-term, cosmetic 
solutions to systemic problems, and as vehicles for 
public-relations campaigns intended to placate activist 
NGOs.6  Th is view holds that while the rhetoric of 
CSR appears well-intentioned, many corporations 
are failing to translate rhetorical commitments to 
strategic goals and operations.  Th at view does not 
imply that companies should end CSR activities, nor 
do we believe that they should.  Many CSR programs 
achieve excellent results both for the corporation and 
for society.  Most companies will want to continue to 
fund CSR activities and support volunteer programs, 
but we believe that they also may want to look deeper 
into their overall interaction with society, as have some 
ﬁ rms—under the banner of CSR or otherwise.  
Scholars, practitioners, and other analysts have begun 
to reexamine both why and how businesses engage in 
the social arena.  A 2008 report of the news magazine,  
Th e Economist, concluded that the CSR label is unhelp-
ful to understanding the subject because the range 
of activities coming under its umbrella is vast and 
third-generation corporate responsibility activities are 
becoming too important to global companies to catego-
rize them separately from other corporate activities.7 
Th e conclusion of an inﬂ uential analysis published in 
2006 resonates with our own observations:
Integrating business and social needs takes 
more than good intentions and strong leader-
ship.  It requires adjustments in organization, 
reporting relationships, and incentives.  Few 
companies have engaged operating management 
in processes that identify and prioritize social 
issues based on their salience to business opera-
tions and their importance to the company’s 
competitive context.  Even fewer have uniﬁ ed 
their philanthropy with the management of the 
CSR eﬀ orts, much less sought to embed a social 
dimension into their core value proposition.  
Doing these things requires a far diﬀ erent ap-
proach to both CSR and philanthropy than the 
one prevalent today.  Companies must shift from 
a fragmented, defensive posture to an integrated, 
aﬃ  rmative approach.  Th e focus must move away 
from an emphasis on image to an emphasis on 
substance.8  (Emphasis added.)
Th e view that pits society and business at odds with 
one another is self-defeating.  Certainly, there are prac-
tical limits to any corporation’s ability to fulﬁ ll societal 
needs—it cannot do everything.  And, there will be 
occasions when conﬂ icts will occur.  Nevertheless, 
the zero-sum view is a losing proposition.  Practically 
applied, it often moves corporations either to ﬁ ght civil 
society groups or to try to mollify them with ineﬀ ective 
palliatives.  It encourages anti-business groups and 
opportunist politicians to throw roadblocks in front 
of nearly every form of business expansion. Th e 2006 
analysis cited above put it in plain terms: “If either a 
business or a society pursues policies that beneﬁ t its 
interests at the expense of the other, it will ﬁ nd itself 
on a dangerous path.  A temporary gain to one will 
undermine the long-term prosperity of both.”9  
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The Urgency of Action
Our central conclusion is that corporate boards 
and the leaders they select must integrate relevant 
societal concerns, such as environmental and human 
rights considerations, into corporate strategy to 
strengthen long-term competitiveness and the 
sustainability of both the corporation and the society 
in which it exists.  A successful framework requires 
that societal and business leaders view and treat each 
other as partners, not adversaries.  Th eir actions 
and public communications should recognize their 
interdependence and shared goals. 
Failure of corporations to shift to an approach—based 
on substance, not image—that recognizes their inter-
dependence with the societies around them will further 
erode society’s trust in, and support of, corporations 
and their leadership, a group that has fallen to an 
extraordinarily low level of public esteem—71 percent 
of Americans rate the reputation of corporate America 
as poor.10  Th at result is not in the interests of either 
business or society.  Society overall would be poorer 
and less able to address its many needs and concerns 
if business is not engaged in helping to ﬁ nd solutions.  
Business would also be hobbled, as it risks losing its 
“license to operate,” imperils its access to needed physi-
cal, ﬁ nancial, and human resources, and invites ever 
greater scrutiny and more stringent regulation.  
Although market forces and the power of “enlightened 
self interest” are pushing many corporations to address 
these issues, the actions taken thus far are slow, incom-
plete, and overall inadequate.  Certainly, many large, 
global enterprises have shown that they understand 
the importance of addressing societal issues because 
they are confronted by them every day in multiple 
settings.  New evidence of their awareness and of 
their activities surfaces almost daily, especially with 
regard to environmental issues such as climate change.  
Th e dynamism behind many present day corporate 
citizenship programs is impressive.  But even leading 
corporations can and should do more, and corporations 
outside the Fortune 500 need quickly to become more 
aware of their interactions with society and more active 
in addressing them.  
Failure to address environment, human rights, and 
other relevant societal concerns puts our prosperity at 
risk because it lowers our standard of living and the 
standards of living of future generations.  Common 
problems demand solutions that transcend tradi-
tional divides.  Business alone cannot solve the world’s 
problems.  Neither can government.  Neither can civil 
society organizations. Th e responsibility to act falls to 
all of us.  
Th e purpose of this report is to restore conﬁ dence and 
trust in American corporations and their leaders by 
encouraging enlightened statesmanship in accounting, 
corporate governance, other board and management 
practices, and, as important, the strategic thinking of 
America’s corporate leaders.  Th is report urges business 
leaders to consider the critical importance of societal 
concerns to their companies’ long-term sustainability, 
and it recommends ways in which corporate direc-
tors can take a leadership role better to address these 
concerns.  
Plan of This Study
In the next chapter we examine what shareholders 
and others say they want from global companies, and 
we look at how companies have responded.  Ample 
evidence exists that large, global corporations are 
increasingly attentive to societal issues, especially issues 
related to the environment.  Yet, many have responded 
to the challenge defensively, which has done little to 
lessen public distrust.  
In Chapter 3 we look at the key leadership role of 
boards of directors and make recommendations 
for directors to promote a corporate culture that 
recognizes societal interdependence and encourages 
honest reporting and proactive management of societal 
concerns facing their companies.
Chapter 4 provides some illustrative examples of how 
these issues have played out in practice.  Th ese exam-
ples oﬀ er no pat answers but illustrate the diﬃ  culty of 
some of the problems faced and the types of solutions 
that companies have developed.
Chapter 5 examines two diﬃ  cult issues that fall outside 
the bounds of any one corporation’s purview.  Th e ﬁ rst 
is the diﬀ erent regulatory and governance regimes that 
apply to privately held and publicly held corporations.  
How do these diﬀ erences aﬀ ect responses to societal 
issues and the competition between these types of 
companies?  Th e second issue is whether the roles and 
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responsibilities of government, business, and non-proﬁ t 
entities can be clariﬁ ed in a way that enhances the indi-
vidual and mutual objectives of all three groups.  Can 
expectations and perceptions be changed to emphasize 
positive-sum rather than zero-sum outcomes?  What 
steps can governments take?
Chapter 6 provides a wrap-up of the issues and draws 
ﬁ nal conclusions. 
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In the wake of corporate scandal, ﬁ nancial crisis, reces-
sion, and increased activism on the part of sharehold-
ers, non-governmental organizations, and others, the 
public is paying increased attention to how businesses 
operate, what they do, and how they interact with the 
broader society—their “authenticity,” as one group has 
termed it.11  Many of the underlying reasons for such 
attention are linked broadly to the role of business in 
society rather than speciﬁ cally to the corporation as 
such.  But, the larger the business the greater its impact 
and the more attention paid to it.  Most of the largest 
businesses are public corporations, and these corpora-
tions are under the most pressure to contribute actively 
to the public good.  Public corporations have diverse 
ownership and shares traded in regulated markets.  
Th ey have unique responsibilities and governance 
concerns, and operate under speciﬁ c rules and regula-
tions that set them apart from non-corporate forms of 
business and from privately held corporations.  
Below, we examine some of the pressures on public 
corporations coming from shareholders and other 
corporate constituencies.  In Chapter 5, we look at how 
public and private corporations face similar issues yet 
are treated diﬀ erently in some respects.
Long-term Shareholders’ Interests 
Converge with Societal Interests
A public corporation has numerous shareholders with 
varied interests.  Th ough the number one interest of all 
shareholders is return on investment, speciﬁ c share-
holders, in particular those often described as “activist,” 
may have additional goals or alternative views on how 
best to attain that return.  Some hope to increase share 
value by promoting such steps as reducing takeover 
defenses, raising dividends, or restructuring or selling 
oﬀ  corporate units.  Others may seek to enhance the 
corporation’s value by encouraging consideration of 
how environmental change, human rights issues, or 
other societal concerns might aﬀ ect the company’s 
operations and strategy.  Many of these concerns 
appear in the form of shareholder resolutions.  
Th e Important Role of Pension Funds and other 
Institutional Shareholders
Institutional shareholders—pension, insurance, mutual 
funds and others—now hold nearly two-thirds of 
the equity of U.S. corporations.  Th at is a signiﬁ cant 
change from the 1950s, when they held less than about 
10 percent.12  Deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t pension funds, which 
most often promote social and governance issues and 
other concerns that aﬀ ect long-term value, account for 
about half of institutional holdings (one-third of total 
equity).  
Deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t pension funds must be long-term 
investors due to the structure of their liabilities, which 
demands payments far into the future.  Th at is not to 
say that pension funds do not pursue short-term gains 
or trading advantages.  In fact, many place a portion of 
their resources with hedge fund and other money man-
agers who trade for short-term proﬁ t opportunities.  
(See box 1, page 14)  But at their core, such institutions 
must pay attention to very long-term ﬁ nancial goals, 
as the lives of their beneﬁ ciaries extend beyond even a 
30-year horizon.  In addition, pension funds generally 
are broadly diversiﬁ ed, in many cases indexing their 
holdings to reﬂ ect generally the national and interna-
tional economies.  In economic terms, these funds are 
so diversiﬁ ed that they internalize externalities—the 
results of actions by one ﬁ rm that fall upon others.13   
Th ey gain not when one company outperforms another 
by shifting costs or proﬁ ts in a zero-sum fashion, 
but when companies expand productivity, engage in 
positive-sum competition, and contribute broadly to 
the social good.  
Some observers also have pointed out that the 
beneﬁ cial owners of pension funds—workers and 
retirees—have broader interests than just their small 
ﬁ nancial stake in each of the thousands of companies 
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whose shares the pension fund holds.  For example, 
a pension-earning worker would not beneﬁ t if the 
company he works for, and whose shares he holds 
through his pension fund, pollutes his community lake.  
At a minimum, such conﬂ icting interests make it dif-
ﬁ cult for pension fund ﬁ duciaries to represent the full 
economic interests of their ultimate beneﬁ ciaries when 
focusing exclusively on ﬁ nancial returns. Many pension 
ﬁ duciaries, therefore, seek to go beyond such a narrow 
measure of wellbeing. 
An additional source of pressure on public corpora-
tions comes from foreign shareholders, who play a 
larger role in corporate ﬁ nance as U.S. companies are 
increasingly dependent on foreign capital.  Unless 
current trends are reversed, it seems likely that foreign 
investors will nudge U.S. corporations to pay greater 
attention to societal issues.  
Capital inﬂ ows to the United States amounted to 
nearly 7 percent of GDP in 2006 and 5.3 percent 
in 2007.   Inﬂ ows of foreign capital are forecast to 
continue at signiﬁ cant levels into the future.*  A large 
portion of patient equity capital is supplied by inves-
tors in advanced economies of Europe, plus Japan 
and Australia.  Some, too, comes increasingly from 
sovereign wealth funds in China and the oil-exporting 
nations of the Middle East.  Many pension funds 
and other institutional investors in the former group 
of countries, more than the latter, are known to have 
strong feelings about the social role of corporations in 
which they invest.  Th e latter group might be presumed 
not to care as strongly about meeting societal goals, but 
these funds tend to be relatively passive investors.   
Some recent international reports, associated with the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) 
(discussed below), have focused on the ﬁ duciary duty 
of investment managers to assess how companies 
handle environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
issues—a term rapidly replacing ‘CSR’ in discussions 
of corporate social performance.14  Th e UNEP reports 
conclude that ESG issues can aﬀ ect corporate (and 
portfolio) performance, and therefore investors ought 
to give appropriate weight to them.  Th at conclusion 
likely will add to shareholder pressure for action and, 
by some accounts, could create a more explicit duty for 
corporate boards to review these issues as well. 
What do activist funds say they want?
Activist pension funds probably account for no more 
than 10 percent of total U.S. equity, but they have 
a substantial eﬀ ect on the companies they own and 
on markets generally.15  Such funds seek to improve 
the performance of their investments by promoting 
changes in corporate governance practices and aligning 
their shareholder votes with their point of view.  Th eir 
objectives tend to focus on four areas: board indepen-
dence, minimization of takeover defenses, tying execu-
tive compensation to performance while restraining its 
Box 1.  Defi ned-Benefi t Pension Funds 
Contribute to the Problem
It seems common sense that deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t 
pension plans, which carry liabilities to pay ben-
eﬁ ciaries long into the future, should demonstrate 
an interest in the long-term value of their holdings.  
But many such plans allocate a portion of their 
portfolio to hedge funds and other asset managers 
who pursue short-term strategies for quick returns.  
Like their corporate counterparts, pension fund 
managers and the asset managers they employ 
typically are evaluated and compensated based on 
quarterly ﬁ nancial results rather than on long-
term performance.  Th e consequent pressure for 
short-term performance has a strong eﬀ ect on asset 
managers’ incentives and makes it more diﬃ  cult for 
corporate decision makers to take a longer-term 
view.  
It is particularly striking that corporate deﬁ ned-
beneﬁ t pension plans act in the same short-termist 
manner as public pension plans and union plans.  
By placing their assets with hedge fund managers, 
ﬁ duciaries of corporate pension plans—including 
the corporation’s directors—take the risk that their 
assets will be employed in ways that undercut the 
corporation’s ability to engage in a long-term strat-
egy.  Th e self-defeating nature of such placements 
seems to go unnoticed by corporate directors. 
*  In part, this increased dependency on foreign capital is driven by a historically low saving rate in the United States matched by extraordinarily high 
saving in the rest of the world.  In part, too, the United States has been and remains an attractive location for investors to place their capital.  
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growth, and asserting the prerogatives of shareholders, 
as “owners,” to have a say in the corporation’s aﬀ airs.  
Such concerns have led many of these funds, their 
associations (the Council of Institutional Investors and 
the International Corporate Governance Network), 
advisors (RiskMetrics’ ISS Governance Services, Glass, 
Lewis & Co., and Proxy Governance), and others 
(among them the American Bar Association, Business 
Roundtable, National Association of Corporate 
Directors) to develop and publish principles, standards, 
and other guidelines by which to judge and prod the 
behavior of public corporations. Th e law ﬁ rm Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges has identiﬁ ed and summarized over 
30 distinct governance objectives of some of the major 
guidelines and codes published by pension funds, 
business associations, and others.16  
Interactions between pension funds and the corpora-
tions whose shares they hold can be complicated and 
testy.  Th e CtW Investment Group (CtW-IG), for 
example, is a part of the Change to Win (CtW) coali-
tion of unions.* Members of CtW aﬃ  liates participate 
in public and Taft-Hartley pension funds claiming 
about $1.5 trillion in assets.  Th e CtW Investment 
Group was founded in February 2006.  Its self-
described mission is to defend the interests of pension 
funds sponsored by CtW aﬃ  liates and other interested 
groups “by organizing workers’ capital into an eﬀ ec-
tive voice for corporate accountability and retirement 
security.”17  Under this banner, short-term interests can 
create hostile interactions between the funds and the 
companies whose shares they hold.
For the 2008 proxy season, for example, the CtW 
Investment Group strategy was to oppose the re-
election of corporate directors who could be connected 
to the sub-prime mortgage crisis.  CtW-IG said it 
would cast shareholder votes against directors at major 
U.S. banks who “fail to provide a compelling response” 
to a request to describe what they did to assess their 
ﬁ rm’s mortgage-related risk and management’s eﬀ orts 
to control such exposure. 
Short-term considerations aside, the goals of institu-
tional shareholders ought to be consistent with the 
long-term goals of the corporations in which they 
invest, and with society overall.  A document that 
closely mirrors CED’s concerns in the current context 
is “Th e Hermes Principles,” published by the UK-based 
Hermes Investment Fund, which invests on behalf of 
UK pension funds, insurance companies, government 
entities and ﬁ nancial institutions, as well as charities 
and endowments.18  In its own words, the Hermes 
Principles attempt to address a simple question: “What 
should owners expect from UK public companies 
and what should these companies expect from their 
owners?”19  Th e answers appear to be as applicable to 
U.S. companies as to those in the United Kingdom, 
and Hermes, along with others, has actively sought to 
hold U.S. companies to the same standard.  (See box 2, 
page 16.)
Other institutional investors hold similar expectations 
of how corporations should operate.  TIAA-CREF, 
for example, in 2007 published the ﬁ fth edition of its 
“Policy Statement on Corporate Governance,” in which 
it spelled out its interests as a long-term investor. Th e 
following excerpt summarizes, without the detail, much 
of the contents of the statement:
In keeping with our mission and ﬁ duciary duty, 
TIAA-CREF continues to establish policies 
and engage with companies on governance, 
environmental, social and performance issues. 
We believe that, consistent with their business 
judgment, companies and boards should: 
(i) pay careful attention to their governance, 
environmental and social practices; (ii) analyze 
the strategic impact of these issues on their 
business; and (iii) fully disclose their policies 
and decisions to shareholders. We expect 
boards and managers to engage constructively 
with us and other shareholders concerned 
about these issues.
TIAA-CREF recognizes that corporate gov-
ernance standards must balance two goals — 
protecting the interests of shareholders while 
respecting the duty of boards and managers to 
direct and manage the aﬀ airs of the corpora-
tion. Th e corporate governance policies set 
forth in this Policy Statement seek to ensure 
board and management accountability, sustain 
* Th e CtW coalition members are: International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT); Laborers’ International Union of North America (LIUNA); Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC); United Farm Workers of America (UFW); 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW); and UNITE HERE. 
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Box 2.  The Hermes Principles
“Hermes’ overriding requirement is that companies be run in the long term interest of shareholders.  Companies adher-
ing to this principle will not only beneﬁ t their shareholders, but also we would argue, the wider economy in which the 
company and its shareholders participate. We believe a company run in the long term interest of shareholders will need 
to manage eﬀ ectively relationships with its employees, suppliers and customers, to behave ethically and have regard for 
the environment and society as a whole.
Communication
Principle 1 ‘Companies should seek an honest, open and ongoing dialogue with shareholders. Th ey should clearly com-
municate the plans they are pursuing and the likely ﬁ nancial and wider consequences of those plans. Ideally goals, plans 
and progress should be discussed in the annual report and accounts.’ 
Financial
Principle 2 ‘Companies should have appropriate measures and systems in place to ensure that they know which activities 
and competencies contribute most to maximising shareholder value.’
Principle 3 ‘Companies should ensure all investment plans have been honestly and critically tested in terms of their ability 
to deliver long-term shareholder value.’
Principle 4 ‘Companies should allocate capital for investment by seeking fully and creatively to exploit opportunities for 
growth within their core businesses rather than seeking unrelated diversiﬁ cation. Th is is particularly true when consider-
ing acquisitive growth.’
Principle 5 ‘Companies should have performance evaluation and incentive systems designed cost eﬀ ectively to incentivise 
managers to deliver long-term shareholder value.’
Principle 6 ‘Companies should have an eﬃ  cient capital structure which will minimise the long-term cost of capital.’
Strategic
Principle 7 ‘Companies should have and continue to develop coherent strategies for each business unit. Th ese should 
ideally be expressed in terms of market prospects and of the competitive advantage the business has in exploiting these 
prospects. Th e company should understand the factors which drive market growth, and the particular strengths which 
underpin its competitive position.’
Principle 8 ‘Companies should be able to explain why they are the “best parent” of the businesses they run. Where they 
are not best parent they should be developing plans to resolve the issue.’
Social, ethical and environmental
Principle 9 ‘Companies should manage eﬀ ectively relationships with their employees, suppliers and customers and with 
others who have a legitimate interest in the company’s activities. Companies should behave ethically and have regard for 
the environment and society as a whole.’
Principle 10 ‘Companies should support voluntary and statutory measures which minimize the externalization of costs to 
the detriment of society at large.’”
Source: Hermes Investment Fund
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a culture of integrity, contribute to the strength 
and continuity of corporate leadership and 
promote the long-term growth and proﬁ tability 
of the business enterprise. At the same time, 
these policies are designed to safeguard our 
rights as shareholders and provide an active and 
vigilant line of defense against fraud, breaches 
of integrity and abuses of authority.20
In summary, shareholders are a diverse group with 
many individual interests.  Institutional sharehold-
ers focused on long-term performance are raising 
important issues about ﬁ rms’ governance, strategy, and 
execution.  Many of these issues are also being pursued 
by non-proﬁ t, civil-society organizations, frequently 
called non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Shareholders and Other Corporate 
Constituencies May Work Together to 
Pursue Non-Financial Objectives
Th e ﬁ ling of shareholder resolutions for inclusion in 
companies’ annual proxy statements is but one of many 
avenues shareholders and others use to exert inﬂ uence 
on the corporation.  Th e resolutions have the advantage 
of being a visible measure of the societal demands on 
public corporations, although much of the interaction 
with corporations, even with regard to ﬁ led resolutions, 
takes place behind the scenes.  Such resolutions can be 
ﬁ led only by shareholders but many are developed in 
conjunction with other corporate constituent groups 
represented by NGOs.  Th us, for example, many of the 
shareholder resolutions ﬁ led for the 2008 proxy season 
that focused on climate change and the disclosure and 
monitoring of political contributions were promoted by 
NGOs.  
Climate Change Resolutions
Climate change resolutions led among shareholders’ 
social proposals, with 54 proposals ﬁ led during the 
2008 proxy season focused on this subject.  Th at 
doubles the number ﬁ led two years earlier and sur-
passes the previous year’s record high of 43 proposals.21  
Th e proposals generally requested greater disclosure of 
climate change practices, including information about 
greenhouse gas reduction targets and renewable energy 
strategies.  Many of the resolutions were proposed by 
members of the Investor Network on Climate Risk 
(INCR), an alliance of 60 institutional investors that 
seeks to promote better understanding of the ﬁ nancial 
risks and investment opportunities posed by climate 
change.  INCR is coordinated by CERES, a coalition 
of investors and environmental groups “working with 
companies and investors to address sustainability 
challenges such as global climate change.”22  
Th e motivations that underpin the shareholder pro-
posals range from a straightforward concern for the 
environment to worry that lack of voluntary action 
will lead to mandated, more-burdensome regulatory 
measures in the near future.  Many investors in the 
United States look at the European cap-and-trade 
system for greenhouse gas emissions as a harbinger 
of future action here.  Indeed, groups of states across 
the country are moving to implement regional cap-
and-trade systems in the absence of federal action.  In 
addition, although the United States is not a signatory 
to the Kyoto Protocol, the possibility of a follow-on 
agreement with U.S. participation threatens to raise 
costs for companies with poor environment practices.23  
For many shareholders, perhaps the majority of those 
oﬀ ering these resolutions, impending regulation in the 
U.S. market and ongoing regulation abroad constitute 
a competitive and material risk that corporations ought 
to address.  
For others, the development of new energy-eﬃ  cient 
technologies and products provides a commercial 
opportunity to meet increasingly “green” consumer 
demand, and should be explored as such.  Viewing 
environmental concerns as an opportunity, many 
institutional investors want corporations to adapt their 
day-to-day operations and value-creation strategies to 
take account of these new challenges and opportunities. 
For example, three separate 2008 shareholder resolu-
tions requested ExxonMobil to develop speciﬁ c green-
house gas reduction goals, put forth and implement a 
policy for renewable energy research and development, 
and publish a report on how to lead the development 
of technologies to achieve a more energy independent 
United States.24  In another instance, a socially active 
non-proﬁ t, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, sub-
mitted a shareholder proposal for Standard Paciﬁ c, one 
of the largest U.S. homebuilders, to adopt speciﬁ c goals 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in both its opera-
tions and its products.* 25
* Th e proposal received 25 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
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Shareholder resolutions are the most visible and 
easily measured actions shareholders are taking.  But 
in 2007, a group of institutional investors—mostly 
public pension funds from such states as California, 
Florida, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey—led 
by CERES, petitioned the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to issue interpretative guidance 
that would force corporations to disclose business risks 
related to global warming.*  In essence, the petition 
seeks to accomplish through SEC action results similar 
to those sought by the individual resolutions discussed 
above. 
Almost always shareholders act on their own behalf via 
resolutions or petitions as noted above.  More recently, 
however, New York’s attorney general, Andrew M. 
Cuomo, added the weight of the state to shareholders’ 
concerns about climate change when he subpoenaed 
several companies seeking to determine if they had 
properly disclosed risks of building new coal-ﬁ red 
power plants.  In August 2008, Xcel Corporation, 
a leading builder of coal-ﬁ red power plants, agreed 
to disclose to shareholders the material risks, such 
as future lawsuits or the increased costs of potential 
regulatory rules that restrict carbon emissions, posed 
by climate change.26  Cuomo remarked that the agree-
ment “sets a new industry-wide precedent that will 
force companies to disclose the true ﬁ nancial risks 
that climate change poses to their investors. Coal-ﬁ red 
power plants can signiﬁ cantly contribute to global 
warming, and investors have the right to know all the 
associated risks.”27  Th e agreement, the ﬁ rst of its kind, 
will likely establish a precedent that corporations face 
legal recourse if they fail to disclose properly risks 
related to climate change, and it may provide a template 
for further such agreements. 
Other Social Resolutions
After climate change, the leading category of social 
issue proposals ﬁ led by shareholders in 2007 dealt 
with political contributions, according to an analysis by 
the governance rating ﬁ rm RiskMetrics.28  Proposals 
on political contributions usually ask companies to 
issue semi-annual reports on political contributions 
and to provide guidelines for making contributions.  
According to RiskMetrics, the resolutions follow 
a template developed by the Center for Political 
Accountability, an NGO that focuses on corporate 
political spending.†  As with many such proposals, 
shareholder proposals related to societal issues often 
come from activist groups rather than from long-term 
investors.  Nevertheless, boards must give any share-
holder proposal due consideration. 
Other issues with substantial shareholder/societal 
support include universal health care, homeland 
security, employment diversity, human rights, and 
product safety.  Th ese shareholder resolutions typically 
are a component of a broader campaign to focus public 
attention.  Many of the individual proposals in areas 
such as health care and human rights in particular 
are sponsored by unions and religious groups that are 
simultaneously shareholders (through pension funds) 
and corporate constituents (in their social functions).  
Of course, members of these groups are also likely to 
be consumers, workers, and community neighbors of 
the companies receiving such proposals.  
Th e eﬀ ort to promote corporate endorsement of 
universal, aﬀ ordable health insurance illustrates 
many of the complications and challenges facing 
public corporations.  A shareholder proposal asking 
companies to adopt ''principles for comprehensive 
health care reform,'' like those devised by the National 
Institute of Medicine, was submitted to several major 
U.S. corporations during the 2008 proxy season.29  
Th e SEC, reversing previous policy allowing exclusion 
based on infringement of ordinary business opera-
tions, allowed the proposals to be included in proxy 
materials for shareholders’ votes.  Company responses 
ranged from acceptance of the principles (GE, Medco 
Health), opposition to the principles (Boeing, Reynolds 
American), to engagement and negotiation with 
shareholders who proposed the principles (Wal-Mart, 
IBM).‡  Although they arrived at diﬀ erent solutions, 
each company has had to address such questions as 
whether it ought to endorse a contentious public policy 
issue not central to its core competency, how such a 
policy might impact its own operations and perfor-
mance, and what the impact of its decision would be on 
its shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and 
others.  
* In January 2009, the SEC had not acted on the petition.  
† CED’s Vice President and Director of Business and Government Policy, Mike Petro, is a member of the board of the Center for Political Accountability.
‡ Th e proposal received 7.3 percent ‘yes’ votes from Boeing shareholders. Th e proposal received 0.8 percent ‘yes’ votes from Reynolds American shareholders. 
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Other Demands of Corporate Constituents
Non-shareholders lack a direct voice in corporate 
matters.  As shown above, however, on many issues 
they have been able to form eﬀ ective coalitions with 
shareholders who share their concerns.  Such links are 
not the only means by which corporate constituents 
can inﬂ uence business decisions, and, of course, there 
should be no presumption that such coalitions always 
operate in the best long-term interests of the corpora-
tion.  Labor groups, consumer activists, and advocates 
of other causes have carried out eﬀ ective campaigns by 
bringing market pressure or political pressure to bear 
on corporate targets.  Such campaigns are aided by 
inexpensive and ubiquitous communications technol-
ogy, notably the Internet.  As one analysis put it, “Th e 
Internet has already triggered lasting change in the 
structures of industries and the ways businesses create 
value. Today, ubiquitous connectivity is creating new 
relationships among businesses, customers, employees 
and partners. People now have access to massive 
amounts of information—and opinions—about 
products and company practices. Th is information is 
available in every part of the globe, every minute of 
every day.”30
Th e changing landscape for information about busi-
ness, and its meaning for corporate communications, 
is well addressed by a report of the Arthur W. Page 
Society, an association of corporate communications 
oﬃ  cers and public relations agency CEOs.31  A particu-
lar concern highlighted by their report is the upending 
of the corporation’s ability to “segment audiences and 
messages and to mange how it wishes to be perceived.”32 
Today’s corporation is more transparent to all its con-
stituencies and less able to manage public perceptions.  
In this environment, authenticity—a grounded sense 
of what deﬁ nes the company, why it exists, and what it 
stands for—is the clearest path to building a distinctive 
brand and achieving long-term success, according to 
these experts.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, a company’s reputation can 
be one of its most valuable assets.   Th e Edelman Trust 
Barometer is an annual survey of attitudes towards 
business and other societal institutions.  Th e 2008 
edition of the Barometer showed the most powerful 
drivers of trust of a business are, in order: the quality 
of its products or services; customer service; and 
overall reputation.33   In this survey, the major drivers 
of reputation are a company’s social and environmental 
track record and how it treats its employees.  Th ese 
factors are shown to translate into whether individuals 
say they will: buy a company’s products or recommend 
them to others; pay a premium for products or services; 
choose to invest, speak or write in support of a com-
pany’s actions; and support or block its plans to locate 
in a community. 
Wal-Mart Watch is a prime example of a broad constit-
uency-based campaign meant to challenge a company’s 
reputation and its ability to carry out company plans 
and policies.  Wal-Mart Watch is a project of the 
Center for Community & Corporate Ethics, whose 
board includes leaders of the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU), the National Partnership 
for Women & Families, Common Cause, and the 
Sierra Club.  It began in spring 2005 as a nationwide 
public education campaign to, in its words, “challenge 
the world’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart, to become a 
better employer, neighbor, and corporate citizen.”34  Th e 
“success” of the campaign can be seen in Wal-Mart’s 
battered reputation, coinciding with reduced sales and 
diﬃ  culty in locating new stores.  More recently, Wal-
Mart has shifted some policies to become a leading 
retailer of environmental products and a supporter of 
healthcare reform and other societal initiatives.*
Wal-Mart Watch is but one organization focused on 
one company.  Th e number of NGOs and individu-
als worldwide engaged in company-or issue-based 
campaigns is too large to count—or to ignore.   Such 
campaigns can impose real costs on companies.   
Societal demands are particularly acute in developing 
countries, many of which hold a more expansive view 
of both the social role of business and the validity of 
civil society involvement in business decision making.  
Th e business environment in many developing coun-
tries challenges global companies in many dimensions.  
In some countries, the problem is not only that the 
government or public opinion may demand greater 
business involvement in society, but also that govern-
ments and other social institutions may be unable 
to supply basic public services such as education and 
* CED, Wal-Mart, and SEIU are partners, along with other business, labor and public policy leaders, in the Better Health Care Together coalition, which 
seeks to reform the U.S. health care system. 
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health care or to establish and enforce appropriate 
legal standards.  In some locations, particularly in areas 
where extractive industries have invested heavily in 
long-term operations and where government authority 
is weak, the global enterprise may be the dominant 
social institution.  As such, it may be held accountable 
both for results it cannot control as well as for those it 
can.  In either case, the corporation may be vulnerable 
to negative publicity and obstruction of its goals unless 
it is prepared voluntarily to take on societal obligations. 
Such challenges are not conﬁ ned to low-income 
countries.  Weak government authority, or the lack 
of government provision of services, also encourages 
within the United States large corporations to provide 
social services, especially in communities where they 
have a dominant, long-term presence.  In Chapter 5, we 
take up the question of the division of responsibilities 
between government and business.  But in the present 
context, we observe that where government leadership 
is particularly weak, organized civil society groups 
have ample room to become more active in promoting 
business solutions to societal problems.  
A signiﬁ cant diﬃ  culty for businesses, whether in 
developing countries or in the United States, is to 
understand both the host of demands on  business 
and its capacity to meet those demands.  Some groups 
admit to seeking a broad “new social contract” between 
business and society, involving the shifting of some 
social responsibilities onto business—a goal beyond the 
means of any one business to satisfy.  A company may 
face so many individual demands that meeting them all 
would be impossible.  Further, it is often the case that 
diﬀ erent corporate constituents and NGOs have con-
ﬂ icting demands.  How does a business decide which 
ones are legitimate, which ones ought to be addressed, 
and which ones can be addressed at reasonable cost?
Corporations Have Responded, but Most 
are Behind the Curve
Businesses diﬀ er along many dimensions: size, location, 
industry, and other characteristics.  Th ey also diﬀ er 
on commitment to social engagement, engagement 
with shareholders or other groups, and recognition of 
the importance of social factors to their own success.  
Some corporations (a majority according to one survey) 
commit to meet speciﬁ ed ethical guidelines.35  Others 
set goals to meet environmental and labor standards, 
plant trees, build homes, construct education centers, 
encourage employees to volunteer in their local com-
munities, provide free food to low-income countries, or 
engage in a vast number of other innovative activities.36  
Of course, some do none of these things.  Like all 
business challenges, some corporations are ahead of the 
curve and others are behind; each corporation will have 
unique societal issues that may impact its performance.  
Oﬀ -the-shelf solutions are unlikely to work well.  
As a general observation, the manner in which corpora-
tions engage with society matters to results achieved.   
Surveys indicate that a majority of companies engage 
defensively to minimize risk through public relations 
campaigns (66 percent of those surveyed) or to mollify 
public concern by making charitable donations (65 
percent of those surveyed).37  Corporate executive of-
ﬁ cers often employ such tactics despite admitting their 
ineﬀ ectiveness.38  More successful approaches emanate 
from a core culture and strategy that guides behavior 
at all levels of decision making, throughout the value 
chain, across all areas of operation, at all times.  Th ey 
tend to be proactive, interactive, transparent, and 
oriented toward integrating societal objectives into 
long-term business strategy including product develop-
ment—GE’s Ecomagination initiative is the model.  
Most corporate executives, especially those in large, 
global enterprises, profess a commitment to solving so-
cietal problems.  Th ey recognize that the value of their 
company’s brand—its reputation—is based not only 
on the products and proﬁ ts they make but also on how 
they are made and, more broadly, how the company 
is perceived to interact with society.39  Seventy-ﬁ ve 
percent of executives of large ﬁ rms say that reputation 
motivates their companies’ eﬀ orts to engage in society.40 
Eighty-four percent of CEOs believe corporations 
must contribute to the broader public good, for 
example by making philanthropic donations, providing 
employee beneﬁ ts, going beyond legal requirements to 
abate pollution, or meeting ethical standards, according 
to a McKinsey survey. 41  Surveys also indicate that 
companies pursue social objectives to retain and recruit 
employees, and because of the tangible contributions of 
corporate citizenship activities to the business bottom 
line.  
Th e aspirations and attitudes of corporate executives, 
however, do not always translate into equivalent action.  
A spearate McKinsey survey revealed that only half of 
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In July 2008, the CFA Institute Centre for Financial 
Market Integrity, a professional association of ﬁ nancial 
market analysts, published an ESG Manual to help 
investors and investment professionals better to “iden-
tify and properly evaluate the risks and opportunities 
that ESG issues present.”46  Th e manual recognizes 
investors’ increased interest in social factors that 
increasingly are aﬀ ecting the valuation of corporate 
shares.  It provides a primer on the vocabulary of ESG 
analysis and a road map to help investors and analysts 
ﬁ nd applicable information in company reports.  
In 2007, Goldman Sachs launched its “GS Sustain” 
focus list, which analyzes companies on the basis of 
“sustainability of corporate performance.”47  While 
the GS Sustain analysis claims no hard evidence that 
investing on the basis of environmental and social 
criteria adds value on its own, it does suggest that ﬁ rms 
that integrate and publish economic, social, and envi-
ronmental criteria with ﬁ nancial analysis have outper-
formed the market by 25 percent.48  Other investment 
groups, such as Citigroup, JP Morgan, and West LB, 
also have initiated dedicated ESG units.49
Th e GS Sustain analysis starts from the premise that 
“Globalization and a changed political landscape are 
combined with signiﬁ cant changes in populations, 
urbanization, resource utilization, climatic patterns, 
and employee and consumer attitudes. Th e evolution of 
communications networks means that there is greater 
connectivity than ever before and, in conjunction with 
the rise of the NGO, companies operate in a more 
transparent environment than previously.”50   Its model 
evaluates how companies interact with four key factors: 
the economy in general, their industry, society, and the 
environment.  It speciﬁ cally incorporates the principles 
of the UN Global Compact and holds that “leadership 
on these issues is crucial.”51  (See box 3 on the UN 
Global Compact, page 22.)
Th e Goldman Sachs analysis grew out of an invita-
tion from a group of investors that formed the Asset 
Management Working Group of the United Nations 
Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI).  
Th e UNEP-FI, launched in 2003, has been actively 
examining “the materiality of environmental and social 
considerations and criteria as they relate to the port-
folio management of mutual funds, pension funds and 
other institutional funds.”52  In 2007, it issued ﬁ ndings 
based on reports provided by ten sell-side brokerages 
those surveyed actually integrate a stance on environ-
mental, social and governance issues in strategies and 
operations.  Another survey showed 60 percent of U.S. 
executives saying corporate citizenship is part of their 
business strategy, while only 39 percent reported that it 
actually is part of their business planning process, and 
only 28 percent indicated they have formal corporate 
citizenship policies and statements.42  Th e disparity 
between business claims and actions has led to the 
paradoxical result that corporate reputation is often 
diminished rather than enhanced.  Only forty percent 
of the public trusts corporate businesses to act in the 
interest of society.43
Numerous factors constrain corporate behavior 
and make it diﬃ  cult to engage in societal concerns.  
Corporate executives, particularly those in smaller 
ﬁ rms, typically cite “not enough money,” “not enough 
time,” and “not enough people” as the three principal 
factors limiting corporate engagement.44  Costs limit 
even the most productive activities of a corporation, 
and diﬀ erences in costs between a company and its 
competitors can be a decisive factor.  Unless a com-
pany’s competitors bear similar costs, the individual 
ﬁ rm may conclude that it will be penalized if it diverts 
resources from immediately productive activities to 
pursue objectives that are longer term or appear ancil-
lary to the company’s mission.  Surveys suggest that 
CEOs of large and small corporations alike seem to 
prefer structural-type governance reforms—instituting 
ethical guidelines and practices—over more substan-
tive, and potentially costly, reforms.  
Financial Analysts and Investors Use 
Social Information to Evaluate Company 
Performance
A frequently cited reason why corporations do not 
pay more attention to societal issues is that they do 
not see such concerns to be relevant to the bottom 
line or of material interest to investors, aside from the 
few socially responsible investment (SRI) funds that 
are managed speciﬁ cally with regard to such concerns.  
If investors and investment valuation models do not 
conﬁ rm the worth of social engagement, the incen-
tive to undertake such activities will be low.  Recent 
research, however, indicates that social engagement is a 
signiﬁ cant factor in valuing a company’s performance, 
and stock analysts have begun to pay attention.45
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Box 3. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact
Th e UN Global Compact has rapidly become the standard for companies and others seeking a forum for 
issues involving business/society interdependence.  Launched in July 2000, the Compact had over 4000 
business participants in April 2008.  Th e Compact does not police or enforce adherence to these principles, 
although it has delisted companies that failed to report or demonstrate participation.  It relies on voluntary 
compliance and the power of public information and non-business activism to encourage participants to follow 
through on their commitments.
Th e Global Compact’s ten principles in the areas of human rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption 
enjoy universal consensus and are derived from: 
• Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
• Th e International Labor Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
• Th e Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
• Th e United Nations Convention Against Corruption
Th e Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of inﬂ uence, a set of 
core values in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption:
Human Rights
• Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human 
rights; and
• Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labor Standards
• Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the eﬀ ective recognition of the right 
to collective bargaining;
• Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor;
• Principle 5: the eﬀ ective abolition of child labor; and
• Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Environment
• Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
• Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and
• Principle 9: encourage the development and diﬀ usion of environmentally friendly technologies.   
Anti-Corruption
• Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.  
Source: UN Global Compact
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on the importance of ESG issues to ﬁ nancial evalua-
tions.53  Th e three key ﬁ ndings of the UNEP-FI report 
are:
• ESG issues are material – there is robust evidence 
that ESG issues aﬀ ect shareholder value in both 
the short and long term.
• Th e impact of ESG issues on share price can be 
valued and quantiﬁ ed.
• Key material ESG issues are becoming apparent, 
and their importance can vary between sectors.54
Other analysts and investors buttress these ﬁ ndings.  
SRI funds were estimated to hold $2.7 trillion in 
assets under management in 2007.  Some ﬁ nancial 
analysts are incorporating quantitative and qualitative 
ESG factors into their asset valuation models, and 
commercial services are oﬀ ering other forms of data 
and analysis of ESG issues.55  Analysts may use some 
unusual indicators in their evaluations.  One expert 
found that ﬁ rms listed on Fortune magazine’s list of 
the “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” 
enjoyed double the market return from 1998 to 2005, 
illustrating a positive relationship between job satisfac-
tion and equity pricing.56  Another trio of authors used 
speciﬁ c screening criteria related to social performance 
and social interests to identify 30 so-called “ﬁ rms of 
endearment”—deﬁ ned as ﬁ rms that strive to bring the 
interests of their primary constituents into strategic 
alignment.57  Th ese ﬁ rms are calculated to have 
signiﬁ cantly out-performed the S&P 500 index over a 
ten-year period.58
Some, though not enough, institutional investors have 
pointed to the need for more information on what 
they term “extra-ﬁ nancial” information.  Extra-ﬁ nancial 
information is generally qualitative, related to long-
term risks such as global warming, other environmental 
concerns, and the potential for public concern leading 
to new regulation.  Such information is described as:
Fundamentals that have the potential to impact 
companies' ﬁ nancial performance or reputation 
in a material way, yet are generally not part of 
traditional fundamental analysis.  For example, 
future political or regulatory risks, the align-
ment of management and board with long-term 
company value, the quality of human resources 
management, risks associated with governance 
structure, the environment, branding, corporate 
ethics and stakeholder relations.59 
Eﬀ orts to promote such analysis and to incorporate 
it into securities research have come mostly from 
European pension funds and asset managers, who 
in 2004 founded the Enhanced Analytics Initiative 
(EAI).*  EAI members have agreed to allocate a 
minimum of ﬁ ve percent of their broker commissions 
to brokers whose securities research integrates analysis 
of extra-ﬁ nancial issues.  Th ey have also set aside some 
resources to evaluate whether broker research conforms 
to EAI interests.  Th e expectation is that as EAI mem-
bership grows and as members increasingly allocate 
brokerage funds for enhanced, long-term research, 
sell-side securities analysts will respond by increasing 
the supply, and the quality, of such research.  
As of January 2008, US-based members of EAI were 
the Calvert Fund, a large mutual fund emphasizing 
socially responsible investing, and two large public 
pension funds, CalSTRS and NYCERS. In our view, 
more U.S. deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t pension plans should show 
an interest in such research and valuation methods.  
Doing so would have a powerful impact on corporate 
conduct.  
Other collective and individual eﬀ orts are starting to 
take root.  In April 2008, for example, the CalPERS 
Board signaled its view of the importance of environ-
mental disclosure by expanding its corporate gover-
nance guidelines to encourage companies to disclose 
and act on climate risks.†  Th e guidelines reference the 
14-point "Corporate Governance Checklist" developed 
by CERES.  CalPERS also announced it would work 
with the INCR to survey investment managers regard-
ing their ability to evaluate climate risks and opportu-
nities of the companies in which they invest.
* Members listed at launch of EAI were: AGF Asset Management (France), NP Paribas Asset Management (FR), MISTRA (Swedish Foundation), 
PGGM (NL), RCM (UK), Deutscher Investment Trust (dit) and dresdnerbank investment management (dbi) (Germany), Universities Superannuation 
Scheme (USS) (UK).
† At the same time, the Board also adopted new corporate board diversity guidelines to encourage the inclusion of diversity as a  factor to assess corporate 
board nominees.
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Th e weight of evidence cited above is that business 
leaders cannot avoid confronting the intersection 
between societal and business concerns.  But they also 
need to pay close attention to traditional ﬁ nancial 
criteria, the bottom line.  Th e Goldman Sachs analysis 
put it this way:  “Our conclusion is that companies 
need to manage all inputs to their business in order to 
enjoy sustained competitive advantage and a valuation 
premium versus their peers. What is more profound, 
perhaps, is that investors cannot rely on ESG factors 
alone but need to integrate them into an industrial 
framework and valuation methodology to pick 
stocks.”60  In the next chapter we look at how corporate 
boards can provide the right leadership to help their 
companies manage their interactions with society and 
build long-term shareholder value.  
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In this chapter we explore what boards can do to help 
their companies to integrate societal concerns into 
strategic plans, improve the execution of those plans, 
improve reporting and communication about their 
eﬀ orts, and ultimately improve the long-term perfor-
mance of the corporation.  Data on board involvement 
with such issues are incomplete, although research 
indicates that high-performing companies generally 
put greater emphasis on board consideration of social 
and environmental concerns, while poorly performing 
companies were more likely to have no one in charge 
of such issues.61  One source reports that over the 
last ﬁ ve years the number of Fortune 500 companies 
with a board committee overseeing the environment 
jumped from 10 percent to 25 percent.62  According to 
a survey conducted by Th e Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) of Th e Economist magazine, globally 26 percent 
of companies place responsibility for “sustainability 
performance” with the board.*63  Respondents also 
reported that boards spent an average of 20 percent of 
their time on social and environmental performance. 
A diﬀ erent survey, conducted by the Boston College 
Center for Corporate Citizenship, indicated that only 
12 percent of U.S. or Canada-based companies have 
a stand-alone CSR department that reports only to 
executive management or the board of directors.64  
However accurate the data, boards could spend more 
productive time considering the long-term sustainabil-
ity of the corporation, which means ﬁ nding practical 
ways—through production, research and development, 
investment, marketing, communications, human re-
source development, and other processes—of carrying 
out a strategy that includes the interaction between the 
corporation and society.  Sustainability, in this context, 
means the ability of the corporation to operate, add value, 
and endure because it demonstrates a compelling under-
standing of its ﬁ nancial, environmental, and social perfor-
mance, and an actionable strategy for enhancing long-term 
shareholder value based on that understanding.  
We recognize that boards may ﬁ nd it exceedingly 
diﬃ  cult to set aside time during regular board meetings 
to discuss long-term sustainability issues, although 
optimally such issues would be integrated with other 
speciﬁ c concerns.  Nonetheless, speciﬁ c time for discus-
sion of such issues might be allocated, for example, 
during a board’s annual retreat.
Meeting Shareholder and Public Goals
For many directors, uncertainty about the validity of 
societal concerns and about how these factors interact 
with corporate performance stand in the way of the 
board’s taking a greater role in examining such issues.  
Yet, changes in practice brought about since 2002 by 
law, regulation, and market pressure have empowered 
boards to shoulder more responsibility for the corpora-
tion’s long-term strategic direction.  Societal issues 
seem likely to play an ever larger role in determining a 
corporation’s long-term performance, thus demanding 
more board attention.
Boards are uniquely positioned to make sure that the 
long-term interests of the corporation are not lost or 
sacriﬁ ced to the pressures of daily business activity.
Successful boards will help the CEO to balance 
short-term and long-term goals. Boards can serve as a 
buﬀ er between the CEO and market forces that make 
unhealthy short-term practices diﬃ  cult to resist.  Th ey 
should support – and protect – CEOs and other senior 
managers who take the long-term view.
A review of literature and our own experiences lead us 
to conclude that as a practical matter, directors must be 
loyal to the long-term interests of the corporation, and 
* Th e EIU study deﬁ nes sustainability to mean “policies and processes which enhance the ﬁ nancial, environmental, societal, human, and other resources 
on which the company involved depends for its long-term health.”  It is unclear, however, what deﬁ nition respondents used when answering survey 
questions about sustainability.
Chapter 3
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ﬁ rm performance.66   As the principal owners and 
suppliers of capital, shareholders have both the right 
and incentive to sell underperforming shares.  In the 
extreme, shareholders can supplant underperforming 
management by replacing the board either through 
direct election of new directors or by transferring share 
ownership to an alternative entity.  Th is “market for 
corporate control” provides ample incentive for the 
board and management to maximize the net total value 
of the corporation, and hence shareholder value.
By contrast, claimants to ﬁ xed cash ﬂ ows, such as 
employees, suppliers, and debtholders, have incentives 
to maximize their share of the total but not necessarily 
to enhance overall ﬁ rm value.67   At least in the short 
term, whether a ﬁ rm performs well or extraordinarily 
well matters very little to those with ﬁ xed, inframar-
ginal claims (payments not dependent on additional 
sales or revenues).  
Th us, shareholders have been granted primacy of 
place in the U.S. system of corporate governance.  
Maximization of shareholder value drives managers 
to implement output-maximizing strategies mindful 
of relative costs and beneﬁ ts.  As the company grows, 
employees beneﬁ t from increased wages, communities 
beneﬁ t from a larger tax base, and suppliers gain more 
business.  
Th e Mediating Board
As best practices and regulatory imperatives have 
empowered boards to take a more central role in the 
governance of U.S. corporations, scholars too have re-
examined the role of the board and found it to be more 
central than the standard shareholder-maximization 
model implies, with implications for societal concerns.  
One well-developed theory posits a model of gover-
nance that views directors as “mediating hierarchs.”68  In 
this view, boards are responsible not only for leading 
the corporation to maximize long-term proﬁ ts but 
also for mediating the competing needs and interests 
of shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees and 
other groups.  Stated brieﬂ y, “the appropriate normative 
goal for a board of directors is to build and protect 
wealth-creating potential of the entire corporate 
those interests are best served when directors incorpo-
rate social considerations into their deliberations.  Th at 
does not mean that other corporate constituents any 
more than shareholders should determine company 
policies, that social considerations should trump 
hard-headed business analysis, or that the corpora-
tion should be viewed as an arm of government or an 
instrument of social policy.  It does, however, mean 
that directors have an obligation to act as stewards of 
the corporation’s long-term economic health.  Th ey 
should widen the purview of their deliberations to 
give weight to societal issues that impact the ﬁ rm’s 
longer-term performance.
As one expert put it, directors “are ﬁ duciaries who are, 
by law, charged to manage or provide for the manage-
ment of the business and aﬀ airs of the corporation. 
Th at role is the core concept of the modern business 
corporation and is central to eﬀ ective corporate gov-
ernance and should not be diminished or neglected.”65  
Directors have the ultimate power to deﬁ ne the long-
term interests of the corporation, and because each 
corporation has a stake in the health and welfare of the 
society in which it operates, its directors cannot aﬀ ord 
to ignore that social environment.*   
Shareholder-Value Maximization
Th e question of the relationship of the corporation to 
associated non-shareholder groups and to society in 
general is virtually as old as the limited-liability cor-
poration itself.  Th e traditional, dominant view is the 
“shareholder primacy” model.  In principle, maximizing 
shareholder value, in the narrow sense of seeking the 
greatest economic proﬁ t, maximizes the value of the 
corporation and, hence, its value to society.  As the 
argument goes, all claimants beneﬁ t as the corporation 
innovates and grows to satisfy shareholders’ economic 
demands.  
Only shareholders, theorists posit, have the incentive 
to maximize the total value of the corporation.  In 
principle, shareholders claim the residual of the ﬁ rm’s 
net income after paying suppliers, employees, manage-
ment, bondholders, and others with committed claims.  
Th ey thereby enjoy most marginal beneﬁ ts and incur 
most marginal costs resulting from positive or negative 
*  In October 2008, the National Association of Corporate Directors issued an agreed set of principles that corporate boards might follow to strengthen 
governance and improve performance.  Available at http://www.nacdonline.org/pdf/keyagreedprinciples.pdf
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team.”69  Th e theory ﬁ ts nicely with the reality of cor-
porate law, which does not require directors to follow 
slavishly the demands of shareholders—as diverse as 
those demands are likely to be.70  Directors must give 
due consideration to their decisions and not line their 
own pockets, otherwise they may direct the com-
pany’s resources as they see ﬁ t.  Th e well-established 
“business-judgment rule,” by which courts will not 
review the actions of a board unless improper conduct 
is alleged, protects directors from second guessing and 
legal liability in the event that decisions do not lead to 
anticipated beneﬁ ts.  
In the end, of course, boards and managements are 
motivated not by theory but because they face certain 
realities in the market place.  Th ose realities include the 
need to satisfy diverse constituencies with diverse ob-
jectives, even among shareholders.  Speculative traders 
who hold shares brieﬂ y want one thing, while long-
term investors may want another.  Passive investors 
want steady long-term returns, while active investors 
may want higher rewards commensurate with greater 
risk taking.  In the wake of the recent ﬁ nancial crisis, 
preservation of capital may be a key objective for many.  
Th ey must also aim to satisfy those market participants 
who are not yet shareholders but could become ones 
if convinced of the soundness and proﬁ tability of the 
corporation and its ability to return a reliable stream of 
income over the long term.
Employees and other constituents also must be 
satisﬁ ed.  Like shareholders, employees who hold the 
speciﬁ c human capital of the ﬁ rm also have residual 
interest in the corporation and cannot be treated only 
as short-term costs.  Nor can suppliers or local com-
munity groups be held out of the equation without 
damaging the long-term interests of the company.  As 
is often the case, as a corporation grows it develops 
a stronger web of interests vital to the corporation’s 
long-term performance and sustainability (as a going 
concern), and thus a wider network of interests that 
must be satisﬁ ed.  Th e development of corporate 
culture and broader social/public goals, as described 
above, is a natural, market-based response to these 
growing interests.  
Directors, who have the sole authority to determine 
how economic surpluses will be used—for example, 
between dividends for shareholders or retained earn-
ings for future investment—are in this model empow-
ered to ensure that each constituency is appropriately 
satisﬁ ed and motivated to enhance the long-term value 
of the corporation—and to help deﬁ ne the values of 
the corporation.  Th ese  mediating hierarchs have a goal 
to “balance the competing needs and demands of share-
holders, creditors, customers, suppliers, executives, 
rank-and-ﬁ le [workers], and even the local community, 
in a fashion that protects speciﬁ c investments in the 
corporation and keeps the corporation alive, healthy, 
and growing.”71  In this context, good governance has 
the qualitative characteristic and goal of ensuring the 
corporation’s long-term success. 
A Practical Path to a Longer-Term and Broader View of 
Shareholder Value 
Th e eminent scholar and former Dean of Harvard Law 
School Robert C. Clark holds that a well-articulated 
and qualiﬁ ed view of the shareholder primacy model—
appropriately understood to allow directors discretion 
to satisfy the needs of non-shareholder corporate 
constituents as well as the shareholders themselves—
may produce the same practical results as the mediating 
hierarchs model.72  Because the latter model is unfa-
miliar to many and may be viewed as lying outside the 
mainstream legal view of the board, which continues to 
emphasize directors’ ﬁ duciary obligations to sharehold-
ers, Clark suggests a variant of the traditional model 
that we ﬁ nd appealing.
Clark accepts the mainstream view that directors 
have a ﬁ duciary duty to maximize shareholder value, 
subject to three important “constraints”: 1) directors 
should cause their corporation to obey the law; 2) 
directors should cause the corporation to meet all of 
its legal obligations to non-shareholder constituencies; 
and 3) directors should cause their corporation to 
respond to market, social, and normative forces to keep 
constituents optimally involved in the corporation’s 
business.  He terms two additional caveats the “matters 
of conscience exceptions:” directors may cause their 
corporations to engage in charitable giving; and direc-
tors may cause their corporations to “cease participating 
in” unethical practices (such as genocide and apartheid), 
even when those actions are proﬁ t maximizing and not 
illegal under applicable law.
Clark argues, and we agree, that an expanded 
shareholder-primacy model, which incorporates 
non-shareholder interests, may be superior for two 
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reasons.73  First, by creating a single goal of maximizing 
shareholder value (even with due consideration for 
non-shareholders), the shareholder primacy standard 
makes it easier to judge the actions of directors in 
contrast to a standard that encompasses multiple and 
hard-to-compare interests.  Second, a board focus on 
shareholder value makes it clear that social goals belong 
primarily in the political arena, which is designed to 
make and execute public policy for the whole of society. 
As discussed above, corporations may achieve social 
objectives in various ways, but making it an explicit 
goal of the corporation would at once create compet-
ing standards for evaluating business judgments and 
competing venues for the pursuit of social goals.
Leadership from the Board
Directors have a legal obligation and duty to address 
the long-term performance of the corporation.  
Directors’ ﬁ duciary duties include broader societal 
concerns that aﬃ  rmatively aﬀ ect the corporation’s 
performance and long-term sustainability.  To meet 
that duty, directors must consider the concerns of 
all—not just current shareholders, managers, or 
other powerful constituents—who are in a position 
to aﬀ ect a company’s long-term performance.  In 
today’s environment, boards must know that they are 
empowered to reject actions that produce only short-
term ﬁ nancial results at the expense of the long-term 
interests of the corporation.  Compensation policies, 
for example, should not be designed to promote 
purely short-term share price enhancement.  
Th e CEO is mainly responsible for carrying out 
the board’s directions.  Boards should tie a portion 
of CEO and senior management’s performance 
compensation to metrics based on the corporation’s 
performance on such concerns. Th at would provide 
direct incentive for top management to pay attention 
to those issues.  It also would require the corporation 
to disclose the link between performance pay and 
the chosen benchmarks.  Th e challenge of motivating 
managers, especially at mid levels, to pursue policies 
established at the top of the company is as common as 
it is diﬃ  cult.  Mid-level managers, some steps removed 
from policy formulation, may have competing objec-
tives and feel a lack of urgency about pursuing corpo-
rate goals, especially when those goals may not readily 
appear to contribute to quarterly (or monthly) proﬁ ts.  
Th erefore, pay incentives at top levels and down the 
line are important for achieving results.   
Th e board’s involvement would be assured due to its 
role, primarily through the compensation committee, 
in setting compensation criteria and in disclosure of 
them.  Indeed, the board would have to consider the 
types of information it would need to evaluate the 
CEO’s performance, and it would have to start track-
ing such information.  Th e former general counsel of 
GE, in a recent book, oﬀ ered several examples of such 
information, including: special reports from functional 
experts within the corporation responsible for such 
key issues as the environment, health and safety, labor 
and employment; review of concerns going through the 
corporation’s internal monitoring or “complaint” system, 
such as GE’s ombudsman system; an assessment of 
trends in formal government proceedings lodged 
against the company; and an assessment of whether 
early warning systems were able to anticipate problems 
or controversies faced by the company.74  (See box 4 on 
page 29 for examples of corporations that tie incentive 
pay to societal concerns.)
More generally, directors regularly should consider 
how the company plans, manages, and communicates 
its interaction with society.  Th e board should insist 
that management report regularly to it and to the 
public on non-ﬁ nancial performance, including social 
performance.*  To institutionalize the process, the 
board may want to establish a special committee or 
empower its governance committee to take responsi-
bility for oversight.  Th at committee should report to 
the full board and appear regularly on its agenda.
CED, in previous policy statements, has discussed the 
critical role of the board of directors in the current 
era.75  Our focus in those reports started with the 
board itself —assembling the right talent for board po-
sitions and maintaining board independence.  Once in 
place, we recommended that boards should be engaged 
in the development of managerial talent through 
succession planning and support and oversight of the 
corporation’s strategic plan.  Th ose two elements—
choosing the right leadership and having the right 
plan—are critically important in the current context as 
well.  In addition, directors have an important role in 
* Of course, these need not be the same reports, but public reporting must be truthful and easily understood.
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promoting honesty in reporting and improving com-
munications with shareholders and the general public.
Choosing the Right Leadership
Th ere is probably no more important responsibility of 
a corporate board than to choose the right individual 
to lead the company as its chief executive oﬃ  cer.  Th e 
CEO will choose the team that will run the corpora-
tion, make the key decisions that determine the 
corporation’s performance, and set the corporation’s 
culture, which will aﬀ ect thousands of decisions made 
by individual employees on a daily basis—decisions 
that will not often rise to the board’s attention but will 
have a substantial aﬀ ect on the company’s performance.  
When choosing a CEO, the board’s selection com-
mittee should be mindful of the role that person will 
play in setting the tone and direction of the company 
with regard to ethics, integrity, and engagement with 
shareholders and other interested parties. 
Box 4.  Examples of Corporate Reporting on Compensation Tied to Societal Concerns
Our recommendation to tie a portion of executive performance pay to metrics based on societal concerns is 
beginning to become practice in some leading corporations.  Two examples of such practice follow.   Th e dis-
closures made by these two companies are clearly a step in the right direction, yet short of ideal.  Th ey provide 
information about the existence of performance incentives linked to broader societal concerns, but they do not 
reveal much supporting detail.  
Th e Dupont Company reported in its 2008 proxy statement that 20 percent of executive short-term incen-
tive pay would be based on “individual performance.”  As stated in the proxy, individual performance is “based 
on the employee’s performance versus personal, predetermined critical operating tasks or objectives (e.g., 
attainment of speciﬁ c sales goals, achievement of ﬁ xed cost reduction targets, successful introduction of a new 
product).  In addition to the employee’s contribution to the Company results, a factor in determining individual 
performance is a qualitative assessment of performance on the Company’s core values: safety and health; 
environmental stewardship; highest ethical behavior; and respect for people.”
Th e American Electric Power Co. (AEP) proxy statement reported the following:  “In establishing perfor-
mance objectives, the HR Committee considers the interests of other major AEP stakeholders, such as its 
employees and customers, in addition to those of its shareholders.  For example, the HR Committee tied 2007 
annual incentive compensation for all executive oﬃ  cers and other key employees to employee safety, environ-
mental stewardship, customer reliability and diverse candidate hiring goals while also tying funding for annual 
incentive compensation to AEP’s earnings per share.  For 2008 the HR Committee again established four 
categories of goals for AEP’s annual incentive compensation plan: Safety, Operations, Regulatory and Strategic 
Initiatives.  Th e environmental stewardship and customer reliability goals are included in the Operations 
category, while the diverse candidate hiring goal is included in the Strategic Initiatives category.”
Source:  2008 proxy statements.
Th ose who study corporate performance, management, 
and governance credit the intangible asset of corporate 
culture as being among the strongest competitive 
factors driving sustained long-term superior perfor-
mance.76  As the former general counsel of GE put 
it, “Ultimately, it is a company’s culture that sustains 
high performance with high integrity.”77  Th at culture 
comes from the company’s leadership and the “tone” 
it sets at the top of the company.  “Tone,” of course, 
must be backed by action.  Leaders have to be able to 
both communicate forcefully the company’s guiding 
principles and demonstrate that behavior with respect 
to those principles will have real (positive and negative) 
consequences.  Executives and managers must know 
and understand that they have a formal responsibility 
for such key societal issues as environmental, health, 
and safety concerns.  
Changes in the business environment, as described 
above, have changed the responsibilities of the CEO of 
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major, global corporations.  Some observers have noted 
that as societal demands on business have increased, 
political skills have become a more valuable asset for 
corporate leaders.78   Th us, boards should consider a 
candidate’s ability to operate eﬀ ectively in diﬀ erent en-
vironments and to communicate eﬀ ectively to diﬀ erent 
constituencies alongside other standard business skills. 
As we said in an earlier publication, the board’s role 
does not end with choosing the CEO.79  Th e board 
must remain engaged in succession planning.  Such 
involvement is especially important with regard to 
maintaining a corporation’s culture and vision of its 
relationship with society.  Although hiring from outside 
is always an option, it is important to grow talent 
internally.  Among the beneﬁ ts is that internal talent is 
steeped in the corporation’s traditions and culture and 
will adhere to its foundational principles. 
Having the Right Plan:  Company Codes, 
Value Statements, and Strategic Plans
In many corporations, tone and a culture of engage-
ment start with a vision statement that establishes what 
the company stands for—what its value proposition 
is.  Such a statement helps guide decision making and 
minimize risk by establishing a standard that goes 
beyond minimums established by local jurisdictions, 
which can vary considerably from place to place.  In the 
best cases, such a statement underpins decision making 
and action.  In the worst cases, it is forgotten immedi-
ately after being written and posted.  Boards can play 
a role by helping to ensure that the corporation has a 
strong vision statement that is used to guide decision 
making.  
One of the icons of corporate responsibility state-
ments is a one-page “credo” of the Johnson & Johnson 
Company, written over 60 years ago, which puts in 
plain language how the company sees its responsibili-
ties.  Th e company takes great pride not only in the 
written words of the Credo but in its use as a guide to 
business strategy and action.  It is credited as playing 
an important role in motivating the company’s highly 
regarded response to a crisis in 1982 and 1986 related 
to its Tylenol product, a small quantity of which 
was adulterated with cyanide and used as a murder 
weapon.80  Many commentators have pointed out that 
in this statement shareholders are mentioned last.  (See 
box 5, page 31.)  Other similar, though often longer, 
statements help many companies establish their identi-
ties, anchor expectations, and aid decision making.  
In addition to individual corporate mission and 
value statements, such as Johnson & Johnson's, many 
leading companies have signed onto global, regional, 
or industry-speciﬁ c statements.  Such statements, like 
the United Nations Global Compact (highlighted 
in Chapter 2), the Caux Roundtable Principles for 
Business, and others, provide a way for companies to 
demonstrate their commitment to well-established 
social principles and standards, which provide accepted 
benchmarks for performance.*  (Appendix 1 provides a 
select list of such principles and the organizations that 
support them.)
Th e question of how to address societal issues and 
where to locate responsibility for such issues is compli-
cated.  Identical solutions will not ﬁ t all corporations.  
Some corporations will ﬁ nd it useful to have a board 
committee with responsibility for environmental 
and other societal issues and so-called sustainability 
reporting.  Some boards already have acted on envi-
ronmental issues.  Several companies have created new 
environmental committees; others use existing com-
mittees, such as the governance committee, to oversee 
environmental issues.81
Th e number of shareholder proposals focused on 
environmental issues nearly doubled from 2004 to 
2008, and increasingly shareholders are asking for envi-
ronmental oversight committees.  A 2008 shareholder 
proposal, for example, asked three companies—Apple, 
Intel, and Kimberly-Clark—for the amendment 
of bylaws to establish a board-level committee on 
sustainability.†‡82   As envisioned by its sponsor, such a 
committee would “be authorized to initiate, review, and 
make policy recommendations regarding the company’s 
preparation to adapt to changes in marketplace and 
* Th ough the UN Global Compact and Caux Roundtable both oﬀ er companies a way to commit to social issues, tangible diﬀ erences exist.  For example, 
the Caux Roundtable encourages companies to follow a broad set of principles while the UN Global Compact attempts to verify compliance and remove 
companies from its rolls when they fail to meet obligations.
† Th e proposal received 7.2 percent ‘yes’ votes from Apple shareholders, 4.5 percent ‘yes’ votes from Intel shareholders, and 4.6 percent ‘yes’ votes from 
Kimberly-Clark shareholders.
‡ Th e SEC allowed a fourth proposal to Sunoco to be omitted from the proxy on the grounds that it constituted “ordinary business.”
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Box 5.  The Johnson & Johnson Credo
We believe our ﬁ rst responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients,
to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services.
In meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality.
We must constantly strive to reduce our costs
in order to maintain reasonable prices.
Customers’ orders must be serviced promptly and accurately.
Our suppliers and distributors must have an opportunity
to make a fair proﬁ t. 
We are responsible to our employees,
the men and women who work with us throughout the world.
Everyone must be considered as an individual.
We must respect their dignity and recognize their merit.
Th ey must have a sense of security in their jobs.
Compensation must be fair and adequate,
and working conditions clean, orderly and safe.
We must be mindful of ways to help our employees fulﬁ ll
their family responsibilities.
Employees must feel free to make suggestions and complaints.
Th ere must be equal opportunity for employment, development
and advancement for those qualiﬁ ed.
We must provide competent management,
and their actions must be just and ethical. 
We are responsible to the communities in which we live and work
and to the world community as well.
We must be good citizens – support good works and charities
and bear our fair share of taxes.
We must encourage civic improvements and better health and education.
We must maintain in good order
the property we are privileged to use,
protecting the environment and natural resources. 
Our ﬁ nal responsibility is to our stockholders.
Business must make a sound proﬁ t.
We must experiment with new ideas.
Research must be carried on, innovative programs developed
and mistakes paid for.
New equipment must be purchased, new facilities provided
and new products launched.
Reserves must be created to provide for adverse times.
When we operate according to these principles,
the stockholders should realize a fair return. 
Source: Johnson & Johnson
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environmental conditions” that might aﬀ ect the sus-
tainability of the business.83 
Th e response of the board of American Electric 
Power (AEP) to a shareholder proposal (ultimately 
withdrawn) is instructive.  Th e AEP board undertook 
a study detailing how AEP might prepare for future 
regulations regarding the reduction of carbon dioxide 
and other emissions.  Th e study, conducted through a 
committee process, recommended some scaling back of 
plans to invest in clean-coal technology due to concerns 
about future regulation.  In addition, the board now 
ties some executive bonuses to environmental-perfor-
mance targets.  (See box 4, page 31.)
Our basic recommendation with regard to societal 
issues is not a “one-size-ﬁ ts-all” solution.  As each 
corporation is unique, each will have unique societal 
issues that may impact its performance.  Th ese 
should be the board’s concern. Our recommenda-
tion is simply that boards should play an active role 
in encouraging company management to evaluate 
the various options available and to decide explic-
itly what it ought to do, based on sound business 
grounds that incorporate a longer-term view.  In 
some cases, it may decide to do nothing.  In some cases, 
it may decide to set up a special committee, as many of 
the Fortune 500 have for environmental issues.  Our 
view is that in most cases, especially for large global 
enterprises, the decision likely will be at least to adopt 
a value statement or modify an existing one, join one or 
more of the international standards (such as the Global 
Compact), or do both.  
Once a decision has been made and justiﬁ ed, the 
board should monitor implementation and continue 
to evaluate the company’s strategy on the basis of 
long-term costs and long-term beneﬁ ts.   Th e integra-
tion of social considerations into strategy changes the 
company’s stance from reactive to proactive and interac-
tive.  It enables managers to think of social impacts not 
only as risk-management issues, but also as business 
opportunities (for example, GE’s Ecomagination 
initiative).    
Honesty in Reporting and Enhanced 
Communication
Transparency—honest reporting—consistently ranks 
at or near the top of the list of what society cares most 
about.84  Based on survey responses, stakeholders 
appear to seek authentic interaction with corporations.  
Open and honest communication with shareholders 
and stakeholders can relieve some of the distrust shown 
by surveys.  In the best case, it can build support and 
loyalty to a company’s mission, converting skeptics to 
engaged partners.  In today’s world of open communi-
cations, all types of information about the corporation, 
much of it inaccurate, is available to anyone willing to 
search for it.  In such an environment it behooves the 
corporation to make accurate, honest, and insightful 
public disclosures of its activities and its motivations—
in a word, to be transparent.  
Modern corporate boards are much more engaged in 
dialogue with shareholders than boards of the past, and 
much has been written about board-to-shareholder 
communications.85  Th e best advice recognizes that 
“shareholders have legitimate interests in information 
about corporate policies and practices with respect to 
social and environmental issues such as climate change, 
sustainability, labor relations and political contribu-
tions.”86   Dialogue with shareholders, of course, does 
not mean that directors must agree to everything 
shareholders want.  In the ﬁ rst instance, the prevalence 
of competing and often conﬂ icting demands makes it 
impossible to please everyone.  Ultimately, directors 
must use their judgment about the course of action 
that is in the best long-term interest of the corporation.
Directors should recognize the value of corporate 
communication with shareholders and the public 
on issues that bear on the company’s reputation 
and brand value, even when such communication 
may not be required by regulation or ﬁ t neatly into 
ﬁ nancial disclosure formats.  Boards that have a non-
executive chair or lead director may want to consider 
a communications role for that person on such issues 
and topics. Many corporations are today reporting 
on so-called “triple-bottom line” results, also called 
“sustainability reporting,” which expands traditional 
ﬁ nancial reporting to include environmental and social 
performance.  Such reporting serves several purposes.  
It opens or enhances communication with the general 
public, eﬀ ectively demonstrating an outward commit-
ment to transparency and the improvement of envi-
ronmental and societal conditions and other related 
concerns.  At the same time, it helps inform decision 
makers about social impacts, shapes deliberations 
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about corporate strategy, and helps to attract employees 
and customers.
To many corporate directors, however, “sustainability” 
reporting has become synonymous with an “environ-
mental and social” report.  To conﬂ ate these concepts 
pushes sustainability issues to the margins of most 
corporate discussions and decision making.  To be most 
relevant, sustainability must be about the ability of the 
corporation to operate and add value over the long term 
because it can demonstrate a compelling understanding 
of, and strategy for, its ﬁ nancial, environmental, and 
social performance.
Although not oﬃ  cially sanctioned, many global 
corporations are using standard formats developed 
by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which was 
initiated in 1997 by the non-proﬁ t group CERES and 
later joined by the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP).*  At present, over 1,500 companies, 
including many of the world’s leading brands, have 
adopted its guidelines, according to GRI.87  Although 
GRI has become the most used standard, other options 
for triple-bottom-line reporting include the Enhanced 
Business Reporting (EBR) framework, which CED 
highlighted in previous reports with regard to disclo-
sure of non-ﬁ nancial indicators of long-term value.88
Th e global trend toward the adoption of sustainability 
reporting creates a de facto standard of reporting.  
Sixty-eight percent of the top 250 global companies 
listed on the Fortune 500 embrace sustainability 
reporting.  A recent study issued by the Corporate 
Register shows that over the last ten years, corporate 
sustainability reports jumped from 462 to 2,450 
worldwide.89  Such reporting, however, is signiﬁ cantly 
more prevalent among European ﬁ rms than their U.S. 
counterparts.  Of the six hundred new GRI reports 
issued by companies over the last two years, only forty-
seven were submitted by U.S. ﬁ rms.90  
As much as we consider environmental sustainability 
reporting to have important beneﬁ ts, we are cognizant 
that such reporting has costs.  Even simple monitoring 
and data gathering are not free activities. Th e costs of 
data analysis and actions taken based on such analyses 
must also be included.  Th ird-party veriﬁ cation of 
claims in sustainability reports and common standards 
of reporting would make such reports more valuable, 
but at a cost.  We also recognize that the costs of such 
reporting are likely to be a proportionately greater 
burden on small companies than on large ones.  Th us, 
aside from mandated environmental and labor 
reporting to government regulatory agencies, corpo-
rate “sustainability” reporting should remain within 
the purview and at the discretion of individual 
companies (as they exercise their responsibility for 
honest and full communications with shareholders).  
Directors should use their authority to help their 
companies ﬁ nd a ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c way to communicate 
eﬀ ectively with shareholders and the public—
through the regular annual report to shareholders, a 
separate public report, or in some other way. 
Our expectation is that many more companies than are 
now reporting will ﬁ nd it supportive of their long-term 
self interests to engage in such reports.  And, many 
may ﬁ nd that the cost of not verifying claims and of not 
employing common standards may be greater than sup-
posed, as unveriﬁ ed claims and non-standard reporting 
lack a degree of standing, are treated skeptically, and 
are more susceptible to challenge by NGOs, the media, 
and others.  Of course, when corporate boards include 
environmental or labor criteria as a factor in senior 
management’s performance bonuses, as recommended 
above, reporting would be mandatory. 
Some European countries are starting to mandate some 
environmental and labor reports.  In 2006, the U.K. 
parliament passed the Companies Act, which requires 
an annual business report to include information 
on the environment, employees, and social issues.91  
Denmark and the Netherlands also instituted manda-
tory environmental reporting, and France now requires 
all companies on the “premier march” of the Paris stock 
exchange to report on a series of social and environ-
mental issues.  Th e 2005 EU Accounts Modernization 
* In October 2006, GRI published the most recent version of its reporting framework, G3, which details 49 core indicators, 30 additional items and their 
related protocols.  Signatories to GRI are divided into categories for beginning (C), intermediate (B), and advanced (A) reporting. Th e lowest level, C, 
requires the ﬁ rm’s most senior-level decision maker to articulate its approach to sustainability, describe the parameters of the report, identify the GRI 
indicators used, explain its governance structure and list stakeholders and how the ﬁ rm engaged them to produce the report. ‘C’ level reports must also 
include at least 10 performance indicators with a minimum of one from each of the three categories (e.g. social, economic and environmental).  Additional 
information can be found at www.globalreporting.org.  
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Directive compels medium and large companies to 
provide an annual report that includes ﬁ nancial and 
non-ﬁ nancial performance indicators, including envi-
ronmental and employee issues.92  
U.S. ﬁ rms by comparison lag in the adoption of 
“sustainability” reports.  A 2007 Grant Th ornton 
survey found that only 29 percent of U.S. companies 
produce sustainability reports, either internally or 
externally.93  Fifty-ﬁ ve percent of executives say their 
companies have no plans to publish such reports in the 
future.94  Th ere are some notable exceptions.  A recent 
(2008) report by Hewlett-Packard, for example, broke 
new ground by including a list of its largest suppliers 
as part of its annual “Global Citizenship Report.”95  
Many NGOs have emphasized the importance of 
supply-chain issues, and in releasing its list, H-P said 
it hoped to increase suppliers’ accountability and that 
its increased transparency would lead to improved 
industry standards. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional investors, 
many of them based in Europe, are increasingly pres-
suring companies to publish sustainability reports, and 
the INCR has ﬁ led a formal petition with the SEC to 
require all public companies to disclose information on 
climate risk in mandatory ﬁ lings.
Among the diﬃ  culties encountered in implementing 
sustainability reporting are the lack of standardized 
metrics that would allow comparison of performance 
across industries and companies.  Some ﬁ rms, accord-
ing to RiskMetrics, report only “lagging” indicators of 
what has already happened instead of “leading” indica-
tors that may help predict what will happen.96  Many 
ﬁ rms report solely on environmental performance 
indicators, while others may include human rights and 
other concerns.  Unlike ﬁ nancial audits, few companies 
enlist independent consultants or third-party organiza-
tions to evaluate and verify the legitimacy of their 
reports.  
In March 2008, the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) issued a consultative 
document on non-ﬁ nancial business reporting that 
emphasized from the institutional investors’ perspective 
the desire for better reporting on ESG and other non-
ﬁ nancial issues.97  ICGN wants to see ESG reporting 
integrated with consideration of other ﬁ nancial and 
non-ﬁ nancial factors that may aﬀ ect the company’s 
ability to achieve strategic objectives.  It notes that 
while separate “sustainability” reports can serve a wide 
audience, investors are interested in issues that have a 
material aﬀ ect on corporate performance.  Moreover, 
they point out that such material issues should be 
included in a company’s annual report, which is ad-
dressed to shareholders and approved by the board, 
thus demonstrating that directors have taken them into 
account.
To anyone looking at trends in corporate reporting, it is 
clear that the public, shareholders, and governments are 
demanding more, better, and more honest disclosures 
on nearly all aspects of a corporation’s performance.  It 
is also important for business leaders to understand 
that in today’s global communications environment 
information is everywhere and accessible to everyone, 
meaning that even if they want to, companies cannot 
hide their interactions with society.  Whether it is 
environmental, human rights, labor, or other societal 
issues, businesses—especially large global corpora-
tions—should expect their activities to be made public.  
In such an environment, proactive, transparent report-
ing, especially if externally and independently veriﬁ ed, 
puts the company ahead of the curve and gives it an 
opportunity to get its story across and take appropriate 
actions before others misuse the information.  
Directors should promote honesty in reporting not 
only on ﬁ nancial results and other non-ﬁ nancial 
aspects of their company’s operations, but also on 
the risks, opportunities and results of its social 
interactions.  Such reporting should show how the 
company evaluates the long-term impact of potential 
costs and beneﬁ ts. 
35
Th is chapter illustrates how some corporations have 
treated contentious societal issues.  In the best circum-
stances they understand how their business interacts 
with society and apply that understanding to achieve 
strategic long-term goals.  Like most business decisions, 
judgments have to be made under conditions of great 
uncertainty, and current policies and practices are 
chosen after some missteps along an irregular path.   
Th e examples below concern the environment and 
climate change and human rights. Th ey oﬀ er no simple 
solutions but rather illustrate the diﬃ  cult problems 
companies face and the responses they develop.  In 
these cases, corporate leaders have made considered 
judgments based on the facts, circumstances and 
trends.  In several of these cases, companies have taken 
unpopular decisions.  In all cases, it is too soon to 
render ﬁ nal judgments.  While we do not second guess 
their decisions, their eﬀ orts raise important questions.  
Corporations and the Environment: Many 
Businesses are Trying to Incorporate 
Climate Change into Corporate Strategy
Environmental concerns have slowly evolved from a 
fringe interest to a core concern of society.  For many 
businesses, environmental issues have reached a tipping 
point, transforming them from a costly, adversarial 
problem to a net income generating solution.  Th e 
adoption of environmental best practices can directly 
reduce costs, and eco-friendly technologies provide 
new proﬁ t opportunities.  Consumers have shown a 
willingness to buy products from ﬁ rms that minimize 
environmental degradation, take seriously the chal-
lenges of climate change, and employ environmental 
best practices.  Companies that can help consumers to 
lower their own energy and environmental costs have 
a competitive edge in today’s market.  Th e prospect 
of legislation to regulate or tax carbon emissions to 
address global warming will beneﬁ t companies that 
have begun to reduce carbon emission, and penalize 
those that have not.  
In this setting, most corporate leaders acknowledge 
the problem of climate change.  Sixty percent of global 
executives, according to a McKinsey survey, see climate 
change as a critical component to long-term strategy.  
Seventy percent of corporate executives recognize a 
causal link between climate-change best practices and 
corporate reputation and brand value.98  
Although most corporate leaders aspire to be part of 
the solution, few meet public or even personal expecta-
tions.  Eight out of ten executives believe corporations 
should help ensure a clean and safe environment, 
though only half of all executives claim to meet that 
goal.99  Forty percent of global executives “seldom or 
never” account for climate change in product develop-
ment, investment plans, regulatory strategy, or purchas-
ing.  
Corporate leaders, worldwide, increasingly consider 
climate change and other environmental trends an 
opportunity to enhance ﬁ rm value, though U.S. 
companies are still more likely to see risks rather than 
opportunities.100  Four out of ten corporate executives 
consider the risks of climate change equal to the op-
portunities.  Almost as many, thirty-seven percent, see 
climate change as mostly an opportunity with limited 
risks, up from 25 percent last year.  Sixty-one percent 
of executives think that the eﬀ ects of climate change, if 
managed well, will produce proﬁ ts.  An August 2008 
survey conducted by the Deloitte LLP’s U.S. Center for 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Board Member 
magazine found that one half of respondents say 
climate change and business sustainability is integrated 
into their business strategy and risk management.  Th e 
survey of more than 200 directors of large American 
public companies also found that the more committed 
a company is to addressing climate change, the more 
likely it is to include this commitment in its strategy 
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and risk management practices.  A McKinsey study 
found that companies that instituted climate-change 
risk-management policies out performed companies 
within the same sector but without equivalent poli-
cies.101  
Many corporate executives say they expect (even want) 
government regulation, though many are ill-prepared 
for regulatory change.  For example, 80 percent of 
corporate executives around the world expect the 
implementation of domestic climate change regulation 
within ﬁ ve years.102  And over 70 percent of corporate 
executives say they want government regulation, 
although they pointedly don’t want the government to 
become “controlling, restrictive or stiﬂ ing.”103 
Th e imposition of regulation would challenge compa-
nies on many levels.  Not surprisingly, most corpora-
tions do not have emission targets for greenhouse 
gases.104  
Seventy percent of corporate executives are not 
accountable, via performance review, for achieving 
climate-change targets.105  A recent study found that 40 
percent of all U.S. companies that operate within the 
EU have not started to prepare for the new European 
REACH environmental regulations, which will 
mandate manufacturers to report and cease from using 
chemicals harmful to human health and the environ-
ment.106
Consumers say they are more likely to buy products 
from ﬁ rms that act to abate climate change and envi-
ronmental degradation, but they admittedly need help 
telling the diﬀ erence among companies with regard to 
climate change records.  Half of consumers reportedly 
are more likely to purchase products from petroleum 
companies that invest in alternative energies.  But, over 
60 percent of consumers could not name companies 
friendly to the environment.107   Th e same study found 
that people are more likely to buy from companies that 
produce environmentally friendly goods or respect the 
environment.* 
Th e following case study on the oil industry aptly 
illustrates some of the contentious issues and com-
mercial challenges facing a key industry associated with 
environmental issues. 
BP and ExxonMobil 
Oil and natural gas company products account for 
almost 60 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.  
Th e oil companies have been challenged to recognize 
both their contributions to environmental impacts like 
global warming and the eﬀ ects that climate change (and 
the eﬀ orts to address them) will likely have on their 
business models.108  Th is section illustrates the diﬀ er-
ent ways in which industry leaders BP and ExxonMobil 
have responded to these challenges.  
BP identiﬁ ed environmental trends, evaluated public 
opinion, spotted an opportunity, and took a calculated 
risk 
BP, formerly known as British Petroleum, is the world’s 
third largest integrated oil company.  In 1997, Sir John 
Browne, BP’s chief executive at the time, argued in a 
widely distributed speech that BP could not aﬀ ord to 
ignore a developing scientiﬁ c consensus that linked 
human activities, via carbon dioxide emissions, to 
increased global temperatures and climate change.  Th e 
speech marked a clear course change for BP, which 
previously opposed government action on climate 
change.  Shortly thereafter, BP partnered with the 
Environmental Defense Fund, a member-based envi-
ronmental action group, to develop and implement an 
internal system for trading greenhouse gas emissions; 
sought consultation from socially responsible invest-
ment (SRI) funds and NGOs on sustainability report-
ing; and pledged to reduce emissions by 10 percent 
from 1990 levels by the year 2010.109  
Despite media praise across the country, the decision 
was risky, and appeared to make little strategic sense in 
the short run.  Because BP’s portfolio of physical assets 
had a high ratio of oil to less-carbon-intensive natural 
gas, BP would need to make substantial investments to 
meet emission targets. 
According to those involved, BP’s shift was a strategic 
and proactive attempt to carve out competitive advan-
* According to the McKinsey report, “55 percent of the respondents say they have already refused to buy the products of a food and beverage company 
because they had heard it was acting against the best interest of society.  Just as many say they have bought the products of a food and beverage company 
because they had heard it did something to beneﬁ t society.  Th e average for all sectors surveyed was 49 percent for both buying and refusing to buy 
products.”
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tage, gain market share, engage and enlist other con-
stituent groups, and avoid becoming what one manager 
termed a “dying, Victorian smokestack industry.”110   
Another recalled that “this was a business decision, 
a cold, hard way of getting competitive advantage by 
taking a distinctive position.”  A third manager added 
that, “Th e question is whether we want to have a 
growth future or a shrinking future. Th ese decisions 
are strategic.  We believe that we, the oil companies, 
are loathed by the world’s publics.  We have to rebuild 
trust.”111  
BP has, by-and-large, met its rhetorical aspirations 
with action.  It received the top score of one-hundred 
global companies for climate change strategies.112  It cut 
greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent below 1990 
levels; partnered with Chevron to found the Carbon 
Mitigation Initiative at Princeton University to carry 
out research on carbon capture and storage, installed 
4,100MW of cogeneration capacity; and in 2004 
started a $350 million energy eﬃ  ciency program.  In 
2005, BP announced plans to invest $8 billion in solar, 
wind, hydrogen and combined-cycle power technolo-
gies over the next ten years.113   
BP ties bonuses for executives to meeting environmen-
tal performance goals, mandates public disclosure of all 
climate change projects, and requires an independent 
audit review of various reports and emission totals.114  
It instituted the position of Chief Environmental 
Oﬃ  cer, created an executive committee on the envi-
ronment, and has been active in the development of 
industry protocols and guidelines for reporting green-
house gas emissions.115  
Nevertheless, BP has had its share of negative publicity 
since committing to move ‘beyond petroleum.’  An 
explosion and ﬁ re at its Texas City oil reﬁ nery, due to 
failure to implement and enforce basic safety measures, 
led to the death of 15 oil workers and injury to 170 
others.  Excessive corrosion of a major pipeline caused 
a production shutdown at Prudhoe Bay.  Th ough BP’s 
reputation for environmental stewardship cushioned 
the reaction of SRI and NGO communities, BP con-
tinues to bear criticism for both events, and these com-
munities continue to monitor BP’s activities.  Recently, 
a coalition of SRI ﬁ rms condemned BP for contracting 
to extract oil from tar sands, which produces three 
times the greenhouse gas emissions of ordinary oil 
and uses large quantities of fresh water.  One member 
of the coalition explained, “We do not wish to see 
the beneﬁ ts of BP’s leadership as a renewable energy 
innovator to be oﬀ set by the harsh environmental 
impacts unleashed by tar sands development.”116 
In summary, BP refashioned its approach to climate 
change issues.  It identiﬁ ed environmental trends, 
plumbed public opinion, weighed potential risks and 
opportunities, and moved proactively to incorporate 
climate change issues into its operations.  It reached out 
to the general public and shareholders.  BP improved 
its reputation and created comparative advantage 
where none existed prior, though, from time to time, 
it struggles to balance its commitment to the environ-
ment with short-term market needs.
ExxonMobil has mostly defended its position as the 
largest non-government, global oil and gas company.*  
ExxonMobil is the world’s largest integrated oil 
company.  ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson has fre-
quently pointed out that over the next 25 to 30 years, 
the world is likely to require substantial fossil fuels to 
meet energy needs, and two-thirds will come from oil 
and natural gas.117  Th us, ExxonMobil has approached 
climate change mostly by continuing to supply the 
world with fossil fuels.118  Implicitly, if not explicitly, its 
business judgment has placed a premium on future oil 
and gas production and related services. 
At the same time, ExxonMobil has quietly increased 
the energy eﬃ  ciency of its reﬁ neries and chemical 
plants.  Since 1973, ExxonMobil achieved a 35 percent 
reduction in energy and carbon dioxide intensity 
rates of production.119  ExxonMobil has interests in 
100 cogeneration facilities in more than 30 locations 
worldwide.  It has invested more than $1 billion in 
such facilities since 2004 and has an interest in power 
generation, with a capacity of more than 4.5 gigawatts.  
New facilities under construction around the world 
are expected to increase this capacity to more than 
5 gigawatts in the next three years.  ExxonMobil has 
pledged to invest $100 million over the next ten years 
to the Global Climate and Energy Project at Stanford 
*  See ExxonMobil’s comment, page 55. 
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University, chartered to develop new technologies to 
lower greenhouse gas emissions.  It has also been active 
in the development of industry protocols and guide-
lines for reporting greenhouse gas emissions.  
ExxonMobil’s considerable achievements in reducing 
emissions have been overshadowed by media reports 
on the company’s eﬀ orts to turn back various share-
holder resolutions asking for action on environmental 
issues, and by its long-standing though diminished 
support for research and public advocacy denying the 
role of carbon emissions on global warming.  (See 
ExxonMobil’s comment below.)*
Based on their evaluations of ExxonMobil’s business 
and communications strategies, both Goldman Sachs 
and CERES have ranked ExxonMobil last among 
major oil companies on their respective environmental 
indices.  ExxonMobil discloses greenhouse gas emis-
sions in their Annual Corporate Citizenship Report 
and in reports to the Carbon Disclosure Project.  
However, it does not set carbon emission reduction 
targets and does not quantify the potential impact of 
climate change on shareholder value or how possible 
climate change regulatory measures might aﬀ ect the 
company’s competitive position.†  ExxonMobil has a 
Public Issues Committee that reviews the corporation’s 
policies related to safety, health and the environment, 
but does not have an executive or executive commit-
tee expressly focused on the issue of climate change.  
According to the company, climate change issues 
and policies have been reviewed annually by the full 
ExxonMobil Board of Directors.  In addition, the CEO 
and other members of the Management Committee 
* ExxonMobil comments as follows:  ExxonMobil’s response to shareholder proposals indicates that the company has already undertaken many of the 
proposed actions, and already published information asked for in new reports.  ExxonMobil does not support research aimed at denying the role of green-
house gases in global warming.  It contributes to and supports a variety of research across the range of issues involved in climate change: a deeply complex 
subject.  Ongoing research will be essential to advise policy responses in the future by providing improved understanding of the risks and opportunities to 
mitigate and adapt to them.  ExxonMobil’s views on certain policy issues that must be considered in formulating a response to the risks of climate change 
should not be confused with denial of the underlying science or risks.
† ExxonMobil comments as follows:   Th e company argues that estimating such ﬁ nancial impacts would be completely speculative at this time, since 
near and long-term policy decisions by key nations, including China and the USA, have yet to be taken.  In ExxonMobil’s view, it is impossible today to 
assess potential implications for shareholder value from regulatory approaches to address rising greenhouse gas concentrations.  Th e company believes 
that investments are long-lived and their commercial viability will depend on a combination of market and technological change as well as on policy and 
regulatory developments.  In particular, this includes the diﬀ erent responses of competitors to the array of challenges, and in this sector, the response of 
oil producing nations and OPEC. 
‡ Th e proposal received 22.2 percent ‘yes’ votes.  
§ Th e proposal received 28.4 percent ‘yes’ votes.
** Th e proposal concerning greenhouse gas emissions goals received 31.1 percent ‘yes’ votes, while the proposal concerning renewable energy investment 
levels garnered 7.3 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
††  Th e proposal concerning greenhouse gas emissions received 30.9 percent ‘yes’ votes, while the proposal concerning a renewable energy policy garnered 
27.5 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
have discussed issues relating to greenhouse gas emis-
sions and climate change.  
ExxonMobil’s perceived actions or lack of actions have 
prompted a plethora of shareholder resolutions.   In 
2003, shareholders proposed a resolution for increased 
disclosure of the risks of climate change.‡120   In 2005, 
a similar proposal called for disclosure of the ﬁ nancial 
impacts of climate change.§  In 2007, shareholders 
also proposed a number of resolutions that asked 
ExxonMobil to develop speciﬁ c greenhouse gas reduc-
tion goals, invest in renewable energy research and 
development, and publish a report on how to lead the 
development of technologies to achieve a more energy-
independent United States.**121  In 2008, 66 members 
of the Rockefeller family, long-term shareholders in 
the company, ﬁ led multiple shareholder resolutions 
that would require ExxonMobil to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, develop a renewable energy policy, and 
convene a task force to study how climate change 
impacts developing economies.††  
Change appears to be taking place.  ExxonMobil has 
in some respects shifted its public stance.  It stopped 
funding scientists whose work aimed to discredit the 
science of global warming.  It also met with other large 
corporations and environmental groups to discuss 
steps to achieve cost-eﬀ ective carbon-emission regula-
tion.122  Philip Sharp, president of Resources for the 
Future and a meeting participant, noted that, “Th ey 
(ExxonMobil) are taking this debate very seriously. 
My personal opinion of them has changed by watch-
ing them operate.”123  More recently, Kenneth Cohen, 
ExxonMobil’s vice president of public aﬀ airs, made a 
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remark that paralleled Browne’s speech twelve years 
earlier: “Th e risks to society and ecosystems could prove 
to be signiﬁ cant, so despite the areas of uncertainty 
that do exist, it is prudent to develop and implement 
strategies that address the risks.”124  
Despite these recent changes, much of the public, the 
scientiﬁ c community, and the public policy community 
continue to view ExxonMobil as resisting change.  
With time, perhaps those views may change to align 
better with ExxonMobil’s current policy positions, 
assuming they hold steady.  Yet, even its current policies 
garner controversy.  ExxonMobil reportedly may con-
tinue to fund some organizations that deny the science 
of climate change, although as indicated above the 
company refutes such reports.125  Th e company has not 
signed the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, a leading 
alliance of over thirty corporations and environmental 
groups calling for implementation of a cap-and-trade 
mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  But 
the company indicates that it supports other policy 
approaches, including a more eﬀ ective tax-based 
approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions.  (See 
ExxonMobil’s comment below.)*
Investors appear split.  On one hand, early in 2008, the 
company earned record proﬁ ts and its shares soared.†  
On the other, analysts place it far behind other oil 
companies in adapting to likely future conditions.  As 
the company reported a drop in 2008 oil production of 
nearly 8 percent and an increase in costs of searching 
for new reserves, analysts questioned ExxonMobil’s 
strategy.126  If its judgments about climate change 
prove correct, ExxonMobil will likely continue to 
thrive well into the future.  But if it has chosen the 
wrong strategic path, it is likely to suﬀ er both directly 
* ExxonMobil comments as follows:  ExxonMobil is an active member of numerous trade and business associations with public positions on climate 
policy that are responsive to the policy debate.  ExxonMobil is active in numerous processes of policy dialogue including with Resources for the Future, 
the Brookings Institution and the US Center for Clean Air Policy.  Th at the company has not joined one particular group—USCAP, which supports a 
cap and trade approach to greenhouse gas controls — is hardly a material comment.  In fact, the company believes that the pros and cons of a variety of 
policy approaches should be considered.  Indeed, the eﬃ  ciency, transparency and predictability of a market-based approach using greenhouse gas taxes 
would appear to oﬀ er many advantages over cap and trade programs.  Th is approach is supported by many leading economists, and was noted in a recent 
U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃ  ce report to be a far more eﬃ  cient and transparent policy approach than a cap and trade approach.
† Although ExxonMobil’s share price fell signiﬁ cantly toward the end of 2008, its decline was about half that of the S&P 500 average and signiﬁ cantly 
less than its major competitors.
‡ ExxonMobil comments as follows:  As stated previously, the business viability of ExxonMobil will depend on how it manages a variety of strategic 
risks: commercial, technical, political and regulatory.  To date, results have shown that ExxonMobil is an industry leader in this regard.  Furthermore, 
ExxonMobil’s policy is to comply with all laws and regulations applicable to its business.  As various jurisdictions adopt measures to address greenhouse 
gas emissions, ExxonMobil will apply its considerable technical and analytical resources to achieve compliance in a cost eﬀ ective manner that preserves 
business value.  Past performance in addressing the range of business challenges that confront the industry suggests that ExxonMobil will be at least as 
eﬀ ective as its competitors in this process. 
because of opportunities missed, and indirectly because 
of the enmity and distrust it garnered by ignoring 
those calling for it to take a diﬀ erent course.127  (See 
ExxonMobil’s comment below.)‡
Corporations and Human Rights
Like the United States Bill of Rights, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes 
basic rights and freedoms of individuals.  But where the 
Bill of Rights is enforceable in the United States, the 
UDHR is an aspirational statement subject to the laws 
and cultures of individual nations.  Th e protection and 
promotion of human rights, therefore, often depends 
on the actions of other sectors of society, including 
business.   
In market-based capitalism, as now nearly universally 
practiced, the business case for human rights is self-
evident.  Corporations depend on a socio-political 
environment that values and enforces individual 
rights.  A lack of secure individual rights threatens the 
physical security of employees and physical resources, 
creates political instability, and adds risk to business 
planning and decision making.  Th e absence of the 
rule of law or a well-functioning judiciary, associated 
with the absence of rights, makes for a mercurial and 
risky investment climate.  Governments that refuse 
to respect human rights tend to act antagonistically 
toward entrepreneurs, property rights, and the free ﬂ ow 
of ideas that underpin robust corporate performance.  
Th e general case for business to promote respect 
for human rights is not necessarily the same as an 
individual company’s incentive to adhere to global 
standards of human rights.  If it were, child and slave 
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labor and other reported labor abuses would not occur.  
Th e record on human rights of large global corpora-
tions with name recognition and broad media coverage 
can be a signiﬁ cant factor for the value of their brands.  
Allegations of human rights abuses carry high costs of 
litigation, strained societal relations, loss of consumer 
trust, and often a presumption of guilt even if the 
allegations prove false. 
Unlike environmental practices, human rights behavior 
cannot generate a revenue stream, although they can 
help avoid revenue losses that occur when a company is 
accused of human rights violations.  Six percent of ex-
ecutives think human rights will inﬂ uence shareholder 
value either positively or negatively.*  Forty percent 
of executives, up from 34 percent last year, consider 
human rights standards mostly an opportunity with 
limited risks.128  At best, corporations committed to 
human rights and a healthy and secure work environ-
ment can add to their bottom line through greater 
employee loyalty, easier recruiting, higher productivity, 
and the avoidance of negative publicity.  
Survey data indicate that large U.S.-based corporations 
have an incentive to uphold high standards of human 
rights practice, and at least nine out of 10 corporations 
say they maintain a human rights policy or adhere to 
explicit human rights principles.129  One study found 
that 62 percent of the public expects corporations to 
abate human rights abuse around the globe.130  Another 
found that 71 percent of the public expects mutual 
fund companies to account for human rights abuses 
when investing abroad.131  
Th e lack of uniform terminology and reporting make 
it diﬃ  cult to determine what practices and policies are 
actually in place. Many corporations confuse human 
rights with worker rights.  Less than one-quarter of 
surveyed corporations recognize human rights that 
are not labor related, although those are most of the 
UDHR-guaranteed rights.  Furthermore, the level of 
commitment is unclear.  Although nine of ten corpora-
tions say they have a human rights policy, only half as 
many corporate executives as public respondents agree 
that corporations should actively try to abate human 
rights abuses globally.  Half of all corporations say their 
supply-chain-management policies address human 
rights by either requiring or only encouraging suppliers 
to meet a standard.  Th ree-fourths of all corporations 
commit to a safe work environment, although only 60 
percent forbid forced or child labor.
Th e issues of human rights take many forms.  Most 
people think of human rights and business in terms 
of supply-chain management, because news coverage 
has focused on that area.  Revelations of abuses in the 
manufacture of apparel and other consumer products 
have threatened brands like Th e Gap and Nike, and 
have prompted them to take more control over their 
suppliers’ practices.  Human rights issues have also 
had an impact on information and communications 
technology ﬁ rms.  Th e following case study focuses 
on non-labor issues that have arisen with regard to 
technology companies’ operations in China.  
Information and Communications Technology Firms 
Struggle to Protect Human Rights in China
Information and communications technology (ICT) 
ﬁ rms such as Yahoo, Microsoft, Google, and Cisco are 
in the business of facilitating and enhancing the ﬂ ow 
of information.  Th ey face pressure from shareholders, 
customers, and others to promote transparency, human 
rights and other democratic ideals (including users’ 
rights of free expression and privacy), to support their 
companies’ reputations and thereby strengthen the 
value of their brands.
Th e Chinese market for ICT services is growing 
rapidly and presents companies with strong proﬁ t 
opportunities.  Of course, any company must observe 
legal rules in countries where it does business.  
However, the conditions imposed by the Chinese 
government make it diﬃ  cult if not impossible for ICT 
ﬁ rms to meet harmoniously all of the expectations 
described above.  
Th e Chinese government deploys a minimum of twelve 
agencies and tens of thousands of public and private 
* Some shareholders disagree.  Investors Against Genocide, for example, initiated a campaign to target mutual funds invested in PetroChina, Sinopec, 
ONGC, and Petronas—all accused of indirectly funding genocide in Darfur.  
† Conspicuous items include information on the Falun Gong spiritual movement, Tibetan independence, the Dalai Lama, Tiananmen Square, and 
web-sites Radio Free Asia, the BBC’s Chinese language service, and Wikipedia. Results of Internet searches of these words are displayed but links are 
inoperative. 
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personnel to monitor online behavior and enforce 
myriad Internet regulations.  It polices cyber cafes, 
shuts down websites at will, provides a platform for 
citizens to report information harmful to national 
interests, and explicitly bans ﬁ ve-hundred keywords 
from public search.†  Internet service providers must 
obtain a license from the Ministry of Information 
Industry, maintain a comprehensive record of customer 
use for sixty days, and provide user information upon 
government request.132   To complicate matters, the 
U.S. government forbids U.S. companies from selling 
“crime control and detection” equipment to China 
(though experts debate whether U.S. law covers the 
sale of ﬁ lters or other repressive information technolo-
gies).
What follows provides a sketch of recent actions of 
ICT ﬁ rms operating in China, highlights the reaction 
of shareholders and other constituents, and suggests a 
potential pathway ICT companies might pursue going 
forward.   
U.S.-based ICT Firms in China
Controversies that have sparked public reaction in the 
United States include the following:
• Shi Tao, a Chinese journalist, sent an email (from 
his Yahoo account) to an American pro-democracy 
organization explaining that a communist party of-
ﬁ cial warned him of the risks to covering the 15th 
anniversary of pro-democracy demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square.  When asked by the Chinese 
government to turn over Tao’s user information, 
Yahoo complied.133  Tao was sentenced to ten years 
in prison.  
• In a separate case, China’s Public Security Bureau 
arrested Wang Xiaoning, an advocate and writer, 
for “incitement to subvert state power.”  Yahoo 
supplied evidence showing that Wang founded 
electronic journals Democratic Reform Free Forum 
and Current Political Commentary through Yahoo! 
Groups. 134  
• Google and Microsoft prohibit the search of words 
such as “human rights,” “freedom,” and “democ-
racy.”  Th e governments of China, Turkey, Syria, 
Pakistan, Th ailand, and Myanmar at one point or 
another, all blocked Google’s YouTube for showing 
politically sensitive video footage.  China, for 
example, banned the web site after video surfaced 
of Chinese soldiers beating Tibetan monks and 
dragging them through the streets.135 
• Microsoft extirpated the blog of Anti (Zhao Jing), 
a research assistant for the Beijing Bureau of Th e 
New York Times.  Th e termination followed a post 
that supported journalists at Beijing News who 
protested the dismissal of its editor-in-chief.136   
• Cisco Systems sells China tens of thousands of 
routers programmed to monitor Internet usage, 
highlight for the secret police any ‘subversive’ senti-
ments, and prevent Internet users in China from 
accessing banned websites.  Cisco also invented 
Policenet, which aﬀ ords oﬃ  cials of the Public 
Security Bureau access to electronic records of all 
Chinese citizens.137  
Shareholders and other corporate constituents reacted   
Th e actions of Yahoo, Google, Microsoft, and Cisco 
described above spurred lawsuits, shareholder propos-
als, and condemnation by Congress.138  Journalists 
and editorial boards across the country repudiated the 
notion that obeying national laws and policies excused 
the companies’ actions. 139  
Guo Quan, a former professor at Nanjing University, 
announced plans to pursue legal recourse against 
Google and Yahoo for excising his name from search 
results.140  Shareholders issued proposals that called 
on Google to refuse “proactive censorship,” to employ 
all legal means to resist demands for censorship, and to 
stop storing information that could be used to identify 
users in countries that restrict Internet access.*141   
Harrington Investments proposed a resolution to have 
Google create a human rights committee.†142 
In 2006, Boston Common Asset Management 
(BCAM) put forth a shareholder proposal that would 
have required Cisco to adopt a human rights policy 
and issue a report that explains how the Chinese use 
its products.‡  Subsequently, BCAM and the NGO 
Reporters Without Borders formed a coalition with 35 
* Th e proposal received 3.7 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
† Th e proposal received 1.4 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
‡ Th e proposal received 22.4 percent ‘yes’ votes. 
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investor institutions that support “shareholder resolu-
tions that we believe are favorable to freedom of expres-
sion.”143  In congressional testimony, BCAM remarked 
that “engaging in short sighted business operations that 
undermine widely accepted human freedoms is simply 
not a sustainable practice.”144  
What can companies do?
China’s continued economic expansion will be built, at 
least in part, on a thriving information and communi-
cations technology sector.  Th e complicated decisions 
companies like Yahoo, Google, Microsoft and Cisco 
face will not abate anytime soon.  
Going forward, the tradeoﬀ s for these companies 
involve diﬃ  cult calculations about the relative beneﬁ ts 
and costs of actions in both home and host countries.  
Th e proﬁ t opportunities for leading ICT companies in 
China are substantial, yet bad publicity and negative 
reaction in the United States can hurt their reputations 
and share values.*  
One prominent solution proposed to guide company 
behavior in this sector is “for the industry as a whole 
to develop clear protocols for how to interact with 
governments when faced with these sensitive issues, 
whether in China, Europe, the United States or else-
where.”145  Th e Berkman Center for Internet & Society 
at Harvard Law School has partnered with the Center 
for Democracy and Technology and Business for Social 
Responsibility, leading human rights groups, academic 
institutions, and technology ﬁ rms to develop a set of 
“Principles on Free Expression and Privacy.”  Th e initia-
tive, agreed to in Fall 2008, outlines a set of principles 
for businesses to follow “when they encounter laws and 
practices that may contravene international human 
rights standards or are at odds with law or culture in 
their home jurisdiction.”146 
Th e Principles on Free Expression and Privacy initia-
tive might constitute a way forward for ICT companies. 
Th e initiative should encourage companies to shift their 
strategies from reactive to proactive.  Yahoo, Google, 
and Microsoft, in an eﬀ ort to determine what laws, 
social norms, or principles should bind their behavior 
abroad, actively participated in this and other initia-
tives.†  Th ough the initiative applies especially to the 
information and communications technology industry, 
a similar approach could be instituted across other 
sectors that face similar constraints and pressures. 
A Role for Directors in Considering 
Corporate Strategy and Societal Concerns
Business decision makers operating in globalized 
markets may need little reminding of how complicated 
such markets are and how strategically important 
societal issues have become.  Whether decisions are 
made after considerable deliberation or in the heat of a 
moment when there is little time to do other than react, 
business decisions that intersect with societal interests 
can reverberate in unexpected ways.  
Directors can play a key role in helping a company to 
get ahead of the curve, to step outside of day-to-day 
pressures, and to think strategically about the long-
term interests of the corporation.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, directors are uniquely placed to ask tough 
questions about how a corporation’s strategy interacts 
with societal concerns that form the landscape in 
which the business operates and to develop appropriate 
incentives for company executives to deal constructively 
in that landscape.   
As the studies above illustrate, there is not one 
answer that ﬁ ts every circumstance.  But a number 
of existing internationally accepted initiatives, such 
as the UN Global Compact, the guide published by 
the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, or 
the recent report issued by UN Representative John 
Ruggie, might serve as guideposts for forward-thinking 
directors who want to incorporate human rights best 
practices into daily operations.147  Directors should 
determine what initiatives, or perhaps what principles 
within various initiatives, best ﬁ t their ﬁ rms’ speciﬁ c 
goals regarding human rights, and then ask manage-
ment to put forward plans to implement such policies. 
Companies simply cannot avoid confronting the hard 
questions posed by environmental, human rights, 
and other societal concerns.  In the next chapter we 
examine the role government can play to help compa-
nies better address these concerns.
* Google’s share price, for example, dropped considerably the day of the Congressional hearing.
† Additionally, Yahoo launched a Business & Human Rights Program, started a fund to “provide support to other political dissidents and their families,” 
and began lobbying the United States government for the release of the journalists.  
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Th roughout the preceding chapters we have drawn 
distinctions between businesses in general and publicly 
held corporations in particular.  Our primary interest is 
in public corporations, which generally are larger than 
privately held corporations, partnerships, and other 
forms of business organization.  Public companies are 
more highly regulated with particular regard to disclo-
sures and requirements for reporting to shareholders.  
But, as noted throughout, in large measure the kinds 
of societal pressures faced by public corporations are 
common to all businesses.
Two persistent issues that ﬁ ltered through our discus-
sion are the topics of this chapter:  
First, is the competitive ﬁ eld balanced between 
public and private forms of business?  In particular, 
do private-equity-owned corporations face the same 
societal pressures and obligations as their publicly held 
counterparts?  
Second, what is the proper division of labor between 
business and government?  Shouldn’t governments take 
primary responsibility for addressing societal concerns? 
Issue 1: Corporations Owned by Private 
Equity Companies Face Many Similar 
Market Pressures but Different Corporate 
Governance Requirements 
Th e actions of private ﬁ rms are subject to the same 
market forces and the same societal pressures as large, 
public corporations.  Of course, private-equity-owned 
ﬁ rms diﬀ er from public corporations on a number 
of accounts: disclosures; access to funding; executive 
compensation; shareholder/ownership rights; and 
investors’ liquidity to name a few.  But these diﬀ erences 
neither protect private ﬁ rms from market competition 
nor free them from exposure to societal concerns 
(including government regulation).  In fact, market 
forces, pressure from non-governmental organizations, 
Chapter 5.
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and enlightened self interest continue to nudge these 
private ﬁ rms toward a more operational and sustained 
integration of social issues with company strategy.  
Others, of course, remain resistant to change or ﬂ y 
under the radar of social monitors.  
Th is section chronicles two short examples, focused on 
private-equity ﬁ rms, to illustrate how some such ﬁ rms 
have interacted with contentious societal issues.  As in 
the previous chapter, we neither oﬀ er pat answers nor 
render ﬁ nal judgments.  Instead, the examples aim to 
highlight recent developments and evince the complica-
tions that private-equity ﬁ rms face and how they have 
responded.  Th e ﬁ rst example focuses on the acquisi-
tion of TXU Energy by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
& Co (KKR) and Texas Paciﬁ c Group (TPG); the 
second examines the Carlyle Group’s acquisition of the 
nursing-home chain Manor Care. 
KKR and TPG partnered with the Environmental 
Defense Fund to integrate environmental concerns into 
corporate strategy*
In February 2007, KKR and TPG bought TXU for 
$69.25 a share, a 20 percent premium, and assumed 
nearly $13 billion in debt.148  Th e deal was valued at 
$45 billion.  On the surface, the deal, excluding perhaps 
its exceptional size, seemed similar to the 160 other 
transactions conducted by KKR over the last 30 years.  
But KKR, for the ﬁ rst time, enlisted the advice of the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an environment-
focused nonproﬁ t organization.  EDF acted as a 
consultant and eventually endorsed the sale of TXU 
to the private-equity ﬁ rms.  Th e partnership, itself 
unusual, received wide media coverage.  When EDF 
endorsed the acquisition, praise proliferated across 
environmental web sites and prominent news media.  
Th e International Herald Tribune characterized the deal 
as an “environmental watershed.”  CNN averred that 
“Private equity goes green.”149 
* As this report was being written, KKR was in the process of becoming a publicly traded corporation.  It remains privately held as we publish. When it 
acquired TXU it was privately held.
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Th e deal garnered attention for a number of reasons, 
among them the initiative shown by KKR and TPG’s 
approach to EDF.  For almost one year prior to the 
deal, EDF had led an aggressive media campaign to 
educate Texans about the threats posed by TXU’s 
proposed plants, rallied political support and threat-
ened legal action.  TXU responded in kind. Th e back 
and forth devolved into a virtual shouting match with 
neither organization appearing to listen to the other.  
Th ough it might appear to some that KKR partnered 
with EDF to mollify and eﬀ ectively quiet EDF and 
other environmental activists, and that EDF agreed 
to the partnership to serve private rather than public 
interests, the facts point to a diﬀ erent conclusion.  
Most important, the KKR-EDF partnership did not 
end after the acquisition of TXU, and was not limited 
to that one acquisition.  KKR, showcasing an inter-
est in environmental issues over the long run, asked 
EDF to serve as an adviser on energy consumption, 
waste output and carbon emissions for KKR’s entire 
U.S. portfolio, in what it termed its “green portfolio 
project.”  EDF agreed to serve in an unpaid capacity to 
maintain its independence and to be able to continue 
to push aggressively for various environmental reforms.  
In addition, EDF won a number of concessions in 
the TXU acquisition.  On the front end of the ne-
gotiations, the investors committed to scale back the 
planned building of coal plants, from eleven to three.  
KKR and TPG also agreed to reduce TXU’s carbon 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020; endorse the platform 
of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership; tie executive 
compensation at TXU to climate stewardship; double 
investments in clean, renewable energy; and establish 
a Sustainable Energy Advisory Committee to help the 
company adopt a more green business model.150    
Th e partnership, put plainly, proved much more than 
an attempt by a private company to “buy oﬀ ” activist 
concerns; nor was it a “sell-out” by an NGO.  Instead, 
the partnership was an earnest eﬀ ort by both parties to 
get ahead of an ever-evolving market.  According to the 
co-director of KKR’s energy practice, KKR wanted to 
partner with EDF to “get ahead of an issue, and poten-
tially set an example in terms of how best to manage, 
monitor, and improve environmental footprints across 
the portfolio.”151  One expert, commenting on the 
KKR-EDF partnership, makes the broader point that 
“some of the largest corporations whose very business 
model depends on environmental damage are moving 
away from their core business practices to emphasize 
sustainability and resource protections.”152  Put slightly 
diﬀ erently, investors that once eagerly funded power 
plants without regard for environmental externalities 
are showing a more long-term concern that relies on a 
business model incorporating environmental outcomes 
and concerns about sustainability.
Th e partnership also speaks to the universal nature of 
societal concerns and the value of a proactive corporate 
strategy.  Th e ﬁ ght over TXU’s environmental eﬀ ects 
had nothing to do with its status as a public or private 
corporation.  Likewise, KKR’s embrace of environ-
mental concerns was indistinguishable from what a 
forward-looking public corporation might have done. 
Th e case is distinctive because corporations generally 
have not actively sought cooperative ventures with 
NGOs; only recently have they started to seek out such 
strategic partnerships.  KKR and many of the public 
corporations we have examined are leveraging such 
partnerships to get ahead of a changing market, with 
the expectation that, over the long run, they will be able 
to realize tangible gains.  Th e same logic applies to the 
interests of NGOs like EDF, which recognize that they 
need the scale and inﬂ uence that reside in the private 
sector.  As we note below, from the corporate perspec-
tive the primary diﬀ erences between public and private 
endeavors of this type is the nature of public disclosure. 
Th e Carlyle Group and the SEIU engaged in an acrimo-
nious dispute over the purchase of Manor Care
Th e Carlyle Group, with the purchase of Manor 
Care, owns 37,000 beds that span 30 states and 552 
diﬀ erent facilities. On the surface, the Carlyle Group’s 
acquisition of Manor Care nursing homes shares many 
similarities with the acquisition of TXU by KKR and 
TPG. Carlyle bought Manor Care for $67 per share, 
a 20 percent premium over Manor Care’s stock price; 
assumed $5.5 billion in debt; and paid Manor Care 
executives over $250 million.  But the execution of the 
deal diﬀ ered drastically from the aforementioned case. 
KKR and TPG were able to develop a strategic part-
nership with EDF, TXU’s principle critic, to integrate 
environmental concerns into corporate decisions.  Th e 
Carlyle Group, in contrast, became embroiled in a 
caustic ﬁ ght with the SEIU, which represented Manor 
Care workers and presented itself as concerned primar-
ily with the quality of patient care rather than the 
employment and working conditions of its membership.
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Th e Carlyle Group’s attempt to purchase Manor Care 
drew the interest of the SEIU for a number of reasons.  
First, Carlyle’s purchase eﬀ orts began shortly after one 
expert published a report ﬁ nding that nursing homes 
purchased by large investment ﬁ rms scored worse than 
national rates on 12 of 14 indicators that regulators use 
as a means to measure the care provided for long-term 
residents.153  Th e report spurred ranking members 
of the Senate Finance Committee to send letters to a 
number of investment ﬁ rms, including Carlyle, regard-
ing the role of private equity ﬁ rms in the nursing home 
industry.  In a press release, Max Baucus, Senator from 
Montana, pointed out, “Nursing homes aren’t just in-
vestment vehicles. Th ey’re homes for some of America’s 
most vulnerable citizens.”154  Many of the investors, by 
contrast, argued against the validity of the ﬁ ndings. 
Most contended that the buyouts actually turned 
around nursing homes approaching bankruptcy.  In 
short, Carlyle’s attempt to buy Manor Care took place 
as controversy erupted over private-equity acquisitions 
of nursing homes in general. 
Adding to the tension, Manor Care itself had a history 
of falling short on a number of standards of care and 
compliance before the acquisition.  Between 2004 and 
2007, Manor Care was found to have 23 percent more 
violations of standards of care than in the previous 
three years.  Eight out of 10 Manor Care facilities 
reported nursing staﬀ  levels below government recom-
mendations.  In Pennsylvania, 30 Manor Care homes 
were cited for failing to provide the care and services 
deemed necessary to maintain the highest quality of 
life.  Ten were cited for failing to prevent the spread of 
infections.  Eight were cited for failing to store, cook, 
and provide food in a safe way.  Across the country, 
only 4 percent of Manor Care nursing homes were in 
compliance with federal care standards.155   
Manor Care’s poor performance along with skepticism 
surrounding the deal set the stage for the SEIU cam-
paign.  From when Manor Care shareholders approved 
the buyout until the deal closed, SEIU led a campaign 
to commit the Carlyle Group to improve patient care 
and provide quality health care for patients and em-
ployees.  A signiﬁ cant concern for SEIU was that the 
debt assumed by Carlyle would necessitate cost-cutting 
measures including layoﬀ s of union members. 
Carlyle attempted to ease public and union concerns 
by issuing a ‘patients ﬁ rst’ pledge.  Th e pledge, which 
promised high-quality care, education and training for 
staﬀ ers and state-of-the-art facilities, constituted a rare 
step for a private equity ﬁ rm.  A Carlyle spokesperson 
stated, “It would not be in our interest in any way to 
have patient care suﬀ er.  It is fundamental to our invest-
ment thesis that we continue to improve and enhance 
patient care because that will attract even more patients 
and make this a better investment.  Th is is logical and 
simple.  If we didn’t provide good care, we wouldn’t 
have good patients.”156  Nevertheless, SEIU and some 
health care experts dismissed the pledge, however 
earnest.  Th e math, most alleged, did not add up.  Th ey 
asked, “How could a private equity ﬁ rm at once assume 
billions of dollars of debt, improve the quality of 
patient care, which would require additional short-term 
costs, and pass proﬁ ts along to shareholders?”
Carlyle’s failure to provide speciﬁ cs to back up its 
“patients-ﬁ rst” pledge, and the SEIU’s predictable 
opposition to the pledge, provided the impetus for an 
increasingly bitter dispute.  David Rubenstein, co-
founder and Managing Director of the Carlyle Group, 
remarked, “Th e SEIU is not happy that 60,000 workers 
at the company aren’t unionized...It’s really an eﬀ ort to 
increase unionization, and not so much to worry about 
patients’ health care.”157 Andrew McDonald, a spokes-
person for SEIU, retorted that “Long before Carlyle 
chose to target nursing homes as their latest cash cow, 
SEIU has been ﬁ ghting to improve care in nursing 
homes…SEIU has fought for and won hundreds of 
millions of dollars in funding to improve care over last 
decade.”158  
Th e Carlyle Group completed its takeover of Manor 
Care at the end of 2007, and acrimony between 
Carlyle/Manor Care and SEIU continues.  Th e SEIU 
still stages protests, and now runs a website, “Carlyle 
Fix Manor Care Now,” which aims to hold Carlyle 
accountable for its promises.159  Similar to “Wal-Mart 
Watch,” the website highlights news stories that allege 
poor standards of care, less-than-state-of-the-art 
facilities, perceived abuse of workers rights and inad-
equate staﬃ  ng levels.  For its part, Carlyle and Manor 
Care have been relatively quiet, appearing to adopt an 
ignore-it-and-it-will-go-away strategy.  An Internet 
and news media search revealed only one relevant press 
release from Manor Care announcing the formation 
of an independent advisory committee on quality of 
care.160
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Contrasts between public and private-equity-owned 
ﬁ rms
Th e public does not discriminate between public and 
private corporations.  Nor, at this scale, do non-govern-
mental organizations or society at large.  Private ﬁ rms, 
as illustrated by the above examples, face strong pres-
sure to serve public as well as private interests.  Neither 
public nor private companies need adopt universal, 
once-size-ﬁ ts-all solutions.  Partnering with non-
governmental organizations, for example, might 
make sense in some cases but not in others.  Conﬂ ict 
and confrontation are sometimes unavoidable.  Th e 
more important point is that both publicly held and 
private-equity-owned businesses must become more 
adept at incorporating societal concerns into strate-
gic frameworks and business plans.
Were the Carlyle group a public corporation, one also 
might expect to see the SEIU pursue its concerns 
about patient quality and workplace standards through 
shareholder resolutions, which have become a prin-
cipal means for union pension funds to express their 
membership’s concerns.  In addition, one might expect 
more public reporting by the company about its eﬀ orts 
in these areas, in contrast to its virtual silence on these 
topics currently.  Paradoxically, the SEIU pension fund, 
like other union and public pension funds, is a major 
investor in the Carlyle Group and stands to beneﬁ t 
ﬁ nancially from Carlyle’s investments.  But, investor 
rights in private equity funds are more circumscribed 
than in public corporations.  
For private ﬁ rms, voluntary disclosure might serve as a 
starting point.  Private ﬁ rms are not compelled to dis-
close as much information as public ﬁ rms.  Information 
disclosed voluntarily via press releases, as demonstrated 
by Carlyle’s patient pledge, often faces intense scrutiny 
and skepticism from non-governmental groups and 
society more broadly.  As pointed out in earlier chap-
ters, the internet and communications revolutions have 
given anyone with Internet access the power to develop 
and disseminate information in ways that conﬂ ict with 
a business’s own attempt to craft a message or image 
about itself.  Many businesses will ﬁ nd that honesty 
and fair dealing are the only safe harbors. 
Nonetheless, private-equity-owned corporations will 
have some competitive advantages over public corpora-
tions solely because they retain more discretion and 
more choice than public corporations with respect to 
disclosures.  Public opinion is strong but not always 
strong enough to compel such private ﬁ rms to act as 
if they were public ones.  How great an advantage a 
private ﬁ rm might have in this dimension is unclear, 
and a case can be made that in the current era of 
openness the insularity of private ﬁ rms may in fact be a 
disadvantage.   
A similar judgment might be reached with regard to 
shareholder resolutions.  Private-equity-owned ﬁ rms 
do not have to deal with such resolutions, which are 
viewed by many corporate executives and directors as 
an annoyance.  But shareholder resolutions can in the 
long run make public corporations stronger, not weaker, 
as they force corporate boards to confront issues they 
might otherwise have ignored.  Either way, private 
equity ﬁ rms are, like public corporations, dependent 
on capital markets.  Because the sources of capital are 
essentially the same in all markets, the lack of certain 
formal shareholder rights in private equity investments 
does not mean that providers of capital—notably 
public and union pension funds—will be less assertive 
in private markets than they are in public ones.  
Issue 2: What Are The Proper Roles and 
Responsibilities of Government, Business, 
and Non-Profi ts with Regard to Societal 
Concerns?
Government plays many economic roles in market 
capitalist systems.  Among governmental objectives are: 
macroeconomic growth and stability; social equity in 
the distribution of income and taxation; and regula-
tion of market competition.  Most important to the 
issues addressed in this report, government is generally 
expected to provide public goods and compel private 
entities to account for the costs (externalities) they 
impose on society—the two primary concerns that 
corporations are increasingly called upon to address.  
Providing Public Goods
Public goods come in many forms.  In economic terms, 
public goods are characterized by non-rival consump-
tion and non-excludability—that is, one person’s 
consumption does not reduce the good’s availability to 
others, and producers cannot block its use by any par-
ticular individual.  Government provision of national 
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security and infrastructure are the most frequently 
cited examples.  
A clean environment and a culture of respect for 
human rights also can be considered as public goods 
because they can be enjoyed by all.  (As discussed 
below, these “goods” also can be analyzed as exter-
nalities.)  Clearly, government has the primary role in 
establishing and enforcing social policies in these areas, 
and that is what governments around the world have 
done.  Normally, the business role is to obey local laws 
and regulations.  But laws and regulations typically 
set minimums.  Many businesses, especially global 
corporations, often exceed these minimum standards.  
In developing countries, global corporations often raise 
local standards by importing environmental and labor 
practices they employ in higher-income countries.  
For example, tight labor markets for skilled workers, 
despite an excess supply of unskilled labor, often cause 
global corporations to provide higher compensation 
either in the form of higher wages or improved fringe 
beneﬁ ts.161
In advanced economies, like the United States, the 
pressure to exceed regulatory minimums is strongest 
when it appears that government policies lag behind so-
cietal attitudes.  For example, most observers consider 
that U.S. environmental policy has not caught up with 
societal concerns about the risks of climate change.162  
Th at has two important eﬀ ects.  First, it creates a 
demand for businesses to accept voluntarily some of 
the costs of complying with higher standards.  Second, 
it creates a mix of risks and opportunities for busi-
nesses based on their evaluation of changes in policies 
that might occur when the political system eventually 
acts to satisfy societal opinion.  Th roughout this report 
we have discussed these two eﬀ ects and the need for 
corporate leaders to address them in cost-beneﬁ t terms. 
In the U.S. context, a lack of trust in political institu-
tions undermines social progress and shifts public 
demands from political leaders to business leaders.  
Some businesses have calculated that the beneﬁ ts of 
leadership in areas of societal concern outweigh the 
short-term costs.  For others the costs are just too great, 
especially when competitors may not follow suit and 
markets will not reward their leadership.  As noted in 
Chapter 4, business leaders increasingly urge regulation 
to create more certainty in the marketplace and to level 
the competitive environment.   
A better outcome would be one where political institu-
tions could be relied upon to address intelligently 
public concerns and close the gap between social 
expectations and government policies.  Th e recent 
example of the government’s response to the ﬁ nancial 
crisis of late 2008 makes such outcomes seem illusory.  
After the President and Treasury Secretary proposed 
a broad and unrestricted grant of authority to spend 
$700 billion to shore up the failing ﬁ nancial system, 
Congress seemed set to pass a revised bill that, however 
imperfect, seemed able to go a long way to stabilize 
the ﬁ nancial markets, at least in the short term.  But 
partisanship, doctrinaire views, internecine squabbling, 
lack of conﬁ dence in the executive branch, or some 
combination of these factors scuttled an initial agree-
ment among political leaders of both parties.  Although 
a rescue bill ﬁ nally was approved, the high-stakes 
drama, played out before an anxious nation, revealed 
how badly fractured the institutions of national gover-
nance are. 
Elsewhere, CED has addressed the problem of 
Washington’s broken policy process.163  Th e situation 
we describe here is but one manifestation of the cost 
of that problem.  It is, to say the least, an unusual 
situation when business leaders are virtually asking for 
regulation.  Our conclusion and recommendation is 
that political leaders should understand the costs 
they impose on business and society at large if they 
do not take action to improve political governance 
and policy making.  Th ey need seriously to address 
reforms in ethics, lobbying, redistricting, earmarks, 
and other legislative procedures and executive prac-
tices to break the logjam holding back policy reforms 
in substantive areas such as global climate change.  
Another type of public good is the ability of govern-
ments to facilitate collective action, that is, to prompt 
(without the force of regulation) individuals or 
businesses to act in their collective interests when 
the incentives for each potential actor are either not 
strong enough to induce action or, in fact, push in the 
opposite direction.  Th e incentive for free riding, for 
example, can inhibit individuals and businesses from 
taking costly action when they might beneﬁ t from the 
action of others while themselves doing nothing.  Th e 
government’s involvement in the promotion of codes 
of conduct and other “voluntary” industry programs 
is an example of such “collective action” and the use 
of the government’s power of persuasion.  Many of 
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these industry codes, such as the apparel agreement, 
extractive industry agreement, and others, have come 
into existence with at least some governmental en-
couragement.  Th e Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) provides a good example of how 
government can use its good oﬃ  ces to bring interested 
parties together to establish a voluntary agreement to 
beneﬁ t all.  
Th e objective of the EITI is to achieve “greater 
transparency in payments and contributions made 
by companies and revenues received by governments 
for natural resource extraction.”  It evolved out of 
a number of prior initiatives, starting with a 1999 
report of the NGO Global Witness, Crude Awakening, 
which focused attention on corruption of government 
and military leaders in Angola, oil companies that 
lacked transparency and accountability, and lending 
practices of the international ﬁ nancial institutions. 
Th e report triggered a coalition of Global Witness, 
Transparency International-UK, the Publish What 
You Pay campaign, and ultimately the UK’s Foreign & 
Commonwealth Oﬃ  ce, which spearheaded the EITI 
initiative.
Th e litany of problems faced by companies in extractive 
industries and local economies with high-value natural 
resource endowments is well stated in the following 
passage:
Th e squandering of public revenue skews 
patterns of investment and further enriches 
elites; it corrupts governance and erodes the 
rule of law; it exacerbates regional conﬂ icts 
and threatens national unity; it deprives local 
communities of their right to development 
and condemns them to poverty.  Companies’ 
bottom lines may not be aﬀ ected in any 
one year, but the cumulative squandering 
of revenues takes its toll: it challenges their 
social license to operate; endangers their local 
operations; and threatens their global reputa-
tions.  It does so by stoking tensions between 
oil-producing communities and the companies 
operating amidst or in close proximity to them.  
It puts companies in the unwanted position of 
acting as de facto surrogate governments, due 
both to the default of the real government au-
thorities and to the sometimes violent demands 
of the local communities.  And it can make the 
companies appear complicit in human rights 
abuses committed by security forces called in to 
quell local unrest and disruption of oil opera-
tions.164
As destructive as these results are, little incentive exists 
for any individual company to break from existing 
practices.  BP tried unsuccessfully in 2001, when it 
announced (separately from the Publish What You Pay 
initiative) that it would disclose all contract payments 
made to Angola.  But the Angolan government pushed 
back and BP dropped the initiative.
BP’s action, however, served as a tonic to the group 
of non-governmental organizations.  It also made 
clear that any initiative would have to include both oil 
companies and governments of oil-rich nations.  In 
2002, George Soros provided the necessary ﬁ nancial 
support to the now umbrella “Publish What You Pay” 
campaign.  And at Soros’ urging Tony Blair, at the 
2002 Johannesburg Sustainable Development Summit, 
announced plans for the EITI.  Shortly after Blair’s 
announcement, the UK government convened a confer-
ence composed of 140 delegates representing seventy 
governments, companies, industry groups, international 
organizations, investors and non-governmental organi-
zations.  
Under public pressure from this collective group, and 
the use of what is sometimes called “soft” government 
power, companies and governments were able to agree 
to the EITI principles, which oblige companies to 
publish what they pay for extractive mineral rights and 
governments to publish what they receive.  
Since the conference, the EITI has enjoyed some initial 
successes, although more diﬃ  cult stages of implemen-
tation lie ahead.  Nearly 40 of the world’s largest oil, 
gas and mining companies endorsed the EITI, and the 
vast majority has completed the ‘International-level 
Company Self-Assessment Form.’  Th e EITI also 
garnered the endorsement of the G8, G20, African 
Union, European Union, and over 70 global investment 
institutions that together manage $14 trillion in assets.  
Twenty-three countries have reached ‘EITI Candidate’ 
status, meaning that the country met the sign-up 
indicators.  Another ten countries already published 
audited EITI reports.  Many more are at present 
working toward the above goals. 
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Another example from an extractive industry, diamond 
mining, illustrates both the role that governments can 
play and the potential beneﬁ ts of a corporation’s social 
strategy.  Since 2003, diamond production has operated 
under the rules of the Kimberly Process Certiﬁ cation 
Scheme (KPCS), which certiﬁ es shipments of rough 
diamonds as coming from areas that are “conﬂ ict-
free.”165  Th e initiative started when Southern African 
diamond-producing states met in May 2000 to discuss 
ways to stop the trade in ‘conﬂ ict diamonds’ and ensure 
that diamond purchases were not funding violence.  It 
has grown to incorporate 48 members, including the 
United States and the European Community.  Member 
companies account for approximately 99.8 percent of 
the global production of rough diamonds.
Th e activities of the De Beers company, the leading 
global producer of rough diamonds, are particularly 
relevant to both the role of government action and the 
broader theme of the interaction between corporate 
strategy and societal concerns.*  Before taking a 
strategic turn toward a society-based strategy, De 
Beers had a reputation as a proﬁ t-maximizing (near) 
monopolist, largely unconcerned with its impact on 
the African societies in which it operates.  By the late 
1990s, De Beers’ strategy was yielding fewer beneﬁ ts 
for the company, and the proliferation of so-called 
‘blood diamonds,’ linked to rebel groups that forced 
workers to mine for diamonds to secure ﬁ nancing for 
arms purchases, was damaging the reputation of the 
diamond industry and hence De Beers’ proﬁ ts.  
In response to social and market pressures, De Beers 
repositioned its strategy to work with governments, 
local communities, and non-governmental organiza-
tions.166  De Beers worked with NGOs on the blood 
diamonds issues and was instrumental in the creation 
of the World Diamond Council to represent the inter-
national diamond industry in the Kimberley Process.  
Although De Beers’ market share dropped from a high 
of 80 percent to 40 percent, its proﬁ ts have increased 
under the current regime, which reassured consumers 
and reinvigorated the diamond market.  
De Beers’ strategy has not been conﬁ ned to engagement 
in the Kimberly Process.  Its leadership in Botswana, 
in particular, has helped both the company and the 
country to thrive.  De Beers’ speciﬁ c operations in 
Botswana are built around a 50-50 partnership with 
the government (aside from the government’s overall 
stake in the De Beers company).  In addition, De Beers 
has built roads, hospitals, and schools, instituted HIV/
AIDS treatment and awareness programs, and hired 
over 600 locals to work at a new diamond sorting 
plant moved recently from London to Gaborone, 
Botswana.167
De Beers’ transformation beneﬁ ted from strong 
leadership, local knowledge, and, at least with regards 
to Botswana, an eager and engaged democratic govern-
ment.  Gareth Penny, chief executive of De Beers, 
recognized the interdependence of business and society, 
remarking that “we think our approach is a competitive 
advantage…the country can now attract banks and 
service industries—and avoid the natural resource 
curse….We are part of the solution.”168  Another key 
part of the solution has been the active support and 
participation of the government of Botswana, which 
has been democratic, intelligent, and relatively free from 
corruption, according to Transparency International.169 
Regulating Externalities
An externality is the eﬀ ect of an economic decision 
by one party on others whose interests were not 
taken into account.  Such eﬀ ects may be positive or 
negative, although governments are most frequently 
called upon to limit the eﬀ ects of negative externalities, 
typically through taxes or regulation that compel ﬁ rms 
to recognize or “internalize” the costs of externalities 
imposed on others.
Government regulation of externalities and business 
strategy intersect in several ways.  Most obviously, 
businesses must implement programs to comply with 
government mandates in areas such as environmental 
protection, labor rights, bribery, money laundering, and 
other concerns.  Businesses have adopted programs 
either in anticipation of regulation or to show that 
less onerous voluntary eﬀ orts could accomplish goals 
similar to those of proposed regulatory mandates.  
Regulatory programs have spurred many businesses to 
oﬀ er new products and services to fulﬁ ll the needs of 
* De Beers Investments is a privately held, ownership company registered in Luxembourg.  It has three shareholders: Anglo American plc, a publicly trade 
corporation, holds 45 percent of shares; the Oppenheimer family’s Central Holdings holds 40 percent of shares; and the Government of the Republic of 
Botswana owns 15 percent.
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new markets created by regulations.  U.S companies, 
for example, have been among the leaders in develop-
ment, production, and sales of emission control devices 
such as scrubbers, catalytic converters, and other 
products developed in response to clean air standards.  
Over a decade ago, CED published a policy state-
ment, Modernizing Government Regulation: Th e Need 
for Action, which contained recommendations for 
improving government regulation to account for social 
concerns.  (Th e “ﬁ ndings” of that report are contained 
in box 6, at right.)  CED articulated four overarching 
principles that continue to serve as a guidepost for 
sound regulatory policy:
• Regulation is warranted only when markets do not 
work as well as regulation to protect citizens and 
consumers.
• Regulatory authority should not be exercised 
capriciously, and the delegation of such authority 
by Congress to regulatory bodies should be limited 
to ensure this.
• Congress and the regulatory agencies should 
publicly and objectively evaluate in some form the 
expected beneﬁ ts and costs of proposed major 
regulatory eﬀ orts, using disinterested, professional, 
scientiﬁ c advice. Such evaluations should also be 
applied periodically to major existing regulations.
• Where feasible and eﬀ ective, regulations should be 
applied with a “soft touch” that allows ﬂ exibility of 
response, including the use of market incentives, in 
lieu of command-and-control directives.
Th ese principles and ﬁ ndings pointed to what some 
now term “smart regulation.”  Smart regulation draws 
from an array of ideas linked to performance- and 
principles-based regulation.  It rejects one-size-ﬁ ts-all 
models and the extremes of rules that are either too 
loose or too rigid.  It seeks to strike an appropriate 
balance between ﬂ exibility and eﬃ  ciency.
An overly rigid regulatory regime with strict enforce-
ment provides dependability and predictability. 
Corporations will, not surprisingly, comply with 
regulatory rules, often staying within their strict 
conﬁ nes while testing boundaries.  But a rules-based 
regulatory model that directs all corporations to adhere 
to identical requirements does not always make politi-
cal or practical sense.  Overly burdensome regulations 
Box 6.  Findings of Modernizing 
Government Regulation
Th e American people overwhelmingly—and 
correctly—believe that government regulation is 
needed to achieve many important economic and 
social goals.  Regulations spring directly from the 
desire for clean air, drinkable water, safe workplac-
es, reliable ﬁ nancial markets, improved medicines, 
and competitive industries.  Government regulation 
is therefore a large and necessary presence in the 
American economy.
Nevertheless, the current regulatory system pro-
duces too few beneﬁ ts at excessive cost.  Th is is not 
well understood by the public, since the main costs 
of regulation are hidden from public view.  Th ose 
costs show up only indirectly in the form of higher 
prices, diminished product variety, lower rates of 
innovation and productivity growth, and reduced 
job opportunities.  A more eﬃ  cient regulatory 
system would be both more eﬀ ective and less costly.
Current eﬀ orts to eﬀ ect meaningful regulatory 
reform are severely hampered by distrust on both 
sides of the regulatory debate.  Individuals commit-
ted to the resolution of health, safety, and environ-
mental problems are suspicious of any eﬀ ort that 
is seen as possibly obstructing or delaying their 
objectives.  Individuals committed to the reduc-
tion of “big government” decry those who would 
proceed rapidly to address such problems with 
costly or ill-designed remedies.  To reconcile these 
two polar extremes, or at least to narrow the gap 
between them, CED believes that better informa-
tion, based on sound science and analysis, is needed 
in the regulatory process.
Source: Modernizing Government Regulation: Th e 
Need for Action
are costly and hamper economic growth.  Historical 
circumstances account for much of the United States’ 
regulatory regime being rules-based, but it is doubtful 
that newly imposed regulations would follow this path.  
Most analysts view rules-based regulation as focused 
too narrowly on the targeted outcome while neglecting 
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that the choice of process might achieve the same out-
comes at lower costs (that is, with greater eﬃ  ciency).  
Excessively loose regulatory regimes have some ben-
eﬁ ts, but lack teeth.  Loose regulation—self regulation, 
voluntary codes of conduct, and the like—involves 
less cost, allows ample ﬂ exibility in meeting goals, and 
engenders less business opposition.  But absent penal-
ties or any measure of accountability, the beneﬁ t of free 
riding always provides a strong incentive not to cooper-
ate.  Many corporations simply will not self-regulate or 
follow industry guidelines.  Although we have demon-
strated throughout this report that self regulation and 
voluntary codes can help businesses to address societal 
concerns, they cannot always substitute for sound 
regulation that establishes fair competitive rules and 
achieves well-articulated societal goals.  Furthermore, 
though public scrutiny and market incentives can be 
powerful forces exposing and checking bad behavior 
and violations of self-regulatory principles, they are no 
substitute for enforcement by government monitors.  
Also, a lack of eﬀ ective disclosure requirements can 
make it diﬃ  cult for interested parties to hold public 
and, especially, private corporations to account.  
Smart regulation presents a nuanced, middle-of-the-
road strategy that ﬁ ts neatly between the extremes.  
Smart regulation resembles performance-based 
regulation, which requires corporations to achieve 
an outcome but allows them to determine how that 
objective is to be met.  It relies more on markets than 
on commands.  Society beneﬁ ts as corporations achieve 
societal goals, such as, emitting less carbon dioxide, 
protecting the rights of workers, or providing more 
access to more information.  Corporations beneﬁ t by 
having the ability to meet social expectations without 
sacriﬁ cing competitive advantage or being forced to 
incur excessive costs.  
Performance-based regulation, though a better balance 
of ﬂ exibility and eﬃ  ciency than the policies mentioned 
above, still suﬀ ers from some drawbacks.  For example, 
the greater the number of compliance strategies 
employed by corporations, the more diﬃ  cult veriﬁ ca-
tion becomes.  One solution is to mandate greater 
transparency and disclosure to provide government 
monitors, shareholders, and other corporate constitu-
ents the information necessary to evaluate performance. 
Government regulators might consider a “comply-or-
explain” requirement such as that initiated in corporate 
governance codes in Britain and now used elsewhere 
in the European Community.  Th e ‘comply or explain’ 
approach calls for companies to disclose how they have 
complied with corporate governance codes or explain 
why they have not.  In essence, government sets goals, 
and corporations must disclose their performance 
relative to those goals; markets provide the discipline. 
In sum, government has the primary role in establish-
ing benchmarks for the achievement of societal goals 
through regulation.  But regulation need not be heavy 
handed; it can apply a ‘soft touch’.  Smart regulation 
attempts to strike an appropriate balance between 
predictability and eﬃ  ciency by allowing businesses 
greater ﬂ exibility in how they meet objectives.  Th is 
approach puts greater reliance on market forces and 
disclosure to achieve desired results.  Th e goal, as one 
commentator put it, is to “strike the right balance” and 
“create a framework which allows entrepreneurs to 
ﬂ ourish, but which also engenders trust in investors 
and consumers.”170  
Democracy, Political Institutions, and Business
In 2007, the book, Supercapitalism, by former Secretary 
of Labor Robert Reich, explored many of the themes 
we have examined in this report and speciﬁ cally in this 
chapter.171  Reich concludes that eﬀ orts to encourage 
corporate businesses voluntarily to address societal 
concerns misdirect social energy that ought to be aimed 
at persuading government to meet its responsibility 
to provide solutions to societal problems.  In Reich’s 
analysis, the last several decades have seen a shift of 
power away from individuals in their roles of citizens 
and towards their roles of consumers and investors.  
Th at shift has made it easier for social activists to aﬀ ect 
corporate behavior than government policies.  In a 
sense, increased competition in the economic sphere 
has made businesses more responsive to consumers and 
investors, while ‘oligopolistic’ conditions in the political 
sphere have resulted in political stagnation and a lack 
of responsiveness to societal concerns.  
Although we do not agree with all of Reich’s analysis or 
conclusions, there is a great deal of truth in the ﬁ nding 
that many businesses appear at present to be more re-
sponsive to many of society’s concerns than are govern-
ments, and that many anti-business social campaigns 
divert attention from government’s responsibility to 
address social problems.  We agree, for example, that 
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government must step up to its responsibilities and 
that “business statesmen” in the United States can 
play an important role by speaking out for govern-
ment solutions to pressing policy concerns, such as 
unsustainable cost increases in federal entitlement 
programs, the lack of universal health care, environ-
mental damage from climate change, and the threat 
to human rights in many developing countries—
issues that businesses are being pressured to address 
piecemeal.  
But better government responsiveness to societal 
concerns does not mean that business should reverse 
course and stop addressing such concerns also.  As we 
have said throughout this report: Corporations must 
integrate relevant societal concerns into corporate 
strategy to strengthen long-term competitiveness 
and the sustainability of both the corporation and 
the society in which it exists.  A healthier political 
system would make that task easier, but it would not 
eliminate the need for businesses also to act.
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Like the economist in the joke who sees something 
working in practice and asks whether it can work in 
theory, skeptics question whether corporations can 
sustain societal-based strategies, and cynics wonder 
whether corporations should.  But global corporations, 
by paying greater attention to their interaction, or in-
terdependency, with society, are redeﬁ ning the balance 
between commercial concerns and societal concerns, 
such as preservation of the environment and human 
rights.  Th ese ﬁ rms continue to prove both skeptics and 
cynics wrong, and they lead the way by showcasing the 
new competitive strategies of the 21st century.
Th e existence of the myriad and varied approaches by 
corporations to societal concerns demonstrates that 
“the market has spoken.”  Such practice is not only 
possible but necessary to secure those corporations’ 
long-term interests.  It improves the societies in which 
they operate (draw resources from and sell to) and 
therefore also improves the long-term sustainability of 
the businesses themselves.  
Our experience and the research conducted for this 
report inform an urgent call for those directors of 
public corporations who have yet to address the new 
realities of global competitive markets to exercise 
appropriate stewardship.  Th ey must lead an evalua-
tion of the long-term sustainability of their business 
strategies in light of changes in societal attitudes.  
Such an evaluation is even more important in light of 
the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008, which in part grew out of 
short-sightedness toward risk and public responsibili-
ties.
Our recommendations to all directors emphasize the 
need for independent judgment and ﬁ delity to the 
long-term interest of the corporation.  Th ey are not 
“one-size-ﬁ ts-all” solutions.  Each corporation will 
have unique solutions that ﬁ t its need.  In summary, we 
recommend:
Chapter 6
Conclusion
• Th e board of directors has ultimate responsibil-
ity for the performance of the corporation. Th is 
responsibility is well served when directors, 
acting as stewards of the corporation’s long-
term interest, give weight to societal issues that 
impact the ﬁ rm’s longer-term performance. 
• Boards should encourage company manage-
ment to evaluate societal concerns, examine the 
various strategic responses, and decide on sound 
business grounds what management ought to do.
• When choosing a CEO, the board’s selection 
committee should be mindful of the role that 
person will play in setting the tone and direction 
of the company with regard to ethics, honest 
reporting, and engagement with shareholders 
and other interested parties.  Boards should 
tie a portion of CEO and senior management’s 
performance compensation to metrics based on 
the corporation’s performance on such concerns.   
• Directors regularly should consider how the 
company plans, manages, and communicates 
about the company’s interaction with society.  
Th e board should insist that management report 
regularly to it and to the public on non-ﬁ nancial 
performance, including social performance.*  To 
institutionalize the process, the board may want 
to establish a special committee or empower its 
governance committee to take responsibility for 
oversight and reporting.  Th at committee should 
report to the full board and appear on its agenda 
on a regular basis.
• Directors should recognize the value of commu-
nicating to shareholders and the public on issues 
that bear on the company’s reputation and brand 
value, even when such communication may 
not be required by regulation or ﬁ t neatly into 
ﬁ nancial disclosure formats.  Boards that have a 
* Of course, these need not be the same reports, but public reporting must be truthful and easily understood.
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non-executive chair or lead director may want to 
consider a communications role for that person 
on such issues and topics.
As we complete work on this project, an intriguing 
debate is taking place among academics and practi-
tioners about “creative capitalism,” a term coined by 
Microsoft chair Bill Gates to denote the use of market 
forces for reducing global poverty and inequality.*172  
Although the term lacks clear deﬁ nition, the debate 
about it has touched on many of the themes analyzed 
here.  Of most relevance is the virtual consensus that 
capitalism is inherently creative; it creates jobs, income, 
wealth, and an ever expanding variety of new and better 
goods and services that improve people’s well being.  
At the same time, the debate has revealed how easily 
well-informed observers can fall into the Friedmanian 
trap of placing the pursuit of proﬁ t in opposition to 
the corporation’s pursuit of societal goals.  As we have 
demonstrated, and as many of the participants in the 
creative-capitalism debate relate, the two goals can go 
hand in hand.  Certainly, clashes between private proﬁ t 
and societal goals frequently occur, but in the long run 
these pursuits should not be viewed as a zero-sum 
conﬂ ict. Th e interests of society and the business com-
munity are not mutually exclusive, but interdependent, 
and their goals are interlinked.  Th e important point is 
that all businesses must consider how social concerns 
interact with strategic frameworks and business plans.   
Many also fall into the trap of a shareholder-primacy 
view, arguing that corporate directors cannot pursue 
any objective other than maximizing returns to share-
holders.  Th roughout this report, we have made a case 
and demonstrated through examples that directors are 
not mere robotic agents of shareholders’ short-term 
interests.  Th ey must exercise independent judgment 
to focus on the long-term interests of the corporation, 
not the narrow interests of some, often short-term, 
shareholders.  
One provocative comment as the ‘creative capitalism’ 
debate wound down intersects with CED’s long-
standing interest in public policy and the role of the 
business community in helping to advance our society 
as a whole.  Th e author of that comment posited that 
the business community’s greatest contribution to 
overcoming societal problems may lie not in corporate 
policies but in business statesmanship—the willingness 
of business leaders to speak out on public policies that 
aﬀ ect the national good.173  Th at is a theme on which 
CED was founded, and which it continues to advocate 
today.  But it is not an either-or choice.  U.S. business 
leaders should consider both how their business 
strategies interact with societal issues and how 
they personally can make a diﬀ erence by support-
ing sound public policies that address society’s key 
concerns.  
Finally, our focus has been primarily on the private 
sector, speciﬁ cally publicly traded corporations.  
Other private-sector businesses and, most important, 
public-sector institutions also have key roles to play.  
Th e public sector in particular must bear primary 
responsibility for addressing societal concerns and for 
providing a favorable environment for business decision 
making.  A signiﬁ cant step in that direction would 
be for political leaders to understand that they are 
imposing unacceptable costs on business and society by 
their failure to reform political governance and policy 
making.  Th e political system must begin to address 
seriously America’s long-term social and economic 
problems.  A healthier political system would make 
businesses’ tasks easier, but it would not eliminate the 
need for businesses also to act.  Our societal problems, 
both nationally and globally, are complex, numerous, 
and sizeable.  Solving these problems will require 
contributions from all sectors of society.
* Th e debate was held on the website http://creativecapitalism.typepad.com/creative_capitalism.  A collection of the essays, blogs, and notes on the 
website was published in book form, December 2008.  
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Pages 37-39, comment by ExxonMobil Corporation 
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to CED’s 
report, Rebuilding Corporate Leadership: How Directors 
Can Link Long-Term Performance with Public Goals, 
speciﬁ cally to statements pertaining to ExxonMobil in 
the section on climate change and corporate strategy.  
Our general comments related to the points made in 
the draft are as follows:
As we have stated publicly numerous times, rising 
greenhouse-gas emissions pose signiﬁ cant risks to 
society and ecosystems.  Th ese risks warrant action by 
individuals, companies and governments.  Since most 
of these emissions are energy-related, any integrated 
approach to meeting the world’s growing energy needs 
over the coming decades must incorporate strategies 
to address the risk of climate change.  We have the 
same concerns as people everywhere – and that is how 
to provide the world with the energy it needs while 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
ExxonMobil has a long record of taking actions to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in our operations, 
of helping consumers reduce their emissions, and 
supporting research into advanced technology with 
the potential to make a signiﬁ cant reduction in future 
global emissions.  We are also an active and construc-
tive participant in dialogue on policy options with 
NGOs, industry and policy makers around the world.  
ExxonMobil also played a leadership role in developing 
internationally endorsed methods and protocols to 
measure and report greenhouse gas emissions from oil 
and gas operations.  Since 2004, we have invested more 
than $1.5 billion in activities that reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and improve energy eﬃ  ciency.  In ad-
dition, we are spending $4 billion in gas utilization 
and commercialization projects to reduce natural gas 
ﬂ aring.  Our actions are delivering results.  Th rough 
eﬃ  ciency actions taken in 2006 and 2007, we reduced 
our greenhouse gas emissions by about 5 million metric 
tons in 2007.  Th is is equivalent to removing about one 
million cars from the roads in the U.S.    
ExxonMobil’s support for thoughtful research and 
analysis on climate issues is long-standing.  Th is in-
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cludes support for fundamental science at Th e Lamont 
Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University, 
Th e Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction, MIT, 
Princeton and Yale; for economics at ABARE, Charles 
River Associates, MIT, and Stanford; and for technol-
ogy at the IEA GHG R&D Programme, Georgia Tech, 
MIT, University of Texas, and Stanford.  Our initiative 
led to the creation of the Global Climate and Energy 
Project at Stanford, with $225M support for a decade 
long eﬀ ort to develop the fundamental science for a 
portfolio of advanced technologies.  GCEP has over 40 
programs at 20 institutions around the globe involving 
over 300 graduate and post-doctoral students.  Our 
own research includes public and proprietary eﬀ orts on 
advanced fuels and engines, fuel cells powered by on-
board reformers to make hydrogen from liquid fuels, 
advanced battery technologies for hybrid vehicles, and 
multiple eﬀ orts to lower the cost and improve the per-
formance of carbon capture and storage.  Our scientists 
have published over forty papers on climate science and 
technology in the peer-reviewed literature and partici-
pate directly as lead authors in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change and as experts in numerous 
national and international expert panels.   
Over many decades, ExxonMobil’s performance for its 
shareholders has beneﬁ ted from a studied approach 
to managing risks in all phases of our business.  Th is 
includes disciplined analysis in the selection of long-
term investment opportunities, care in the execution 
of project development and management, and eﬃ  cient 
operation of existing facilities and businesses.  In 
meeting the growing energy needs of society and doing 
so with respect for the environment our approach 
considers and manages the full range of risks, including 
commercial, technological, political and regulatory 
risks.  
Risks include understanding and responding to climate 
change through research, analysis, participation in the 
policy debate, a strong focus on systems for compliance 
with emerging regulations, and the ability to achieve 
competitive advantage through development and use of 
advanced technology.
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Self-descriptions of select initiatives, guidelines 
and compacts focused on environmental, social, and 
governance issues*
AccountAbility: “AccountAbility advises and mentors 
a growing number of businesses, nonproﬁ ts and 
governments in the development of their approach to 
accountability, learning and performance. Enabling 
better dialogue, information exchange and the creation 
of shared value will remain our focus as we continue 
to develop the AA1000 Series and the related suite of 
tools that put accountability into practice in individual 
businesses and organizations. In the past ﬁ ve years we 
have also focused on the incentives and policies that 
inﬂ uence individual organizations and on the emerging 
role of new partnerships with integrated private gain 
and public purpose and which are increasingly at the 
heart of rule making and enforcement.”  http://www.
accountability21.net/
Amnesty International: “Amnesty International aims 
to highlight human rights abuses in which companies 
are implicated and how governments fail to prevent 
these abuses or hold companies to account when they 
occur.” 
“Th e organization is campaigning for global standards 
on business and human rights and stronger legal frame-
works at both national and international level to hold 
companies to account for their human rights impact.” 
“Amnesty International also calls on companies to 
make respect for human rights an integral component 
of their business operations, including through their 
dealings with other companies, partners, associates, 
subsidiaries, suppliers and government oﬃ  cials.”  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/business-and-human-
rights
Aspen Institute Business and Society Program:  “Th e 
Business and Society program (BSP) is dedicated 
to developing leaders for a sustainable global society.  
Th rough dialogues and path-breaking research, we 
create opportunities for executives and educators to 
explore new pathways to sustainability and values-
based leadership.”  http://www.aspeninstitute.org/ 
Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship: 
“For more than 20 years Th e Center for Corporate 
Citizenship has provided research, executive educa-
tion and convenings on corporate citizenship topics. 
Because of our aﬃ  liation with Boston College’s Carroll 
School of Management, we function as an educational 
institution, a think tank and an information resource 
— all in one place. And all focused on fundamentally 
and measurably improving your company’s ability to 
build and leverage its citizenship eﬀ orts for the beneﬁ t 
of society.” http://www.bcccc.net/
Business for Social Responsibility: “Business for 
Social Responsibility (BSR) provides socially respon-
sible business solutions to many of the world’s leading 
corporations. Headquartered in San Francisco and 
with oﬃ  ces in Europe and China, BSR is a nonproﬁ t 
business association that serves its 250 member com-
panies and other Global 1000 enterprises. Th rough 
advisory services, convenings and research, BSR works 
with corporations and concerned stakeholders of 
all types to create a more just and sustainable global 
economy.”  http://www.bsr.org/
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights: 
“Th e Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights 
(BLIHR) is a programme to help lead and develop the 
corporate response to human rights. It is a business-led 
programme with 13 corporate members.” 
“Our principal purpose is to ﬁ nd “practical ways of 
applying the aspirations of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights within a business context and to inspire 
other businesses to do likewise”. In our second three-
Appendix
Environmental, Social, and Governance Organizations
* Inclusion of an organization in this appendix does not constitute CED endorsement.  Descriptions of these organizations are taken from their public 
websites.  
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year period until 2009 we are committed to sharing our 
tools and experiences not only within the group but 
with all interested companies.”  http://www.blihr.org/ 
Carbon Disclosure Project: “Th e Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) is an independent not-for-proﬁ t orga-
nization aiming to create a lasting relationship between 
shareholders and corporations regarding the implica-
tions for shareholder value and commercial operations 
presented by climate change.”  http://www.cdproject.
net/index.asp 
Caux Round Table: “Th e Caux Round Table (CRT) 
is an international network of principled business 
leaders working to promote a moral capitalism.  Th e 
CRT advocates implementation of the CRT Principles 
for Business through which principled capitalism 
can ﬂ ourish and sustainable and socially responsible 
prosperity can become the foundation for a fair, free 
and transparent global society.”  http://www.caux-
roundtable.org/
Ceres:  “Ceres companies come in a range of sizes - 
multinationals to small operations - and a range of 
sectors from ﬁ nancial services to manufacturers, to 
electric power to retailers and technology companies. 
Ceres companies are able to achieve competitive 
advantages by integrating environmental and social 
performance into their business strategies. Th ey 
understand that environmental and social issues pose 
potential risks for their businesses and are committed 
to addressing them. Ceres companies are committed 
to enhancing value through: In-depth engagement 
with stakeholders and shareholders, disclosure of 
environmental and social commitments and results, 
and continuous performance improvement.”  http://
www.ceres.org/
Electronic Industry Code of Conduct: “Th e 
Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (EICC) is a code 
of best practices adopted and implemented by some of 
the world’s major electronics brands and their suppli-
ers. Th e goal is to improve conditions in the electronics 
supply chain. Development of the Code was a multi-
stakeholder eﬀ ort, inﬂ uenced by internationally-
recognized standards.”  http://www.eicc.info/
Equator Principles: “Project ﬁ nancing, a method of 
funding in which the lender looks primarily to the rev-
enues generated by a single project both as the source 
of repayment and as security for the exposure, plays an 
important role in ﬁ nancing development throughout 
the world.  Project ﬁ nanciers may encounter social 
and environmental issues that are both complex and 
challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the 
emerging markets.
Th e Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) 
have consequently adopted these Principles in order 
to ensure that the projects we ﬁ nance are developed in 
a manner that is socially responsible and reﬂ ect sound 
environmental management practices. By doing so, 
negative impacts on project-aﬀ ected ecosystems and 
communities should be avoided where possible, and if 
these impacts are unavoidable, they should be reduced, 
mitigated and/or compensated for appropriately. 
We believe that adoption of and adherence to these 
Principles oﬀ ers signiﬁ cant beneﬁ ts to ourselves, our 
borrowers and local stakeholders through our borrow-
ers’ engagement with locally aﬀ ected communities. We 
therefore recognise that our role as ﬁ nanciers aﬀ ords us 
opportunities to promote responsible environmental 
stewardship and socially responsible development. As 
such, EPFIs will consider reviewing these Principles 
from time-to-time based on implementation experi-
ence, and in order to reﬂ ect ongoing learning and 
emerging good practice.
Th ese Principles are intended to serve as a common 
baseline and framework for the implementation by 
each EPFI of its own internal social and environmental 
policies, procedures and standards related to its project 
ﬁ nancing activities. We will not provide loans to proj-
ects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply 
with our respective social and environmental policies 
and procedures that implement the Equator Principles.” 
http://www.equator-principles.com/ 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: “Th e 
EITI is a coalition of governments, companies, civil 
society groups, investors and international organiza-
tions. It supports improved governance in resource-rich 
countries through the veriﬁ cation and full publication 
of company payments and government revenues from 
oil, gas and mining.”  http://eitransparency.org/
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Fair Labor Association: “Th e mission of the Fair 
Labor Association (FLA) is to combine the eﬀ orts of 
industry, civil society organizations, and colleges and 
universities to protect workers’ rights and improve 
working conditions worldwide by promoting adherence 
to international labor standards. Th e FLA conducts 
independent monitoring and veriﬁ cation to ensure 
that the FLA’s Workplace Standards are upheld where 
FLA company products are produced. Th rough public 
reporting, the FLA provides consumers and sharehold-
ers with credible information to make responsible 
buying decisions.”  http://www.fairlabor.org/  
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria: “GBC is a Coalition of 
more than 220 companies united to keep the ﬁ ght 
against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria a global 
priority.  Th e Coalition’s members share learnings from 
the front lines of the ﬁ ght, and GBC provides tailored 
support so that companies can take an active role in 
defeating the pandemics.   GBC also organizes collec-
tive actions among companies, and links the public and 
private sectors in ways that pool talents and resources.”
“GBC will establish clear, actionable principles and 
standards for baseline corporate engagement on AIDS, 
TB and malaria.  As a ﬁ rst step, we will convene a 
cross-sector working group to produce such a frame-
work.  Th ere is increasing clarity about what the private 
sector can and should do to maximize overall impact 
on these diseases.  By deﬁ ning a common agenda for 
business globally, and providing guidance and support 
wherever possible for its implementation, we will 
reinforce all programs — local, national, and interna-
tional; government, NGO, and private sector.  Th ese 
principles and standards will also provide a starting 
point for higher-level individual and collective action.”  
Global Reporting Initiative: “A multi-stakeholder 
governed institution collaborating to provide the global 
standards in sustainability reporting.” It provides guide-
lines for organizations to use as the basis for disclosure 
about their sustainability performance, and also pro-
vides stakeholders a universally-applicable, comparable 
framework in which to understand disclosed informa-
tion.  http://www.globalreporting.org/Home
Human Rights Watch Business and Society: 
“Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the 
human rights of people around the world. We stand 
with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, 
to uphold political freedom, to protect people from 
inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring oﬀ enders 
to justice. We investigate and expose human rights 
violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge 
governments and those who hold power to end abusive 
practices and respect international human rights law. 
We enlist the public and the international community 
to support the cause of human rights for all.”  http://
www.hrw.org/doc/?t=corporations
International Labour Organization: “Th e 
International Labour Organization (ILO) is devoted to 
advancing opportunities for women and men to obtain 
decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, 
equity, security and human dignity. Its main aims are 
to promote rights at work, encourage decent employ-
ment opportunities, enhance social protection and 
strengthen dialogue in handling work-related issues.” 
“Th e ILO is the global body responsible for drawing 
up and overseeing international labour standards. 
Working with its Member States, the ILO seeks to 
ensure that labour standards are respected in practice 
as well as principle.”  http://www.ilo.org
Kimberly Process: Th e Kimberly Process is a joint 
governments, industry, and civil society initiative to 
stem the ﬂ ow of conﬂ ict diamonds—rough diamonds 
used by rebel movements to ﬁ nance wars against 
legitimate governments. Th e trade in these illicit stones 
has fuelled decades of devastating conﬂ icts in countries 
such as Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Sierra Leone.  Th e Kimberly Process 
Certiﬁ cation Scheme imposes extensive requirements 
on its members to enable them to certify shipments of 
rough diamonds as ‘conﬂ ict-free.’  http://www.kimber-
leyprocess.com/
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
“Th e guidelines (www.oecd.org/daf/investment/
guidelines) are recommendations addressed by govern-
ments to multinational enterprises operating in or from 
adhering countries. Th ey provide voluntary principles 
and standards for responsible business conduct in a 
variety of areas including employment and industrial 
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relations, human rights, environment, information 
disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, 
science and technology, competition, and taxation.”  
http://www.oecd.org/
OECD International Trade and Core Labour 
Standards:  “What are the major developments 
with respect to trade and labour standards since the 
OECD’s 1996 study on Trade, Employment and 
Labour Standards? What is being done to promote 
these standards? What evidence is there of progress? 
What are the possible links between core labour 
standards, trade, foreign direct investment, economic 
development and employment? International Trade 
and Core Labour Standards addresses these and related 
questions. It also provides a current overview of key 
issues with respect to core labour standards and their 
relation to trade and employment, aiming to provide a 
common basis for constructive policy dialogue among 
the concerned parties in the future.”  http://www.oecd.
org/l
Petroleum Industry Guidelines for Reporting: “Th e 
International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA), American 
Petroleum Institute (API), and International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) 
jointly initiated the development of these Guidelines 
to promote credible, consistent, and reliable GHG 
accounting and reporting practices from oil and gas 
operations.”  http://www.ipieca.org/activities/climate_
change/downloads/publications/ghg_guidelines.pdf
RugMark Foundation: RugMark is the international 
nonproﬁ t organization that “recruits carpet producers 
and importers to make and sell carpets that are made 
without illegal child labor. By agreeing to adhere to 
strict no-child-labor guidelines and by permitting 
random inspections of their carpet looms, manufactur-
ers earn the right to place the certiﬁ ed and individually 
numbered RugMark label on their carpets. If inspec-
tors ﬁ nd children working on looms, they are oﬀ ered 
the opportunity to go to school instead, and producers 
and importers lose the privilege to use the RugMark 
label.  http://www.rugmark.org/home.php
SustainAbility:  “SustainAbility advises clients on 
the risks and opportunities associated with corporate 
responsibility and sustainable development. Working at 
the interface between market forces and societal expec-
tations, we seek solutions to social and environmental 
challenges that deliver long term value. We understand 
business and what society expects of it.”  http://www.
sustainability.com/
Th e Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative: “Th e 
Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) is the most 
widely used international accounting tool for govern-
ment and business leaders to understand, quantify, 
and manage greenhouse gas emissions. Th e GHG 
Protocol, a decade-long partnership between the World 
Resources Institute and the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, is working with busi-
nesses, governments, and environmental groups around 
the world to build a new generation of credible and 
eﬀ ective programs for tackling climate change.”  http://
www.ghgprotocol.org/
Th e United States Climate Action Partnership: 
“USCAP is an expanding alliance of major businesses 
and leading climate and environmental groups that 
have come together to call on the federal government 
to enact legislation requiring signiﬁ cant reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions.”  http://www.us-cap.org/
index.asp
Transparency International: Transparency 
International is a global network including more 
than 90 locally established national chapters and 
chapters-in-formation. Th ese bodies ﬁ ght corruption 
in the national arena in a number of ways. Th ey bring 
together relevant players from government, civil society, 
business and the media to promote transparency in 
elections, in public administration, in procurement 
and in business. TI’s global network of chapters and 
contacts also use advocacy campaigns to lobby govern-
ments to implement anti-corruption reforms.”  http://
www.transparency.org/
United Nations Global Compact: “Th e Global 
Compact is a framework for businesses that are 
committed to aligning their operations and strategies 
with ten universally accepted principles in the areas 
of human rights, labour, the environment, and anti-
corruption. As the world’s largest, global corporate 
citizenship initiative, the Global Compact is ﬁ rst and 
foremost concerned with exhibiting and building the 
social legitimacy of business and markets.”  http://
www.unglobalcompact.org/
61
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights: Th e Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights are intended to “to guide companies 
in balancing the needs for safety while respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” http://www.
voluntaryprinciples.org/
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development: “Th e World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) is a CEO-led, 
global association of some 200 companies dealing 
exclusively with business and sustainable development. 
Th e Council provides a platform for companies to 
explore sustainable development, share knowledge, 
experiences and best practices, and to advocate busi-
ness positions on these issues in a variety of forums, 
working with governments, non-governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations.”  http://www.wbcsd.
org/
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CE  Circulo de Empresarios
  Madrid, Spain
CEAL  Consejo Empresario de America Latina
  Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA  Committee for Economic Development of Australia
  Sydney, Australia
CIRD  China Institute for Reform and Development
  Hainan, People’s Republic of China
EVA  Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
  Helsinki, Finland
FAE  Forum de Administradores de Empresas
  Lisbon, Portugal
IDEP  Institut de l’Entreprise
  Paris, France
IW  Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Koeln
  Cologne, Germany
 Keizai Doyukai
  Tokyo, Japan
SMO  Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming
  Th e Netherlands
CED Counterpart Organizations
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. Th is 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariﬀ  barriers to trade.
